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Abstract: In 1965, at the height of the Great Society, when there was also a consensus 
about the importance of the humanities to edify American life, Congress established a 
federal agency to support them: the National Endowment for Humanities (NEH). Shortly 
thereafter arose a sea change in scholarship and education in the humanities, which by the 
1980s became an issue in the broader U.S. culture wars. Many scholars and intellectuals 
became sharply divided over such questions as the authors and books to prioritize and 
include in liberal arts curricula, modes of interpretation of texts, and perspectives on the 
goodness (or lack thereof) to be found in Western civilization and American history. This 
policy history examines how, in this changing context, the NEH has managed to endure 
and how it has interpreted and carried out its mandate to support the humanities. It is 
divided into two parts.  
 Part I tells the story of how the NEH has maintained itself; how it has survived 
attempts at termination, achieved budget increases and sustained losses, and how it has 
set its budgetary priorities. This analysis of organizational maintenance traces the 
evolution of the national debate over federal funding for culture, looking at how the 
major political parties have changed position on this issue over time. It examines how the 
NEH built a clientele, the state humanities councils, to bolster its support in Congress. 
And it looks at how changes in party positioning and related developments in the culture 
 ii  
war effectively empowered that clientele—with the effect of helping save the agency 
when threatened with abolishment, but also giving that clientele greater influence over 
the NEH’s policies and budgetary priorities.  
 Part II explains how the NEH’s internal bureaucratic structure has operated during 
the culture wars. When the agency was founded, Congress established a structure with 
the goal of empowering the NEH to make decisions on the basis of nonpolitical expertise 
in the humanities, assuming that the agency would need to be able to resist pressures to 
award grants to favored constituencies at the expense of merit. Part II analyzes how that 
structure has operated in a different and wholly unanticipated context, one in which many 
of those who could claim the mantle of expertise have become polarized on issues such 
as multiculturalism and the importance of “great books.” It compares the bureaucratic 
structure at the NEH with the structures and practices that have evolved at other federal 
grant-making agencies: the National Endowment for the Arts and National Science 
Foundation. The analysis shows how the structure at NEH has enabled Democratic and 
Republican appointed chairmen to push the substance of grant-making in progressive and 
traditional directions, respectively, despite continuity of formal rules, procedures, and 
professional staff. 
 This dissertation concludes with an assessment of what can be expected from the 
NEH in regard to its durability, budgetary priorities, and grant-making under Republican 
and Democratic administrations.       
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INTRODUCTION 
“Legislators of democracies and all honest and enlightened men who live in them must 
therefore apply themselves relentlessly to raising up souls and keeping them turned 
toward Heaven. It is necessary for all those who are interested in the future of democratic 
societies to unite, and for all in concert to make continuous efforts to spread within these 
societies a taste for the infinite, a sentiment of greatness, and a love of immaterial 
pleasures.”1 
 
September of 1965 was the moment in American history when national legislators 
took up Tocqueville’s charge most directly and enthusiastically. It was then, at the height 
of the Great Society, that Congress passed and President Lyndon Johnson signed 
legislation to establish the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities, 
composed of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and National Endowment for 
the Humanities (NEH). In the founding statute’s statement of purpose, Congress boldly 
declared, among other aspirations: 
(2) that a high civilization must not limit its efforts to science and 
technology alone but must give full value and support to the other great branches 
of man’s scholarly and cultural activity; 
 
(3) that democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens and that it 
must therefore foster and support a form of education designed to make men 
masters of their technology and not its unthinking servant; 
 
Congress further stated, “the world leadership which has come to the United States 
cannot rest solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly 
                                                        
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000): 519. 
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founded upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation’s high qualities as a 
leader in the realm of ideas and of the spirit.”2  
In setting up the NEA and NEH, Congress sought to provide at least a partial 
solution to a concern held by many critics of democracy: how to maintain higher forms of 
culture in a society that is inclined toward materialism and other excesses. Unlike the 
federal art projects of the New Deal, for example, the NEA and NEH were not justified 
primarily in terms of creating jobs for unemployed artists and writers. Nor was Congress 
responding primarily to concerns about the need to improve civic literacy or the use of 
culture in American foreign policy, though such concerns were in the air. Rather, it was 
thought that the federal government should support culture so as to lift people’s sights 
above mere economic concerns, make for a better quality of life, and simply embrace a 
function that was a hallmark of a civilized nation. 
As of the writing of this dissertation, the NEA and NEH still exist—and with 
more than 50 years of hindsight, they present something of a puzzle. How was it that the 
federal government came to establish bureaucracies with such a sublime mission, how 
have they since endured, and how have they interpreted and carried out their mission in 
practice? These questions become all the more interesting in view of two factors. The 
first pertains to another of Tocqueville’s insights, which is that efforts to edify democracy 
can run the risk of being undermined by democracy itself. The second is the rise of the 
culture wars.3  
                                                        
2 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-209, 79 Stat. 845 
(1965): 845-55. 
3 James W. Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990): 31. 
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In regard to the humanities, specifically, it is easy to imagine that a federal agency 
dedicated to fields such as philosophy, literature, archaeology, art history, and so on 
would struggle to acquire the political support it would need to thrive. The American 
mind, after all, is often oriented toward practical affairs. Given the pressing needs that 
Congress is now called upon to address, from unemployment to healthcare to 
infrastructure, not to mention foreign affairs, it is difficult to conceive of how the 
humanities could rise to the level of an urgent priority relative to other needs.  
Then there is the question of what conception of the humanities—a vague and 
often confusing term—this agency would seek to advance. This question becomes 
especially charged in light of stark divisions that have arisen among scholars and 
educators over the nature and purpose of the humanities, conflicts that have become part 
of a broader U.S. culture war. Particularly since the 1980s, intellectuals have sparred over 
numerous issues concerning the substance of humanistic education and research. In 
literature courses, for example, which books and authors are worthy of inclusion in the 
curriculum? Are some inherently more important or deserving of study than others? Does 
the history of Western civilization represent the rise of human freedom, equality, and 
excellence? Or has it largely been a story of oppression and marginalization of certain 
groups? Debates over the status of the “Western canon” and multiculturalism have 
divided scholars, as well as spilled over into the public square, especially in the context 
of debates over K-12 history standards, museum exhibitions, and efforts by universities to 
encourage certain forms of diversity. 
The purpose of this policy history is to understand how the NEH has coped, or 
failed to cope, with these challenges, and what its manner of coping has meant for what it 
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has ended up funding. The primary concern, therefore, is with the substance of what the 
agency does, and why it does it.  
“Policy history,” as Paul Pierson has explained, is “an unfolding story of policy 
development.” To understand policy development means to “pay attention to processes 
that play out over considerable periods of time.” It is by focusing on the processes at 
work, the relationships between various institutions, actors, and other political 
developments, that we can understand outcomes that are of interest. Policy history, says 
Pierson, can “refine our expectations about the possibilities and constraints of 
contemporary politics.”4 In this sense, I hope to shed light on what we can expect from 
the federal agency charged with supporting the humanities at a time when, as many have 
argued, the humanities are in crisis. 5 
I divide this policy history into two sections. Part I is on what James Q. Wilson 
referred to as “organizational maintenance”—the need for a bureaucracy to acquire 
autonomy and resources. This section examines how the agency came to be founded, how 
it has obtained budgetary increases and sustained losses, survived the threat of 
termination, and how its budgetary priorities have come to be determined. It primarily 
concerns the relationship of the NEH and its chairmen with Congress, the presidency, 
interest groups, and the general public. Part II is focused on how the agency operates 
internally and how it has come to make grant decisions in the context of the culture war. 
This section looks at the design of the agency’s bureaucratic structure, the assumptions 
                                                        
4 Paul Pierson, “The Study of Policy Development,” Journal of Policy History 17, no. 1 (2005): 34, 48. 
5 See, for example, Stanley Fish, “The Crisis of the Humanities Officially Arrives,” New York Times, 
October 11, 2010, https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/the-crisis-of-the-humanities-
officially-arrives/?_r=0 and Verlyn Klinkenborg, “The Decline and Fall of the English Major,” June 22, 
2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/sunday/the-decline-and-fall-of-the-
english-major.html.   
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that informed the original design, and how the structure has functioned in the culture-war 
context—one that was wholly unanticipated by the agency’s founders. In both sections, I 
tell the story of how the NEH has been forced to cope with the challenges of democracy 
and the culture war.  
In the remainder of this introduction, I elaborate on the nature of the challenges 
posed by democracy and the culture war—with the NEH has had to cope in both its 
organizational maintenance and in its process of awarding grants.  
THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 
By the challenge of democracy, I refer to how certain democratic values and 
dispositions are inimical to the very purpose of the NEH—which was, from the outset, a 
self-consciously elitist initiative. When Congress founded the agency, it did so with the 
express purpose of countering what it saw as deficiencies within democracy itself. There 
was a sense that, but for a federal foundation dedicated to supporting the humanities, 
America would not do enough in areas such as literature, history, and classics. Science 
and technology would receive a disproportionate amount of resources, attention, and 
esteem, while citizens would take their ethical and spiritual bearings from trivial, lowest-
common-denominator forms of entertainment. Scholars in the humanities were viewed as 
uniquely capable of ameliorating the dehumanizing effects of democratic culture. 
Therefore, in setting up the foundation, professional humanists were to be the ones who 
largely determined how federal funds would be spent, with applications subject to 
scholarly peer review. Democratically elected politicians could not be trusted to steward 
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the resources of such a foundation in a way that would fulfill its mission of uplifting the 
nation. Yet, per Tocqueville referenced above, the very deficiencies of democracy that 
make such countervailing measures necessary also threaten to undermine them.   
Perhaps the greatest democratic disposition that we would expect to pose a 
challenge is people’s limited understanding of and appreciation for the study of “the 
humanities,” which, at the time of the founding of the NEH, was generally associated 
with liberal education. Liberal education, traditionally understood, is ordered toward the 
pursuit of truth about the highest things, such as the good life, the just political order, and 
beauty itself. That pursuit, which may never cease, is an end in itself. It is a form of 
education that can give people the freedom to see through and beyond the prejudices and 
assumptions that are part of modern society. As per the founding statute, it is a form of 
education that can make people masters of their technology and not its unthinking 
servant. Yet many Americans do not intuitively view such an education as a valuable or 
worthwhile endeavor.6  
Tocqueville observed that Americans were exceptional in the degree to which 
they were preoccupied with improving their material wellbeing. He attributed this partly 
to America’s democratic social state, a condition in which the demands of work and the 
pursuit of wealth leave people with little leisure and discourage spending time on purely 
theoretical inquiry.7 However, there were several unique factors that exaggerated this 
disinclination towards cultural and theoretical pursuits. One of these factors, he argued, 
was the legacy of Puritanism in the settling of New England, a religion which “is 
                                                        
6 For a discussion of the tensions between liberal democracy and liberal education, see, Daniel E. Cullen, 
“Liberal Education and Liberal Democracy,” in Liberal Democracy and Liberal Education, ed. Daniel E. 
Cullen (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017): 3-13. 
7 Tocqueville, 414, 434. 
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naturally little favorable to the fine arts and permits literary pleasures only with regret.” 
Another factor was that the Americans found themselves in an undeveloped continent, 
which offered innumerable opportunities to become wealthy, which helped fuel people’s 
dedication to commerce. Moreover, because of the United States’ ties to England, which 
retained an aristocratic heritage, Americans were able to import the fruits of scientific, 
artistic, and literary genius without having to develop them on their own.8  
In the early 1960s, Richard Hofstadter offered an account of the American mind 
that drew upon Tocqueville’s observations. Winner of the Pulitzer Prize in Non-Fiction in 
1964, Hofstadter’s Anti-Intellectualism in American Life offers further insights into the 
challenge that we would expect democracy to pose to the NEH. Hofstadter defined anti-
intellectualism as a “resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who 
are considered to represent it.”9 Like Tocqueville, Hofstadter attributed it largely to the 
nation’s religious heritage and fierce commercial spirit. Of religion, Hofstadter argued 
that the nature of American evangelical Christianity led people to be distrustful of 
intellectual elites. Not only did American evangelicalism emphasize intuition and the 
heart in spiritual matters, but it had also been opposed to older, more established forms of 
Protestantism that had professional clergy. Commerce, in Hofstadter’s account, set the 
tone of society from early on and encouraged a dismissive attitude toward culture, 
especially among men. Beyond religion and commerce, America’s general commitment 
to the notion of equality fostered an anti-intellectual attitude in the nation’s politics and 
                                                        
8 Tocqueville, 429-30. 
9 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963): 7. 
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approach to education. Whereas intellect represents a claim to distinction, America gave 
pride of place to the “common man.”10 
Given the ways in which the American mind, oriented primarily toward practical 
affairs, can be ill-disposed toward the concept of liberal learning, it should not come as a 
surprise that many would resist the idea that the government should subsidize it, 
especially relative to more immediate and wide-felt needs. In the years following the 
2008 financial crisis, various governors sounded this reluctance as they criticized the idea 
of public support for humanistic studies at state universities. For example:  
 In 2011, Governor Rick Scott of Florida called for shifting funding at public 
universities to programs in STEM (science, technology, engineering, math). In a 
talk-radio interview, Scott said: 
You know, we don’t need a lot more anthropologists in the state. 
It’s a great degree if people want to get it, but we don’t need them here. I 
want to spend our dollars giving people science, technology, engineering, 
math degrees. That’s what our kids need to focus all their time and 
attention on. Those type of degrees. So when they get out of school, they 
can get a job.11  
 
 In 2013, Governor Patrick McCrory of North Carolina advocated for legislation 
that would base subsidies for public colleges and universities on post-graduate 
employment rather than enrollment. McCrory, appearing on the same radio 
program as Governor Scott in 2011, said:  
If you want to take gender studies that’s fine, go to a private school 
and take it. But I don’t want to subsidize that if that’s not going to get 
someone a job.12  
                                                        
10 Hofstadter, 47-51. 
11 Adam Weinstein, “Rick Scott to Liberal Arts Majors: Drop Dead,” Mother Jones, October 11, 2011, 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/10/rick-scott-liberal-arts-majors-drop-dead-anthropology.   
12 Kevin Kiley, “Another Liberal Arts Critic,” Inside Higher Ed, January 30, 2013, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/30/north-carolina-governor-joins-chorus-republicans-
critical-liberal-arts. 
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 Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s original 2015 budget proposal amended the 
University of Wisconsin system’s mission statement, inserting language about 
“[meeting] the state’s workforce needs” while removing, among other sentences, 
“Basic to every purpose of the system is the search for truth.” (Following a 
backlash, the proposed changes were retracted and called “a drafting error.”)13  
 In 2016, Governor Matt Bevin of Kentucky proposed basing subsidies to state 
colleges and universities on the graduation rates of certain degree programs, 
favoring STEM over the humanities. Said Bevin: 
There will be more incentives to electrical engineers than French 
literature majors. There just will. All the people in the world that want to 
study French literature can do so, they are just not going to be subsidized 
by the taxpayer.14  
 
The governors’ statements reflect a longstanding American skepticism about the worth of 
liberal studies, as well as the view that it is not the government’s responsibility to support 
them.  
Even assuming that there is to be such an agency, the democratic spirit also 
challenges the idea that professional humanists ought to be the ones directing the 
distribution of funds. When the NEH was founded, it was assumed that grants would 
have to be determined mainly by scholars in the humanities, for they were the ones that 
had the knowledge and expertise to know what kinds of research and education truly 
                                                        
13 Philip Bump, “Scott Walker moved to drop ‘search for truth’ from the University of Wisconsin mission. 
His office claimed it was an error.” Washington Post, February 4, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/02/04/scott-walker-wants-to-drop-search-for-truth-
from-the-university-of-wisconsin-mission-heres-why/. 
14 Adam Beam, “Kentucky Gov. Matt Bevin wants state colleges and universities to produce more 
electrical engineers and less French literature scholars,” US News and World Report, January 29, 2016, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-01-29/in-kentucky-a-push-for-engineers-over-french-lit-
scholars.   
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could edify and uplift the nation. Yet, per Hofstadter, scholars’ claim to distinction is 
something that the democratic spirit resists.  
The spirit of elitism in which NEH was formed—to have an agency dedicated to 
immaterial concerns and to vest much decision-making in select scholars—has been 
opposed by what we may call a spirit of populism. The populist spirit, which draws upon 
certain democratic instincts, has long influenced American politics and public discourse. 
Populist rhetoric, in general, casts the primary political conflict as one between ordinary, 
virtuous citizens and an oppressive elite. The primary charge against elites, whether they 
are business moguls, government bureaucrats, academics, or members of media is that 
they have “ignored, corrupted, and/or betrayed the core ideal of American democracy: 
rule by the common people who expected their fellow citizens to advance by diligence, 
practical intelligence, and a faith in God alone.”15 In debates over the NEH, attacks on the 
existence of the agency itself and its use of scholars to evaluate applications and decide 
on grants awards have been challenged in ways that bear the hallmarks of populism. As 
described below, the rise of the culture wars helped feed into this democratic or populist 
challenge.   
THE CULTURE-WAR CHALLENGE  
The founders of the NEH in Congress anticipated the challenges from democracy. 
The bureaucratic structure was designed so as to empower the chairman of the agency to 
                                                        
15 Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: BasicBooks, 1995): 2. 
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follow the recommendations of scholars in the humanities in making grants—and to resist 
the pressures of elected officials who may want to direct grants to favored constituencies, 
irrespective of the merit of the proposed projects. To foster greater grassroots support for 
the agency among the general public—a public that may not have an intuitive 
appreciation for the value of the humanities—Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) insisted on 
the establishment of state humanities councils, NEH affiliates in every state and territory.  
Yet by the 1980s, another major challenge to the NEH arose, one that was 
unforeseen by the agency’s founders: the culture wars. When the agency was founded, it 
was understood that the humanities at times necessarily dealt with controversial topics. 
But in 1965, Congress did not foresee the sea change that was on the verge of occurring 
within the humanities, in which more traditional notions of liberal learning were 
jettisoned, while scholars embraced a much greater focus on previously understudied 
(some would call them marginalized) groups. Nor did legislators anticipate a situation in 
which scholars, educators, and intellectuals, the supposedly nonpolitical experts, would 
become bitterly divided over issues from curriculum content to the interpretation of 
American and Western history—and that these disagreements would spill over into 
public discourse and debate.  
Sociologist James Davison Hunter introduced the notion of “culture wars” in an 
eponymously titled book in 1991 as a way of making sense of the rise of social and 
political conflicts in which cleavages did not fall along the lines of class or religious 
denomination as they previously often had. In controversies over such issues as the 
family, abortion, school curricula, the arts, and the humanities, opponents fell into camps 
that Hunter characterized as “orthodox” and “progressive,” with both sides encompassing 
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religious adherents in addition to the religiously unaffiliated.16 Patrick Buchanan, who 
ran unsuccessfully for the Republican nomination for president in 1992, invoked the 
culture-war concept in his speech at that year’s GOP convention, saying:  
There is a religious war going on in this country. It is a cultural war, as 
critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself, for this war is 
for the soul of America.17 
 
At the heart of the culture war, according to Hunter, is a conflicting understanding 
of the nature of moral authority, “the basis by which people determine whether something 
is good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable, and so on.” Nothing less than 
the power to define reality, and in turn, define what constitutes a normative way of life, is 
at stake. Those on the “orthodox” side, even if they affiliate with different religions, share 
the belief that moral standards derive from an authority that is objective, transcendent, 
and eternal, and does not change with the times. On the “progressive” side, “truth tends to 
be viewed as a process, as a reality that is ever unfolding.” Religiously affiliated 
progressives tend to believe that their church’s moral teachings, even those long 
established, can change and be conformed to modern ideas of justice and equity. While 
religiously unaffiliated people tend to fall more on the progressive side, some can be 
found in the orthodox camp as well. This latter group includes “secular conservative and 
neo-conservative intellectuals” whose “commitment to natural law or to a high view of 
nature serves as the functional equivalent of the external and transcendent moral authority 
revered by their religiously orthodox counterparts.”18  
                                                        
16 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 
17 Patrick J. Buchanan, “Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican National Convention,” August 17, 
1992, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/.  
18 Hunter, Culture Wars, 42-46. 
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 Culture-war battles take place in the arena of “public culture,” with the terms of 
debate set by elites. Public culture encompasses laws, the division of responsibility 
between government and other actors, notions of what constitutes civic virtue and 
patriotism, and the “collective myths surrounding [a nation’s] history and future 
promise.” Elites “are the ones who create the concepts, supply the language, and 
explicate the logic of public discussion.” The elites with the greatest influence in shaping 
the discourse over public culture are those whom Hunter calls “knowledge workers,” 
such as think tank fellows, lobbyists, public interest lawyers, journalists, and activists. 
While academics contribute to shaping public culture, rarely does their scholarship reach 
the general public directly; it is mediated through knowledge workers.19  
 A number of scholars have since challenged the culture wars thesis, contending 
that the vast majority of Americans are not polarized into opposing camps and that 
ideologically-driven agitators are not very consequential for American politics.20 Hunter, 
in response, has said that while many of his critics view culture as the sum of values and 
opinions held by individuals, as recorded in surveys, he interprets “culture” as the 
symbols and ideas that frame public debate. Those symbols, as he argued in Culture 
Wars, are the products of elites, who take on influential roles when concrete conflicts 
arise. Even if the majority of people tend toward the middle, elites frame debates in 
polarizing ways and put forward stark choices in terms of policy options.21  
                                                        
19 Hunter, Culture Wars, 52-60. 
20 See, for example, Alan Wolfe, One Nation After All: What Middle-Class Americans Really Think About: 
God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left, and Each 
Other (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998), and Morris Fiorina with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope, 
Culture War?: The Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011).  
21 James Davison Hunter, “The Enduring Culture War,” in Is There a Culture War?: A Dialogue on Values 
and American Public Life, ed. James Davison Hunter (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2006): 10-40.   
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 Education is one of the public arenas in which culture wars take place. From 
kindergarten through college, schools do not simply provide students with technical skills 
that can help them succeed economically. Schools inculcate students with notions of civic 
and moral virtue. Colleges and universities, which help form the next generation of 
leaders, have loomed large in the culture wars. As with other public arenas, culture wars 
concerning higher education pit orthodox and progressive elites against one another.22  
 The culture-war controversies in higher education pertain to “the ongoing struggle 
to define in practical terms the mission of the modern university itself.” Disputants on 
both sides pledge fealty to principles such as “academic freedom” and “open-minded 
inquiry,” but disagree fiercely on what they mean in practice, namely because the pursuit 
of knowledge has to take place within certain boundaries. Academia has always had to 
establish criteria with respect to education and research.23 Controversies arise in setting 
such criteria in areas such as curriculum content, the rules governing free speech on-
campus, decisions on what to publish, the regulation of student groups, admissions 
policies, and the hiring of faculty. 
 Many of the culture wars within higher education—and within the humanities, in 
particular—have centered on the concept of “multiculturalism.” To simplify, 
multiculturalism refers to the idea that no culture or society should be viewed as superior 
to others, and that cultures that have previously been oppressed or marginalized deserve 
greater recognition and to have their perspectives heard. In practice, this means, for 
example, that in developing humanities curricula, so-called classic or canonical works do 
not necessarily deserve pride of place. Given that those texts were written mostly by 
                                                        
22 Hunter, Culture Wars, 211-12. 
23 Hunter, Culture Wars, 213. 
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white European males, most of whom have long been dead, they present a biased view of 
reality. To make up for this bias, the curriculum should also include other perspectives, 
especially those of previously ignored, oppressed, and marginalized groups such as 
women, gays and lesbians, racial minorities, the disabled, and people of third-world 
countries. Since the 1970s, various fields have arisen to provide these perspectives, such 
as women’s studies, black studies, and queer studies. Affirmative action in admissions 
and faculty hiring, along with speech codes intended to prevent hostile expression 
directed towards the aforementioned groups, are other ways in which colleges and 
universities have sought to put the multiculturalist ethos into practice.24  
In an essay on the culture wars, Daniel Bell presents “three distinctive turns” 
which characterize those intellectuals whom Hunter would call “progressive:”  
 aesthetic—the spread of a relativism that denies the idea of standards and 
judgment in art; 
 
 sociological—the replacement of class by race and gender as the meaningful 
terms for social divisions in society and the cruxes of power; 
 
 philosophical—the denial of Western civilization as the source of our basic 
questions in epistemology, morals, and politics, and the rejection of required 
readings of classical works in the university curriculum. 
 
These “turns,” Bell argues, are related to several intellectual movements, including 
postmodernism and deconstructionism. These intellectual trends undermine ideas that had 
been central to the study of the humanities around the time of the founding of the NEH, 
including the notion that there is a definable “canon” of great works, the distinction 
                                                        
24 Hunter, Culture Wars, 215-218. 
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between high and low culture, and the notion that in interpreting texts, the goal is to 
arrive at an authoritative reading—namely, the author’s intended meaning.25  
 The intellectual elites representing the “orthodox” side in the higher-education 
culture wars have tended to come from outside of the academy, often holding fellowships 
at conservative think tanks or writing for conservative journals and magazines. In 
general, what unites the “orthodox” side is the impulse toward the notion of 
transcendental authority, which can take the form of divine authority, natural law, or an 
objective notion of human excellence.26 Intellectuals on the “orthodox” side disagree with 
each other as to what is ultimately true, as well as which truths are accessible to human 
reason. However, they are often in agreement on what the biggest, most important 
questions are and the texts and thinkers that should provide at least the initial guide to 
asking and thinking through them.  
 In debates between so-called progressive and orthodox intellectuals, 
“politicization” is a charge that both sides level against one another. Orthodox 
intellectuals have claimed that the multiculturalist aim of including new perspectives is 
less about broadening the search for truth and really about promoting a left-wing political 
agenda, one that is critical of capitalism, the United States, organized religion, and a 
traditional notion of the family. They say that for all the talk of “diversity,” advocates of 
multiculturalism “rarely if ever propose courses in Irish Catholic, Greek American, Asian 
American, Jewish, or Protestant Fundamentalist studies.” And while universities strive to 
recruit more racial minorities as students and faculty, they do not make similar efforts in 
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3 (1992): 97. 
26 Hunter, Culture Wars, 45-6. 
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regard to the religiously affiliated or those who lean conservative politically.27 But, 
according to the proponents of multiculturalism, past humanities curricula were 
themselves politicized. Western Civilization courses, they argue, promoted a culture that 
has historically been oppressive toward many subgroups, racial minorities and women in 
particular.  
As Hunter says in summation:  
representatives from each side of the cultural divide fervently believe that 
they properly uphold the principles of academic freedom—and that it is the other 
side that has politicized and thus tainted the atmosphere of academic inquiry. 
 
Given the perceived stakes of these controversies and that they pertain to ultimate 
questions about moral authority, “the culture war yields little or no middle ground.” As a 
result, culture war disputes have “an interminable character.”28 
We would expect that the rise of the culture wars would present challenges for the 
NEH—and indeed they have. For one thing, culture wars have exacerbated part of the 
challenge from democracy. The notion that scholars and educators in the humanities were 
attempting to impart un-American or leftist ideas helped fuel populist calls to terminate 
the agency. Moreover, grant-making, especially in regard to more interpretive projects, 
would necessarily invite controversy. Decisions on whether or not to fund orthodox 
versus progressive projects would entail the agency’s coming down on either side of the 
culture war—or at least that is how critics of agency would be inclined to appraise the 
situation, given the ways in which culture-war controversies end up being framed. Per 
Hunter, above, there is no middle ground. Further, the process that the NEH had 
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developed to evaluate and determine grant awards was not designed in anticipation of a 
stark divide in elite opinion about the purpose and substance of the humanities.  
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE  
 As noted above, this dissertation is divided into two parts. As policy history, each 
part seeks to understand key outcomes by looking at how various processes have played 
out over time. Part I (chapters 1 – 6) focuses on organizational maintenance, which 
encompasses the NEH’s survival, the size of its budget, and determination of budgetary 
priorities. The main processes that this part examines include how the political parties 
have changed position in regard to federal funding for culture, how the interest-group 
context has changed, and the reputations garnered by various agency chairmen. Part II 
(chapters 7 – 9) seeks to explain how the NEH has made grants in the context of the 
culture war. By relying upon various models of gradual institutional change, namely 
“conversion” and “drift” (explained more fully in the introduction to Part II), I seek to 
explain how the bureaucratic structure has operated in a context that was unforeseen by 
the agency’s founders.  
 Another way of articulating the purpose of this policy history is to understand 
what the NEH funds and why it funds it. The agency was founded with a serious purpose, 
a mission akin to what Tocqueville said should be of concern to all “honest and 
enlightened” legislators and citizens. This policy history seeks to understand what we can 
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expect of the NEH, given the possibilities and limitations inherent to the U.S. political 
system and political culture.29 
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PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE 
At the 2015 annual meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA), there 
was a panel session, “The National Endowment for the Humanities at Fifty.” After 
panelists spent the first part discussing what the NEH had accomplished and the 
difference the agency had made in the humanities, the moderator asked their opinions on 
areas in which the agency—or the idea of the agency—had failed. James Grossman, the 
AHA’s executive director and a former vice president for research and education at 
Chicago’s Newberry Library, opined that the NEH “has not succeeded in establishing a 
national constituency for the humanities.” Grossman was quick to add that one might not 
have reasonably expected NEH to accomplish this; only that one might have hoped that it 
could have.1  
 Grossman’s lament implies something important about the beginnings of the 
agency: it was founded in the absence of a politically influential constituency. The history 
of the NEH is, in effect, the story of the political fortunes of an elite idea. At the height of 
the Great Society, the idea that the arts and humanities were important to edifying and 
uplifting American life, and that therefore the federal government ought to support artists 
and scholars, had great political purchase. The next fifty years have been a story of how 
                                                        
1 James Grossman, “The National Endowment for the Humanities at Fifty” (panel remarks at the 129th 
annual meeting of the American Historical Association, New York, New York, January 4, 2015), 
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the NEH has coped as that idea has failed to inspire the enthusiasm that it did in 1965—
and, at times, attracted great hostility.  
Organizational maintenance, according to James Q. Wilson, refers not only to a 
bureaucracy’s survival, but also to its ability to acquire autonomy and resources.2 While 
Wilson says that organizational maintenance is the “special responsibility” of the 
bureaucracy’s executive, Part I looks at more than just the role of NEH chairmen (though 
this does factor into the analysis).3 Part I traces the course of high-level debates about the 
federal government’s role in supporting the arts and humanities, focusing largely on the 
positions that the Democratic and Republican Parties, as well as elements therein, have 
taken at different times. Part I examines why the parties have changed positions on 
questions such as whether or not the NEH ought to exist, what it ought to symbolize, and 
what kinds of programs and activities it ought to sponsor. These debates have often been 
framed in terms of elitism versus populism, with Republicans and Democrats falling on 
different sides of that cleavage at different times and in different contexts.  
In addition to tracing these high-level debates, Part I analyzes the importance of 
the clientele that the NEH cultivated: the state humanities councils (SHCs). Part I looks at 
how the introduction of this clientele transformed the agency’s interest-group context, 
how the councils have promoted the durability of the agency, and how they have affected 
NEH’s budgetary priorities.   
Part I proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 discusses the founding of the NEH and its 
initial interest-group context, which bore the hallmarks of what Wilson referred to as 
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 22  
“majoritarian politics.” Congress, in establishing the NEA and NEH, responded to a 
national consensus about the importance of the arts and humanities in uplifting the 
nation; there were no influential interests groups mobilized for or against the agency.  
In chapter 2, I draw upon David Karol’s model of party-position change to 
explain the development of the politics of the NEH during the 1970s.4 The initial lack of 
influential interest groups who cared about the NEH opened up the possibility for 
dramatic party-position change. President Nixon, to the surprise of many, decided to 
champion the Endowments, which ended up bringing many congressional Republicans to 
their cause. Once the NEH had achieved bipartisan support, debates over the agency 
became focused more on what it ought to symbolize and the criteria it should use to 
distribute grants. In these debates, some Republican politicians and conservative 
intellectuals came to embrace something akin to the original Great Society vision for the 
cultural agencies as patrons of high culture that awarded grants according to strict use of 
peer review. On the elitism-populism cleavage, these Republican politicians and 
conservative influencers fell squarely and, at times, proudly on the side of elitism or 
“excellence.” Democrats, in contrast, began calling for a broader distribution of grants, 
particularly to racial and ethnic minorities that had become important constituencies. 
Though the Republican Party still retained a populist element of its own, which continued 
to resist the notion of federal funding for culture, that element was uninfluential 
throughout the 1970s.  
As discussed in chapter 3, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the main legislative 
founder behind the agency, wanted the NEH’s political fortunes to rest on something 
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solider than the idea of the value of federal funding for culture. In the 1970s, at his 
insistence, the NEH established the state humanities councils partly to introduce more 
citizens to the humanities, as well as to cultivate grassroots support for the Endowment. 
The NEH not only established councils in all 50 states, federal territories, and District of 
Columbia, but the agency also helped launch and fund a national organization that came 
to represent the SHCs’ collective interests: the Federation of State Humanities Councils. 
The introduction of the state councils led to shift in the interest-group context, from 
majoritarian to what Wilson referred to as “client” politics, in which there is “a dominant 
interest-group favoring [an agency’s] goals.”5 With the state councils, the SHCs gained a 
supportive clientele based in states nationwide. But at the same time, the councils 
represented a potential competitor to the NEH, particularly regarding the allocation of 
resources. For decades, the NEH sought to reap the advantages of having a state-based 
constituency, while keeping the SHCs under its control, leading to a relationship that was, 
at times, fraught with tension.   
 Chapter 4 explains how, as the culture wars escalated in the 1980s, the terms of 
debate and party positioning again changed. When the decade began, Republicans and 
conservative intellectuals promoted a vision of the NEH as a symbol of excellence, which 
meant that it was to favor scholarly research over public-facing programs, such as the 
state humanities councils, and determine grant awards on the basis of strict peer review. 
Yet as the decade wore on, this vision lost purchase within the GOP. The Religious 
Right, which was opposed to the very existence of the NEA and NEH, became an 
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important constituency within the party, leading some Republicans to become 
increasingly hostile toward the cultural agencies, the Arts Endowment in particular.  
But even as conservative opinion leaders became alienated from academia and 
denounced trends in scholarship and education in the humanities, they remained 
supportive of the NEH. This was primarily because of the reputation of the Republican 
appointees who led it during the heyday of the culture wars: William Bennett and Lynne 
Cheney. Through their use of the bully pulpit, Bennett and Cheney established 
themselves as resolute opponents of progressive trends in the humanities, giving 
Republicans and conservative influencers confidence that the NEH was still doing well 
by America (under Cheney, the agency’s budget surpassed the NEA’s for the first time in 
history). But following the election of President Clinton and Cheney’s replacement with 
University of Pennsylvania president Sheldon Hackney, widely denounced on the Right 
as symbolic of cultural rot in academia, the NEH was left in a vulnerable position.  
With the loss of bipartisan support for the principle of federal funding for culture, 
the state humanities councils became all the more important for the maintenance of the 
overall NEH. Chapter 5 explains how the state councils became an influential clientele, 
capable of drawing admiration from politicians of both parties. The positive standing of 
the SHCs in Congress, including among some Republicans, probably contributed to 
saving the NEH when some GOP leaders sought to abolish it, along with the NEA, in 
1995. While Congress ended up cutting the NEH’s budget by approximately 40 percent, 
the brunt of the cuts affected the agency’s grant-making in research, education, and 
public programming. The SHCs’ appropriation level was hardly reduced; in turn, they 
came to receive a greater share of overall NEH funding. The NEH also began to defer to 
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the SHCs’ demands for greater autonomy and independence, goals which they had long 
sought. The defunding crisis effectively completed the reshaping of the NEH’s interest 
group context to one largely characterized by client politics. 
The development of the politics of the NEH following the 1995 defunding crisis 
is the subject of chapter 6, the final chapter of Part I. In the context of Republican 
hostility to the idea of federal funding for culture and waning Democratic enthusiasm, the 
NEH has still managed to maintain itself. Yet the politics of the NEH have come to have 
little if anything to do with debates over the substance of the humanities and much more 
to do with simply who is receiving the agency’s dollars. The state humanities councils 
have remained the most influential advocate for the NEH in Congress, promoting a 
continuation of funding for the Endowment while seeing their share of the grant budget 
increase. The NEH has also impressed upon Congress its commitment to serving rural 
areas, Native Americans, and veterans. Even when President Donald Trump proposed 
terminating the NEH, the Republican-controlled Congress resisted the plan and decided 
to continue to appropriate funding, citing their appreciation of the state councils and 
service to particular constituencies, without any mention of the research and education 
grant-making that had once been the agency’s core work. Even as the sublime ideals that 
inspired the founding of the NEH no longer have political purchase, the agency itself has 
found a way to carry on. 
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1.0  THE FOUNDING OF THE NEH 
The NEA and NEH are outliers in the history of the federal government’s support 
for culture. Prior to 1965, not only had the federal government been reluctant to support 
culture in general, but when it did, its initiatives had much more explicit civic and 
economic aims. For example, from the founding period through the late nineteenth 
century, presidents and other political officials made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to 
found a national university, with the civic goal of imbuing future leading citizens with 
sentiments and beliefs that aligned with the aims and principles of the American 
republic.1 New Deal initiatives such as the Federal Art Project, Federal Writers’ Project, 
and Federal Theatre Project were focused, first and foremost, on providing job 
opportunities for the unemployed, who happened to be artists and writers.2 From 1936-
1941, the U.S. Office of Education ran the Federal Forum Project, sponsoring hundreds 
of town hall meetings across the country. The purpose of these meetings was to bring 
citizens together to discuss important issues and differences of opinion respectfully, help 
them grow in understanding of national and international issues, and promote continuing 
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education, among other civic goals.3 Furthermore, in the early years of the Cold War, the 
federal government supported cultural exchanges with other countries; in this case, the 
goals pertained to foreign-policy (described in brief below). 
 The NEH, in contrast, was imbued with a mission to support high culture at least 
partly for its own sake. This mission reflected the uniqueness of the moment in which the 
agency was founded. As Stanley Katz, former president of the American Council on 
Learned Societies (ACLS), has opined, 1965 was the only year in American history in 
which the NEH could ever have been established.4  
 The founding of the NEH bears the hallmarks of what James Q. Wilson referred 
to as “majoritarian politics,” meaning the agency came about not at the behest of 
powerful interest groups, but because of a broad consensus. Majoritarian policies have a 
base of support among the general public and elites, and objections to their enactment 
tend to be on the basis of principle; namely, that the policy in question represents an 
inappropriate expansion of the federal government.5 Because majoritarian agencies 
impose broad costs on society in exchange for broad benefits, it is unlikely that interest 
groups will mobilize either on behalf of or in opposition to the agency. In the case of the 
NEH, at least initially, the broad cost to society represented an increase in discretionary 
spending in exchange for cultural uplift.  
The great danger that majoritarian agencies have to fear is that they will behave in 
such a way as to inspire an organized foe, something akin to which happened to the NEH 
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in the mid-1990s (as described in chapter 5). As David Lewis notes in his study of agency 
termination, “administrative agencies never escape the politics that created them.”6 
Though the NEH’s interest group context changed significantly with the establishment of 
the state humanities councils, the agency’s political fortunes have always rested, to a 
degree, on how compelling its mission or perceived purpose is to the nation as a whole.  
 The founding of the NEH occurred because of a confluence of factors, which 
never had obtained before and dissolved shortly thereafter. For a brief moment in time, in 
the mid-1960s, academics, public intellectuals, and the general public had a shared 
conception of the content of the humanities and believed that they were valuable to 
American life. This consensus was incorporated in President Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society agenda. And with lopsided Democratic majorities, the 89th Congress translated 
that consensus into a new federal bureaucracy.  
1.1 GENERAL EDUCATION AND WESTERN CIV 
The NEH was founded at a time when many citizens and scholars associated the 
liberal arts and humanities with a sympathetic, if not celebratory study of Western 
Civilization. Courses in Western Civ were then central to what was known as “general 
education,” a movement that began in the early 20th century as a reaction against several 
transformative trends in American higher education. These included the decline of the 
classical liberal arts curriculum, increase in specialization within disciplines, and 
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students’ having the opportunity to choose from a variety of elective courses. General 
education, intended for non-specialists and geared toward freshmen and sophomores, 
was, in many respects, a civic enterprise. It was intended to provide educated citizens 
with a set of shared values and common base of knowledge, which were thought to be 
important to the flourishing of democracy. According to Gilbert Allardyce, “General 
education, therefore, was a philosophy of unity: unity of knowledge, unity of the 
curriculum, unity of education and life.”7  
Western Civ courses focused on great books and presented a Whiggish view of 
history, equating “civilization” with the rise of freedom in the United States and the 
nations of Western Europe, whose fates were bound together in the two world wars. 
Along with Civ, international relations (IR) courses had become common after World 
War I. IR courses, “hopelessly jingoistic by later professional standards of objectivity,” 
also told a story of the rise of liberty, with professors “[tracking] the steady rise and 
expansion of American freedom in an otherwise hostile world.”8  
World War I was integral in spurring colleges and universities nationwide to 
develop Western Civ courses, with the federal government even playing a role. In 1918, 
when American troops were being conscripted for the Great War, colleges and 
universities partnered with the War Department to establish Student Army Training 
Corps (SATC). Based at more than 500 colleges and universities, SATC sought to 
prepare 125,000 students for military service. Part of this program involved the “War 
Issues Course,” compulsory for all participants. Combining material from a range of 
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disciplines, the course was intended to give the conscripts an understanding of the nature 
of the European conflict, as well as the kind of society they were being asked to defend. 
Professors of history, government, philosophy, economics, and literature patriotically 
came together to plan and teach this course. When Arthur M. Schlesinger surveyed 
history programs at colleges and universities after the war, he found that faculty had 
become inspired to educate freshmen to be “intelligent citizens of the republic and the 
world.”9 According to Allardyce, “This was the environment that formed the Western Civ 
courses.”10   
The start of the Cold War inspired a renewed sense of urgency for general 
education. Policymakers and higher-education leaders viewed colleges and universities as 
having a critical role to play in the formation of enlightened democratic citizens. 
Christopher Loss, in his account of the role of higher education in American state 
building, argues that general education during the Cold War can be understood as an 
attempt to fortify America’s “vital center.” Many educators, policymakers, and 
researchers at the time believed that education could help keep students from buying into 
radical political ideologies of the Left, namely, communism, and could also help lead 
them discard racial prejudice, the great blight on American democracy.11  
Two major reports on higher education, published in the mid-1940s, spoke to the 
importance of liberal arts education in the formation of democratic citizens. In 1945, 
Harvard University published a report, General Education for a Free Society, the product 
of a committee of faculty members convened by university president James Bryant 
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Conant. Among many recommendations, the committee proposed a Western Civ course, 
“Western Thought and Institutions,” as a requirement for all students. The committee did 
not prescribe a specific curriculum, but suggested that works by the following authors be 
considered for inclusion: Aquinas, Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Adam Smith, Bentham, and Mill.12 Two years later, President Truman’s 
Commission on Higher Education issued a report that also presented the liberal arts as 
central to general education, but unlike the Harvard report, emphasized the study of 
America and the West’s interaction with the rest of the world.13  
Though general education was at the height of its prestige in the early Cold War 
years, it was already in decline. Harvard, for example, did not follow the 
recommendations of the 1945 report. Faculty rejected the Western Civ course and, over 
time, students were allowed to fulfill general-education requirements through an 
increasing number of curricular options.14 However, it was not until the second half of the 
1960s that colleges and universities began explicitly to disavow the earlier general-
education ideal. In response to campus protest movements and minority activists’ 
demands for group recognition, colleges and universities embraced “a new rights-based 
conception of democratic citizenship that was intimately connected to an energetic 
pluralist politics known as diversity.”15 Dramatic changes to the liberal arts curriculum 
followed from the diversity ideal, including the rise of new disciplines such as black 
studies and women’s studies, as well as the end of compulsory Western Civ courses. Yet 
                                                        
12 Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society, General Education in a Free 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945): 216, 
https://archive.org/details/generaleducation032440mbp.  
13 Loss, 138. 
14 Allardyce, 717. 
15 Loss, 213. 
 32  
the conscious abandonment of general education did not pick up in earnest until the latter 
half of the 1960s.  
The peak years of general education came at a time that has been considered the 
golden age of higher education, characterized by the “three p’s” of prosperity, prestige, 
and popularity.16 More Americans were attending college than ever before, with 
enrollments rising from 2.7 million in 1950 to more than 7.9 million in 1970, spurred 
partly by the GI Bill. The increase in college attendance likely contributed to a growing 
appreciation for higher forms of culture among the general public, as well as respect for 
intellectuals. In 1964, Richard Hofstadter won a Pulitzer Prize in Non-Fiction for his 
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. Toward the beginning of the book, Hofstadter 
claimed to observe that more and more Americans were questioning the country’s 
habitual hostility toward intellectuals:  
In the past, American intellectuals were often discouraged or embittered 
by the national disrespect for mind, but it is hard to recall a time when large 
numbers of people outside the intellectual community shared their concern, or 
when self-criticism on this count took on the character of a nation-wide 
movement.17  
 
Hofstadter interprets the public’s growing respect for intellectuals as a reaction against 
the McCarthyism of the early 1950s and the surprise launch of Sputnik by the Soviet 
Union. The launch of Sputnik impressed upon people the idea that improving education 
had to become more of a national priority.18 Historian Thomas Bender points to 
additional phenomena that may have encouraged a growing respect for intellectuals at the 
time. The Great Depression had “discredited the business elite, who had historically been 
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a major source of anti-intellectualism in the United States.” In addition, people were 
impressed with what they viewed as the results of Keynesian economics, “an academic 
theory of acknowledged utility.”19 
1.2 CULTURAL ENRICHMENT FOR THE MASSES 
In the decades following World War II, the growing American middle class was 
seeking out more opportunities to expose themselves to higher forms of culture—to art, 
music, and literature that were more intellectually demanding than lowest-common-
denominator entertainment. Fred Siegel offers the following statistics in this regard: 
The public’s expanding taste and increased income produced a 250 
percent growth in the number of local symphony orchestras between 1940 and 
1955. In that same year, 1955, 15 million people paid to attend major league 
baseball games, while 35 million paid to attend classical music concerts. The New 
York Metropolitan Opera’s Saturday-afternoon radio broadcast drew a 
listenership of 15 million out of an overall population of 165 million. 
 
When NBC aired a three-hour broadcast of Shakespeare’s Richard III starring Laurence 
Olivier in 1956, the program drew 50 million viewers.20  
The Book of the Month Club (BOMC), founded in 1926, was of a piece with 
efforts by the general public to consume more serious forms of culture. A five-judge 
panel comprised of literary professionals, such as professors, novelists, and newspaper 
editors and columnists, chose books at least as much for their quality as their commercial 
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potential. In the 1930s and 1940s, the panel chose books by such authors as George 
Orwell, Arthur Miller, Truman Capote, and Ernest Hemingway. Social critic Dwight 
Macdonald derided the Club in his famous essay, “Masscult and Midcult,” saying, “the 
best that can be said is that it could be worse.” But according to Fareed Zakaria, writing 
with more than forty years of hindsight, “Actually it could have been a lot worse. 
Although never overtly intellectual or academic, the BOMC found high-quality literature 
that could appeal to a broad audience.”21  
Popular consumption of high culture was exemplified by the Great Books 
movement, which was at its height in the 1950s and early 1960s. This phenomenon 
originated at the University of Chicago, spearheaded by university president Robert 
Hutchins and philosophy professor Mortimer Adler. Hutchins and Adler sought not only 
to give classical works of Western Civilization a pride of place in the school’s 
curriculum, but also bring the wisdom of the books to the general public. They believed 
that the positivist, empiricist, value-free social science that was ascendant in the academy 
during the early twentieth century was inimical to democracy and provided a basis for 
totalitarianism.22 According to historian Benjamin McArthur:  
Hutchins had been preaching since the early 1930s that an “education for 
democracy” must rest on the immutable tenets laid forth by the great works of our 
Western tradition. That message won a wide hearing in a nation hungry for 
guidance.23 
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Amy Kass, who has chronicled the evolving place of the liberal arts at the University of 
Chicago, interprets Hutchins and Adler as having:  
transformed a technique of general education into a vision of salvation; 
they believed their Bildungsideal could save mankind and the modern world from 
moral decay and physical destruction…The Great Books movement, in short, 
offered an intellectual surrogate for, or supplement to, attendance in church.”24 
 
In 1947, Hutchins and Adler launched the Great Books Foundation, located in 
Chicago, which sought to stimulate broad public interest in the best works of the Western 
tradition. The Foundation worked to foster Great Books reading groups, which, according 
to journalist Alex Beam, were convened “in public libraries, in church basements, 
chamber of commerce offices, corporate conference rooms at IBM and Grumman 
Aircraft, in private homes, on army bases, and, yes, in prisons.”25 Moreover, if the 
Foundation’s statistics on participation are to be believed, there were “50,000 Americans 
enrolled in groups in 1947 and, after dipping to around 25,000 in the 1950s, rose back to 
around 47,000 in 1961.”26 Encyclopedia Britannica produced elegant editions of the 
books, ideal for display in the home, with sales peaking at 50,000 sets in 1961. Of the 
sets sold by Britannica, it is questionable how many were actually read. Text was laid out 
in double columns, printed in nine-point Fairfield type.27 Nevertheless, the purchase of 
these books suggests that segments of the general public had at least some esteem for 
historic texts of the Western tradition, at least in principle. 
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1.3 ELITE FEARS OF MASS CULTURE ON THE RIGHT AND LEFT 
In the decades leading up to the founding of the NEA and NEH, intellectuals 
expressed serious concern about the dangers of mass culture and the importance of 
preserving high culture. Thinkers from across the political and ideological spectrum 
viewed these as important issues, from Russell Kirk, Ernest van den Haag, and Irving 
Kristol on the Right to Dwight Macdonald and Irving Howe on the Left. Despite sharp 
disagreements on various issues, there was at least some overlap among liberal and 
conservative intellectuals about the dangers facing high culture in modern society, as well 
as the role that high culture could play in the edification of democracy. According to 
Herbert Gans, “The socialist criticism of mass culture was in some ways similar to that of 
the conservatives, although it was not hostile to political democracy or to social and 
economic equality.”28 
 Gans identifies four major themes in the criticism of mass or popular culture. The 
first is the “negative character of popular culture creation;” unlike high culture, it is 
produced with the goal of making a profit. The second theme is that popular culture 
debases high culture by borrowing from it; both in terms of copying its content and 
employing talented artists and writers, who would otherwise be engaged in the 
production of high culture. The third theme is that popular culture has harmful effects on 
the audience; that graphic, escapist, titillating forms of entertainment are emotionally, 
intellectually, and culturally destructive. Fourth, mass culture is harmful to society as a 
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whole, lowering the level of civilization and “also encouraging totalitarianism by creating 
a passive audience peculiarly responsive to the techniques of mass persuasion used by 
demagogues bent on dictatorship.”29  
Some intellectuals proposed higher forms of culture as an antidote to the 
destructive influence of mass culture. They viewed the arts and humanities in a similar 
way in which Tocqueville viewed religion; as a countervailing force to the more debasing 
tendencies of life in a commercial republic.30 According to Joli Jensen, intellectual critics 
of mass culture understood “art” in distinction to lower forms of cultural expression; as 
“instrumental high culture—a way to uplift and refine the people.”31 Critics also saw 
artists and intellectuals as having a pivotal role to play in helping save the blinkered 
masses from the debasement of popular entertainment. If the arts and humanities were the 
saving religion, artists and intellectuals were to be the priests and ministers. Indicative of 
this perspective is the question posed in a 1959 Daedalus symposium, “How can 
intellectuals ensure that the mass audience is protected from the bad effects of mass 
culture, and (if possible) exposed to the good effects of art?”32    
Given the urgent need to promote high culture, perhaps there was a role for the 
federal government. Irving Kristol, called the “godfather of neo-conservatism,” made 
precisely this argument in a short 1963 article, “Of Newton Minow and Matthew 
Arnold.”33 Thirty years later, Kristol would claim that the National Endowment for the 
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Arts had become “mission impossible” because of changes in the art world; namely, 
because it had become so nihilistic and hostile to the bourgeois way of life.34 But in 1963, 
Kristol saw that there could be a role for the federal government in supporting elite 
culture. Because of what the article suggests about the state of elite opinion at the time, it 
is worth discussing it at some length.  
Newton Minow, appointed chairman of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) by President John F. Kennedy, became a controversial political figure, scorned by 
many in the broadcasting industry. In his first address as FCC chairman, before the 
National Association of Broadcasters, “Television and the Public Interest,” he 
admonished his audience to consider their responsibility to the nation. He told those 
present to consider not only ratings in choosing which programs to air, but also the need 
to provide edifying options along with entertaining ones, especially for children. 
Minow’s speech has been mostly remembered for his biting assessment of what 
constituted much of the programming of the day. He said:  
When television is good, nothing—not the theater, not the magazines or 
newspapers—nothing is better. 
 
But when television is bad, nothing is worse. I invite each of you to sit 
down in front of your television set when your station goes on the air and stay 
there, for a day, without a book, without a magazine, without a newspaper, 
without a profit and loss sheet or a rating book to distract you. Keep your eyes 
glued to that set until the station signs off. I can assure you that what you will 
observe is a vast wasteland.35 
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Those words, “vast wasteland,” were the most memorable of the speech, used in the title 
of a front-page headline the following day in the New York Times. Television producers 
did not take kindly to Minow’s admonitions. Sherwood Schwartz, the producer behind 
the mid-1960s sitcom, Gilligan’s Island, indicated his feelings for the FCC chairman by 
naming the characters’ shipwrecked boat the S.S. Minnow.36    
Kristol opened his article acknowledging that his feelings toward Minow were 
“not unmixed.” He believed that Minow was abusing his power by intimidating certain 
television stations whose programming he disliked. Nevertheless, Kristol continued, “I 
must also say that I think Mr. Minow is on the side of the angels.” Minow, in Kristol’s 
view, was focused on a “real and serious problem…How may a democracy control its 
own self-destructive impulses?” Kristol explained that Minow, in his admonitions and 
actions vis-à-vis broadcasters, had a kindred spirit in Matthew Arnold, the Victorian poet 
and social critic. Arnold believed that the health of a society depended on its people 
acknowledging the difference between things that are “elevated” versus things that are 
less-so. In pre-democratic times, the clergy and aristocracy preserved this distinction and 
kept it in the people’s view. But with the withering of those hierarchies, the responsibility 
of keeping the citizenry mindful of “things that are elevated” fell to the state.37 
Kristol acknowledged the dangers of entrusting this task to the government, but 
was sympathetic to the idea. To involve the government in upholding higher forms of 
culture, precautions would be necessary. In this vein, Kristol proposed to “work by 
indirection…through prudent legislation, discreet regulation, generous tax exemptions, 
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negotiated dispensations (from trade unions, for instance), and—yes, occasional 
downright special privileges.” Kristol concluded his essay stating: 
A policy of this kind could help repair the life of this nation, and bring it 
into harmony with those moral causes that govern the standing and the falling of 
states. Always assuming, of course, that we really believe there are such moral 
causes.38 
 
Though Kristol did not propose the establishment of a federal arts and humanities 
foundation, the logic that he put forward—acting by indirection—was the same logic 
behind the NEA and NEH. As will be explained below, while the foundation was to bring 
government support to bear on the arts and humanities, government officials were not to 
assume a domineering role. Rather, the foundation was supposed to make decisions on the 
basis of the non-political expertise of artists and scholars. 
1.4 THE HUMANITIES LOBBY GOES TO WORK 
By the mid-1960s, for more than a decade, a small group of congressmen had 
been advocating for federal support for the arts. President Kennedy had expressed 
support for the idea of a federal arts foundation during his campaign, and with legislative 
efforts for the arts percolating in Congress, humanists may have sensed an opportunity to 
push for federal support for literature, history, philosophy, languages, and so on. To that 
end, in early 1963, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Council of Graduate 
Schools in the United States, and the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa came together to 
form the National Commission on the Humanities. This blue-ribbon commission was 
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chaired by Brown University president Barnaby Keeney, and its members included 
several university presidents; academic humanists representing disciplines such as 
history, English, philosophy, French, and classics; the chair of the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission; and Arthur Dean, a senior partner of the law firm Sullivan and 
Cromwell and an advisor to several presidents on foreign affairs. In April of 1964, the 
Commission published a report, in which it argued that the expansion of humanistic 
activity was in the national interest and therefore deserving of federal support, and that 
federal support should be administered by a new independent agency, the National 
Humanities Foundation.39  
The arguments in the report reflected the national consensus about the importance 
of the humanities described above, from the substance of the humanities to their 
purported benefits to American life. When the Commission defined the humanities, it did 
so in a way that aligned with the content of Western Civ courses. The Commission said 
of the humanities, “The method of education is one based on the liberal tradition we 
inherit from classical antiquity,” and that the humanities “sustained mankind at the 
deepest level of being.” By “mankind,” the Commission meant, principally, Europe and 
the United States:  
[The humanities] prospered in Greece and Rome, in the Middle Ages, in 
the Renaissance, and in the Enlightenment…In the formative years of our own 
country it was a group of statesmen steeped in the humanities who fused their 
own experience with that of the past to create the enduring Constitution of the 
Republic. 
 
At another point in the report, the Commission spoke of the humanities using the words 
of Matthew Arnold; as “the best that has been thought and said in former times.” And the 
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humanities were presented as providing a source of unity: “We speak, in truth, for what is 
being defended—our beliefs, our ideals, our highest achievements.”40  
Like the critics of mass culture, the authors of the report raised concerns about 
dehumanizing tendencies inherent to the modern world and suggested that the humanities 
could be an antidote. The increase in human leisure, the Commission argued, presented a 
grave danger:  
When men and women find nothing within themselves but emptiness they 
turn to trivial and narcotic amusements, and the society of which they are a part 
becomes socially delinquent and potentially unstable. The humanities are the 
immemorial answer to man’s questioning and to his need for self-expression; they 
are uniquely equipped to fill the “abyss of leisure.” 
 
The Commission argued that people needed “a vision [to] be held before them” and that 
for democracy to flourish, it required “wisdom of the average man.” Moreover, the 
humanities were necessary in order that America truly benefit from the great scientific 
advances that were occurring. The Commission stated, “If the interdependence of science 
and the humanities were more generally understood, men would be more likely to 
become masters of their technology and not its unthinking servant.”41 This language 
about wisdom, vision, and the dangers of technology was repeated verbatim in the 
enacting legislation of the NEA and NEH. 
 Perhaps indicative of the confidence that intellectuals felt at the time, as well as 
the prestige and respect they enjoyed, the Commission attributed a vaunted role to 
scholars in the humanities. Like the mass-culture critics, the Commission presented 
scholars as the priests of the religion of the humanities; as the ones who would minister 
the redemptive power of philosophy, history, and literature to the masses. The 
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Commission said that scholars in the humanities have “the privilege and obligation of 
interpreting the past to each new generation of men…” Moreover, “They preserve and 
judge the fruits of humanity’s previous attempts to depict, to rationalize, and to transcend 
the world it inhabits.” Furthermore, “It is both the dignity and the duty of humanists to 
offer their fellow-countrymen whatever understanding can be attained by fallible 
humanity of such enduring values as justice, freedom, virtue, beauty, and truth.”42  
The Commission also noted the potential geopolitical advantages of encouraging 
the humanities. A National Humanities Foundation, argued the Commission, would help 
“correct the view of those who see America as a nation interested only in the material 
aspects of life and Americans as a people skilled only in gadgeteering.” America’s 
leadership in the world had to be based on more than just power, wealth, and technology. 
It also must be based on “things of the spirit.”43  
As noted above, the understanding of the humanities presented in this report was 
being displaced at many colleges and universities. Very soon after the publication of this 
report, more and more colleges and universities began explicitly rejecting the general 
education ideal and discarding compulsory Western Civ courses. Over the next decade 
and a half, many scholars within the humanities would contest the Eurocentric 
perspective found in the report, along with the idea that the humanities were mainly the 
province of a scholarly elite. In 1980, a second Commission on the Humanities, 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, issued a report, “The Humanities in American 
Life,” in which it said the following about the 1964 report:  
Although few people would look back on the early 1960s as an age of 
American innocence, the earlier Commission’s prescription for invigorating the 
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humanities and our sense of national purpose had a straightforwardness and 
simplicity that can scarcely be attained today.44  
 
Steven Weiland, who served as executive director of the Federation of State Humanities 
Councils, said in 1980 that the state councils “were organized, fortunately, in a way that 
implicitly rejected the patronizing attitude of The Commission of [sic] the Humanities 
(1964).”45  
1.5 LEGISLATIVE PRECURSORS FOR THE ARTS 
The Commission on the Humanities report was published when efforts to 
establish a federal arts foundation were gaining ground in Washington. For at least a 
decade, a small group of dedicated congressmen had championed greater federal support 
for the arts, both in the interest of improving the United States’ geopolitical position, as 
well as to improve the quality of life at home. Opponents of federal support for the arts 
argued that culture was an inappropriate, even unconstitutional, area in which to involve 
the national government. They also warned about the prospect of government control 
over artists and the danger that public money would end up supporting scandalous, 
morally offensive projects.  
In 1957, Senators Jacob Javits (R-NY) and Joseph Clark (D-PA) first introduced 
legislation to establish a federal arts foundation, with the primary purpose of enabling the 
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performing arts to reach underserved communities. At the time, however, Congress as a 
whole was only willing to support art as an instrument of foreign policy; mainly to 
combat communist propaganda that America was materialistic and culturally deficient. 
Through the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956, 
Congress provided support for artists, dancers, and musicians to visit foreign countries, 
continuing a program that President Eisenhower had begun two years earlier.46  
Eisenhower, himself a painter, supported the idea of the federal government doing 
more on behalf of the arts. In his 1955 State of the Union Address, he stated, “In the 
advancement of the various activities which will make our civilization endure and 
flourish, the Federal Government should do more to give official recognition to the 
importance of the arts and other cultural activities.” To that end, he recommended “the 
establishment of a Federal Advisory Commission on the Arts within the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, to advise the Federal Government on ways to encourage 
artistic endeavor and appreciation.”47 In 1957, Congress held hearings on legislation to 
enact such a commission. The commission (or “council” as it was called in different 
versions of the bill) was to be advisory in nature, tasked primarily with preparing studies 
and making recommendations. The commission would “propose methods to encourage 
private initiative in the arts and its cooperation with local, State, and Federal departments 
or agencies to foster artistic and cultural endeavors and the use of the arts both nationally 
and internationally in the best interests of our country, and to stimulate greater 
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appreciation of the arts by our citizens.”48 Congress declined to establish the commission, 
but passed the National Cultural Center Act in 1958, which led to what became the John 
F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.  
The question of government encouragement of the arts was an issue during the 
1960 race for President. The Democratic Party platform of that year had a section, “The 
Arts,” which supported the idea of “a Federal advisory agency to assist in the evaluation, 
development, and expansion of cultural resources of the United States,” as well as 
“legislation…to provide incentives for those endowed with extraordinary talent, as a 
worthy supplement to existing scholarship programs.”49 Candidate Senator John F. 
Kennedy told Equity magazine, the journal of Actors’ Equity Association (a labor union 
representing live theatrical performers), that he was “in fully sympathy” with the 
proposal by Senators Javits and Clark to set up a federal arts foundation. While the GOP 
Platform did not have a corresponding section about the arts, it did note cultural 
exchanges as one of the Eisenhower administration’s accomplishments.50 In the same 
issue of Equity, Republican candidate Richard Nixon voiced his support for a federal 
advisory council, believing that this would be the appropriate first step before considering 
the creation of a federal foundation.51  
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In the 87th Congress, after Kennedy was elected President, arts advocates in 
Congress introduced bills with several measures to support the arts, including an arts 
advisory council, grants for states to set up state arts programs, and a federal arts 
foundation. In regard to the state grants, the goal was to encourage states to set up their 
own arts programs, which some had already begun. The most prominent state arts 
program at the time was the New York State Council on Arts, which supported opera, 
symphony, ballet, theater, and art shows throughout the Empire State. The proposed 
federal grants program would award matching grants to states to set up agencies or other 
projects to encourage the arts.52 However, none of these proposals—the advisory council, 
state grants, or federal foundation—were able to pass during that term.  
President Kennedy finally established a federal arts advisory council through an 
executive order on June 12, 1963.53 Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the most 
enthusiastic arts advocates in Congress, had proposed that the President set up the council 
in that manner. Humphrey, in a 1962 letter to August Heckscher, a public intellectual 
whom Kennedy had appointed special consultant on the arts, suggested that given 
persistent opposition in the House of Representatives, the President might go ahead and 
appoint the committee. Should the council prove effective, this would put proponents in 
the House in a stronger position to fight for statutory authorization.54 
In December of 1963, the Senate passed legislation to establish both a National 
Council on the Arts and a federal arts foundation. The Council set up by the statute had 
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greater heft than the one established by President Kennedy’s executive order. Whereas 
Kennedy’s council was comprised of heads of existing federal agencies and up to 30 
private citizens, the body established by Congress had a paid full-time chairman and a 
small paid staff. The federal arts foundation, to be governed by a presidentially appointed 
director and board of trustees (separate from the Council), would make grants directly in 
support of cultural projects, as well as matching grants to support arts programs and 
agencies in the states. Proponents of the bill raised many of the arguments that had been 
in the air, such as how support for art could enhance America’s reputation internationally, 
the importance of bringing culture to underserved regions, citizens’ growing demand for 
culture, financial needs within the art world, and the benefits of art to the overall quality 
of American life.  
Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, then a Democrat, was the most 
vociferous opponent of the legislation, arguing that it was an inappropriate expansion of 
federal power and risked endangering artistic creativity. In his remarks on the Senate 
floor, Thurmond asserted that the federal government was one of “limited powers” and 
said, “It would require an imagination of truly artistic, rather than legalistic, talents to 
justify this measure under the general welfare clause or under any other section of the 
Constitution.” Beyond the constitutionality issue, Thurmond contended that a centralized 
agency would “eventually lead to sterility of thought and production” and would be 
unlikely to fund original work. He stressed that since the arts had flourished in America 
without government support, Washington should continue to limit its participation.55  
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The House, still the less enthusiastic chamber, in 1964 passed a bill to establish 
the National Arts Council, but dropped the provision for a federal arts foundation. Much 
of the floor debate focused on the idea of federal subsidies for art, with opponents 
warning that this advisory council was just the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent. 
House opponents, like Senator Thurmond, argued that this was an inappropriate area for 
federal involvement. Some members charged that the Council and the prospect of a 
federal arts foundation represented wasteful, frivolous government spending. Other 
members warned that a federal arts foundation would end up funding work that was 
morally suspect. Congressman John Ashbrook (R-OH) warned (presciently, as it turned 
out) that the government would end up funding sexually explicit projects.56 Opponents of 
the legislation on the Committee on Education and Labor authored a brief set of minority 
views, arguing: 
We can fully expect, if this bill is sanctioned, that the Federal 
Government, in the name of art and culture, will soon be called upon to subsidize 
everything from bellydancing [sic] to the ballet; from Handel to the Hootenanny; 
from Brahms to the Beatles; from symphonies to the striptease.57 
 
After the House passed the arts council legislation, by a vote of 213 to 135, with 82 
members abstaining,58 the Senate quickly passed the House version,59 establishing the 
National Arts Council. 
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1.6 THE CORNERSTONE OF THE GREAT SOCIETY 
The national consensus about the need to enrich America’s cultural life, combined 
with the Democratic landslide of the 1964 election, paved the way for the enactment of 
federal subsidies for the arts and humanities. Federal support for culture became part of 
President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda, in which the government was to be 
concerned not only with citizens’ material needs (the focus of New Deal liberalism, as 
explained below), but also with citizens’ spiritual aspirations and quality of life. President 
Johnson’s vision for the Great Society bore the hallmarks of intellectuals’ concerns about 
mass culture and the importance of the arts and humanities for improving the quality of 
American life. In his 1964 speech at the University of Michigan, in which he outlined his 
vision of the Great Society, LBJ identified improving the “quality of our American 
civilization” as the biggest challenge confronting the nation. The Great Society, he 
argued, was a place where “leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared 
cause of boredom and restlessness… where the city of man serves not only the needs of 
the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for 
community… where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the 
quantity of their goods.” Toward the end of his speech, he charged the graduates:  
You can help build a society where the demands of morality, and the 
needs of the spirit, can be realized in the life of the Nation…Will you join in the 
battle to build the Great Society, to prove that our material progress is only the 
foundation on which we will build a richer life of mind and spirit?60 
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Developments in liberal political thought presaged LBJ’s emphasis on spiritual 
concerns. In a 1956 essay, “The Future of Liberalism,” Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. argued that 
while the “quantitative” liberalism of the New Deal was necessary to confront the 
economic crisis of the Great Depression, a “qualitative liberalism” was needed to meet 
the challenges of the new age of material prosperity. Bemoaning the “cultural 
mediocrity” in which the American people found themselves, Schlesinger wrote that it 
was urgent to “move on to the more subtle and complicated problem of fighting for 
individual dignity, identity, and fulfillment in a mass society,” calling for, among other 
things, “the bettering of our mass media, and the elevation of our popular culture.”61 In 
March of 1965, Schlesinger sent a copy of this essay to Richard Goodwin, an advisor and 
speechwriter for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, along with a note saying, “I’m glad 
you fellows are catching up.”62 
The idea of a federal humanities foundation, after the recommendations of the 
Commission on the Humanities, quickly attracted supporters in Congress. In August of 
1964, several months after the Commission released its report, Congressman William 
Moorhead (D-PA) introduced legislation to establish such a foundation, saying that it 
could be “the cornerstone of the ‘great society.’”63  
In January of 1965, at the start of the 89th session, Senator Ernest Gruening (D-
AK) introduced a bill to establish a federal humanities foundation, while Moorhead 
reintroduced similar legislation in the House. To the consternation of arts advocates, 
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these bills included the arts within the orbit of the humanities. Senator Javits, therefore, 
introduced legislation for a federal foundation to support the arts alone.64 Throughout the 
development of what became the final legislation, Javits remained insistent that the 
incorporation of the humanities not detract from support for the arts, for which he had 
long fought.65    
The Johnson administration was not inclined to enact two separate federal 
agencies.66 However, the President had previously expressed sympathy for both the arts 
and humanities. In a speech at Brown University in September of 1964, he said, “I look 
with the greatest of favor” upon the recommendations of the Commission on the 
Humanities for a federal humanities foundation.67 In his 1965 State of the Union Address, 
he pledged to propose a National Foundation on the Arts.68  
In March of 1965, following several weeks of hearings on various proposed bills, 
the Bureau of the Budget developed two options for federal support of culture: (1) a 
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities to be housed within the Smithsonian 
Institution; and (2) an independent federal agency composed of two endowments, each 
with its own chairman and national council. The administration ultimately came down on 
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the side of independence, the preference of artists and humanists. On March 10, Senator 
Claiborne Pell (D-RI) introduced The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities 
Act of 1965, with Senators Gruening and Javits as cosponsors. Companion legislation 
was introduced in the House by Congressman Frank Thompson (D-NJ), with 
Congressman Moorhead and others as cosponsors.69  
 With the backing of the President and substantial Democratic majorities in both 
chambers of Congress (68 Democrats in the Senate and 295 in the House), the legislation 
passed handily. In the Senate, the legislation twice passed by voice vote, first on June 
10,70 and then again on September 16, after it had passed the House in amended form.71 
The only opposition came from Senator Thurmond, who, prior to the second vote, 
reiterated his view that the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to 
establish such an agency, and that government support would result in mediocre art and 
the stifling of creativity.72  
 The House had a more spirited debate over the legislation to establish the 
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, with various members, mostly 
Republican, rising in opposition. Opponents raised similar concerns to what they had 
expressed the previous year when the House debated the establishment of the National 
Arts Council. Opponents warned about the prospect of government control over the arts, 
which could foster mediocrity, and concerns about growing the federal budget.73 In a set 
of minority views, a group of Republican members raised several other objections: what 
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they viewed as a complicated administrative structure; the “myth of American cultural 
backwardness” that supposedly made this legislation necessary; and the fact that 
Congress had not considered more indirect ways of supporting cultural development.74 In 
the end, the legislation passed by voice vote, with a motion to recommit failing by a vote 
of 128 to 251.  
Table 1. House Vote on Motion to Recommit the National Foundation on the Arts and 
Humanities Act of 196575 
  Aye Nay Not Voting 
Democrats 50 207 36 
Republicans 78 44 17 
Total 128 251 53 
   
 Much of the opposition to the legislation had to do with the idea of government 
support for the arts, not the humanities, which were less controversial. Congressman 
Albert Quie (R-MN), who voted against the legislation, said that had the bill just been for 
a federal humanities foundation, he would have voted for it.76 In his own set of minority 
views, he explained that it would be appropriate for the federal government to balance its 
support for the sciences in higher education with support for the humanities.77 During 
debate on the House floor, Congressman Robert Duncan (D-OR), who voted against the 
legislation, stated that a bill to support the arts alone would not have passed; that the arts 
needed to be combined with the humanities, given that there was more widespread 
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agreement about the need to rectify the imbalance of federal support for the sciences in 
higher education. 78 In later years, Senator Pell also acknowledged that the inclusion of 
the humanities was necessary to achieve federal support for the arts.79  
 When members of Congress spoke of their support for the humanities, they 
reflected a view of the humanities like that which was part of general education and 
presented in the report of the Commission on the Humanities. Senator Ross Bass (D-TN), 
for example, during hearings, said the following about the importance of bringing federal 
support behind the arts and humanities:      
We need to encourage our young people to know and understand the 
heritage which is the foundation of our present culture so that they may develop it 
further. They need to better understand the teachings of such philosophers as 
Plato and Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and John Locke, John Stuart Mill and 
Thomas Jefferson—to better understand the works of such artists as 
Michelangelo, Titian, the impressionists, the abstractionists, and the social 
commentators in paint.80 
 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) remarked, “as an avid reader, I am presently embarked on a 
repeat adventure in reading through the complete works of William Shakespeare.”81 And 
Senator Gruening (D-AK) spoke of Latin and Greek as “essential to a well-rounded 
education” and lamented that they were in decline.82 
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 The Endowments were designed with the goal of awarding grants on the basis of 
professional standards in the arts and humanities, just as grants awarded by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) were awarded according to scientific expertise. Frederick 
Burkhardt, president of ACLS, said during hearings on legislation to establish a federal 
humanities foundation, “This would be their foundation, directed by their peers, related to 
their interests and aims in a way that no bureau or agency within the Government is at 
present, or is ever likely to be.”83 As will be explained in depth in chapter seven, both the 
NEA and NEH were structured so as to empower their respective chairmen to follow the 
recommendations of experts in the arts and humanities; private citizens that the agencies 
would bring in to evaluate proposals. The founders of the agencies sought to empower 
the chairmen to resist pressure from politicians; for example, to distribute funding toward 
favored constituencies or reject proposals because they might seem controversial. These 
goals were of a piece with the great esteem that intellectuals had at the time. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
“It now represents a real consensus of the country.” So said Senator Javits at the 
passage of the final legislation, which was, for him, the culmination of more than 15 
years of work in Congress.84 Though arts and humanities organizations, such as ACLS, 
advocated for the establishment of a new federal foundation, it was not because of their 
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political clout that Congress acted. Rather, these organizations introduced the idea at a 
time when elites and the general public were positively disposed toward the arts and 
humanities. According to Livingston Biddle, the Pell staffer who shepherded the enacting 
legislation through Congress (and later became chairman of the NEA), if any interest 
group was important in securing passage of the bill, it was organized labor, which in 
1965 “was identified as a force for good, if not total enlightenment, by a great majority of 
the Congress and by the administrations, first of Kennedy and then of Johnson.” The 
AFL-CIO endorsed the legislation, of which Biddle said, “We could not have asked for 
more than this.”85 Yet the NEH’s dependence on a general enthusiasm for the idea of 
federal support for culture put the agency in a precarious position, which became evident 
almost immediately after it was enacted.
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2.0  PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN THE 1970S 
“But, first of all, I would like to say I have heard and seen more converts today than I 
have in a long, long time. I regret that I did not bring a load of sawdust over to sprinkle in 
the aisles here in the House Chamber. More Members have been converted to the cause 
of arts and humanities than I ever expected to hear of in my life.”1 
 
 Thus said a dismayed Harold R. Gross (R-IA) during debate over the 1970 
reauthorization of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act. In what came 
as a surprise to Gross, among others, the GOP abandoned its initial opposition to federal 
funding for culture, and Republicans in Congress became vigorous champions of the 
NEA and NEH. Throughout the 1970s, Republicans joined Democrats in increasing the 
Endowments’ budgets, which reached their all-time real-dollar peak in 1979. For the first 
half of the 1970s, the Republican and Democratic positions on the agencies were 
indistinguishable. But beginning in the mid-1970s, while both parties remained 
supportive of the NEA and NEH, divisions between Republicans and Democrats began to 
arise over what the agencies ought to represent and how they ought to carry out their 
mission.  
These divisions were often framed as a conflict between elitism and populism. In 
the 1970s, while Republicans were generally on the side of elitism and Democrats on the 
side of populism, the elitism-populism cleavage did not fall neatly along partisan lines. A 
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minority of Republicans retained the GOP’s original opposition to the existence of the 
NEA and NEH, arguing that they represented the condescension of America’s cultural 
“elite” (a term of opprobrium in this case) and a frivolous waste of taxpayer dollars. 
Other Republican officials and conservative public intellectuals, however, proudly 
assumed the mantle of “elitism,” arguing that the NEH should focus on promoting high 
culture, namely academic research and scholarly-driven programs, and making grant 
decisions on the basis of merit or excellence as determined by strict peer review. In this 
sense, they embraced something akin to the original Great Society vision for the agency. 
Democrats exhibited populist, small-d democratic sensibilities in their insistence that the 
NEH broaden its reach by awarding grants to nontraditional recipients, underrepresented 
groups, and having the NEH cede control of the state humanities councils to state 
governments. Some politically liberal intellectuals, though, found themselves more 
aligned with Republican policymakers and conservative intellectuals, arguing that the 
Endowments should award funds solely on the basis of cultural excellence.    
I approach this analysis of Democratic and Republican positioning on the NEH 
through the lens of David Karol’s theory of party-position change. Karol defines political 
parties as “coalitions of groups with intense preferences on issues managed by 
politicians.”2 By “group,” he means a “self-aware collection of individuals who share 
intense concerns about a particular policy area.” Groups are bigger than the organizations 
that they encompass; for example, the “religious right” is a group that has included 
organizations such as the Christian Coalition and Moral Majority, and “the labor 
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movement” has included different unions. By “issue” he refers to big policy questions, as 
opposed to specific pieces of legislation.3   
Karol argues that position change is a byproduct of the party managing its 
coalition. He presents three modes of party position change: coalition maintenance, 
coalition group incorporation, and coalition expansion. Coalition maintenance happens 
when a party changes its position in response to the demands of a group that is already 
part of its coalition. Coalition group incorporation happens when a party changes its 
position to bring in a new a group. Coalition expansion occurs in the absence of groups 
with a stake or interest in the issue; politicians take a new stand in an effort to appeal to 
the general public.4  
The two models that are helpful in explaining the development of the politics of 
the NEH during the 1970s are coalition expansion in the case of Republicans and 
coalition maintenance in the case of Democrats. In the early 1970s, the idea of federal 
funding for the humanities was a “groupless” issue. This meant that President Nixon had 
the freedom to back the NEA and NEH in an effort to bolster the GOP’s appeal (or at 
least his own image) among the general public. Republican politicians rapidly changed 
their stand on the issue at hand; hence Congressman Gross’s lament about the stunning 
number of “conversions” he witnessed among his fellow Republicans. By the mid-1970s, 
as the NEH was giving away more money, Democrats had a political incentive to push 
for a broader distribution of funds to previously underserved populations such as racial 
and ethnic minorities: groups that were within the party’s coalition.  
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Coalition expansion and coalition maintenance are similar in that they both 
involve the parties rapidly changing position, and the change is because incumbent 
politicians take new stands, not because they are replaced. Conversion or “flip-flopping,” 
therefore, is a major source of party-position change. In fact, to remain ideologically 
consistent as a Republican or Democrat can require inconsistency—changing one’s 
views—on policy substance. In such instances, politicians reinterpret the implications of 
conservative or liberal principles or ideals with respect to a particular issue.5 
A significant way in which coalition expansion and coalition maintenance differ 
is in the stability of the policy change. In coalition expansion, because of the absence of 
groups, the new position is unstable; politicians can easily revert back to the original 
stance. In coalition maintenance, on the other hand, the new position tends to be stable. 
Politicians are hemmed in by the demands of pleasing their existing constituents and have 
little latitude to modify their position.6   
2.1 THE NEH’S EARLY YEARS: HOSTILE REPUBLICANS LIMIT 
AGENCY GROWTH 
As described in the previous chapter, the NEH was enacted because of a national 
consensus about the value of federal funding for the arts and humanities. As James Q. 
Wilson explains in regard to these kinds of policies, “When a consensus evaporates or a 
symbol loses its power, issues are handled by a process which…gives the advantage to 
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the opponents of change.”7 This aptly characterizes the difficulties that the NEH faced 
during its first four years. Republicans attacked the NEH for grants that seemed frivolous, 
capped its budget, and limited the length of its first reauthorization. Democrats 
demonstrated cooling enthusiasm, with many of them voting with Republicans to limit 
appropriations and some even voting against the first reauthorization, despite originally 
having supported the founding of the new federal foundation. Wilson’s account of 
majoritarian agencies bears hallmarks of Karol’s description of groupless issues; because 
of the absence of interested constituencies, political support can be unstable. At this point 
in time, important constituencies within the Democratic and Republican parties were not 
particularly interested in federal funding for culture.  
Shortly after the founding of the NEH, Congress chose to keep appropriations 
modest, below what it had authorized. In 1967, the House proposed an appropriation of 
$3 million in direct program funds for the NEH for the 1968 fiscal year (not counting the 
appropriation of matching funds in the event of private gifts).8 This amount was less than 
the $5 million that was authorized. It was also less than the House was willing to give the 
NEA and less than the NEH had to spend in total the previous fiscal year. In fiscal year 
1967, the NEH had $4.5 million in direct program funds at its disposal—$2 million from 
that year’s appropriation and approximately $2.5 million from the 1966 appropriation, 
which had gone mostly unspent because the agency needed additional time to get 
organized.9  
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During the appropriations debate, House Republicans pushed for limiting 
spending, with some members calling attention to grants that seemed to epitomize 
wasteful federal spending. Congressman Durward Gorham Hall (R-MO), who had 
opposed the enacting legislation, seized on a grant of $8,789 to UC Santa Barbara art 
professor David Kunzle for a study on “The History of the Comic Strip.”10 Hall 
introduced an amendment to freeze the NEH’s funding at the previous year’s level of $2 
million. Though Hall’s proposal lost by a vote 29-99, his attacks pushed the House to 
keep appropriations modest.11 When the House and Senate compromised on 
appropriations, the NEH was awarded $3.5 million in definite program funds (not 
counting funding for matching gifts), still below the $4.5 million in direct program funds 
which the NEA received.12   
When it came time to reauthorize the NEA and NEH for the first time, 
Republicans successfully limited appropriations levels. The bill that came out of the 
House Committee on Education and Labor authorized appropriations up to $40 million 
for NEH program funds in FY 1970, but that figure did not last long. Congressman John 
Ashbrook (R-OH), who had opposed the founding of the NEA and NEH, introduced an 
amendment to reauthorize the NEA and NEH for a single year and hold appropriations to 
what they were in FY 1968: $4.5 million in program funds for the NEA and $3.5 million 
for the NEH. Ashbrook’s amendment passed by a vote of 261-131. He carried nearly the 
entire Republican caucus, in addition to almost half of the Democrats—including 42 
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Democrats who had voted for the establishment of the NEA and NEH in 1965.13 Later 
that year, the House passed the conference legislation, which reauthorized the agency for 
two years and allowed for slightly higher appropriations, by a vote of 194-166. The bill 
was favored by a majority of Democrats and opposed by a majority of Republicans. Of 
the 63 Democrats to vote against the reauthorization, 16 of them had voted to enact the 
NEA and NEH three years earlier.14 
But even with the higher authorization levels in place—$8 million for FY 1969 
and $9 million for FY 1970—Congress was reluctant to appropriate significantly 
increased funds. For FY 1969, Congress gave the NEH only $200,000 more in program 
funds than the previous year, to the dismay of Senators Javits and Pell, the leading 
sponsors of the Endowments. Javits noted his “deep concern” and remarked, “apparently 
neither the Senate committee, nor the House of Representatives, at least so far, realizes 
the tremendous significance which is attached to these funds in the future of our country 
and in the hearts and minds of the American people.” He reported having attempted to 
restore $1 million in definite funds and $500,000 in matching funds to both the NEA and 
NEH in committee, but had “failed, by lopsided votes in both cases.”15 Four years after 
the agency’s launch, it was unclear that the NEA and NEH would ever grow at a rate 
beyond this halting pace. 
 
                                                        
13 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “To Amend H.R. 11308, a Bill to Amend the National 
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, by Cutting Authorization from the Committee Approved Level 
of $55 Million for Fiscal [sic] and $80 Million for Fiscal 1970 to $11.2 Million for Fiscal 1969,” February 
27, 1968, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/90-1968/h262.  
14 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Conference Report on H.R. 11308, a Bill to Amend the 
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act by Extending the Foundation for 2 Years,” June 5, 
1968, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/90-1968/h333.  
15 90 Cong. Rec. 18855 (1968). 
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Figure 1. NEH Program Funds, 1966 – 1970: Authorized Versus Appropriated16 
 
Early leaders of the NEH have spoken to the political difficulties and lack of 
enthusiasm that the agency dealt with in the early years. In April 1969, the NEH’s first 
chairman, Barnaby Keeney, was asked what he thought were the agency’s greatest 
accomplishments. “Surviving!” was his answer. Keeney added, “this is a very vulnerable 
operation, and it’s an operation that lends itself to controversy. It’s quite easy to make 
grants that will irritate more people than they will please.”17 Armen Tashdinian, who 
joined NEH as a staffer that same year, also spoke to the uncertainty that agency staff felt 
early on. When asked about how the agency understood its mission, Tashdinian, like his 
first boss, answered, “Survive.” Tashdinian recalled that after the Great Society Congress 
ended, there were fears at NEH that the agency risked being eliminated.18 Ronald 
Berman, who became chairman in 1971, said that one of the NEH’s “incipient problems” 
was “the restrained enthusiasm of Congress for the humanities.” According to Berman, 
                                                        
16 122 Cong. Rec. 11094 (1976). 
17 Barnaby C. Keeney, interview by Dorothy Pierce McSweeny, April 14, 1969, 
http://web2.millercenter.org/lbj/oralhistory/keeney_barnaby_1969_0414.pdf, 12-13.  
18  Armen Tashdinian (former NEH staffer) interviewed by author, August 16, 2013. 
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“while there was a minority in the House and Senate which actively promoted the two 
endowments the majority might be said only to tolerate them. The purposes of the [NEA 
and NEH] were often misunderstood, and sympathy for them was not extensive.”19 
2.2 REPUBLICANS CHANGE POSTION 
All this changed, however, in 1970. The NEH went from surviving to thriving 
because of a rapid, dramatic position change by Republicans. President Nixon, in a 
December 1969 message to Congress, called for reauthorizing the NEA and NEH and 
increasing their FY 1971 budget to $40 million. He offered many of the same arguments 
that proponents of the Endowments had voiced for years, framing it as an issue of 
advancing “the quality of life.” Nixon closed his message with words that could just as 
easily have come from President John F. Kennedy or Senator Hubert Humphrey: “Few 
investments we could make would give us so great a return in terms of human 
understanding, human satisfaction and the intangible but essential qualities of grace, 
beauty and spiritual fulfillment.”20  
 Nixon, in all likelihood, decided to back the NEA and NEH for reasons of both 
politics and policy. According to Jane Alexander, who served as NEA chairman between 
1993 and 1997, Leonard Garment, a Nixon advisor, told her that the President hoped that 
                                                        
19 Ronald Berman, Culture & Politics (New York: University Press of America, 1984): 5. 
20 Richard Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress About Funding and Authorization of the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities,” December 10, 1969, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2367.  
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supporting federal arts funding would mollify antiwar activists.21 Nixon also may have 
truly believed that increasing federal support for culture would be good for America. 
David Smith, author of a history of the NEA, does not discount political motives, but also 
argues that Nixon thought that art could help ameliorate social ills. In Smith’s words, 
Nixon believed that “the American soul was under fire,” with “the threat coming from the 
counterculture and the growing pervasiveness and acceptance of the pornographic, the 
obscene, and the anti-American.” Smith interprets Nixon as believing that art had the 
potential to improve the “moral life” of the nation.22  
 Many Republicans in Congress quickly followed Nixon’s lead in regard to the 
cultural agencies. In 1970, when the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act 
was up for reauthorization, the House considered a bill to extend the NEA and NEH for 
another three years. The bill authorized an appropriation level of $40 million for FY 
1971, per the President’s request, and placed no limits on funding levels in FY 1972 and 
1973. The House passed the bill by a vote of 262 to 78. The partisan breakdown on that 
vote was as follows: 
Table 2. House Vote in 1970 on Reauthorization Legislation23 
  Aye Nay Not Voting 
Democrats 163 34 46 
Republicans 99 44 43 
Total 262 78 89 
 
                                                        
21 Donna M. Binkiewicz, Federalizing the Muse: United States Arts Policy and the National Endowment 
for the Arts, 1965-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 172. 
22 David A. Smith, Money for Art: The Tangled Web of Art and Politics in American Democracy (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2008): 105-6. 
23 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “To Pass H.R. 16065, a Bill to Amend the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as Amended,” June 30, 1970, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/91-1970/h286.  
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Of the 99 Republicans who voted in favor of the bill, 49 of them were converts from 
having previously opposed to the NEA and NEH. All of those 49 members had voted 
against the establishment of the agencies in 1965, against the reauthorization in 1968, or 
both. The “converts” of that day included, among others, future Republican president 
Gerald Ford, then a Michigan congressman.24   
When it came time to reauthorize the NEA and NEH again in 1973, Republicans 
voted to do so by wide margins, with a significant number even resisting efforts to 
moderate spending. Both Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY) and Senator William 
Proxmire (D-WI) introduced amendments in their respective chambers to limit 
appropriations increases. Kemp’s amendment would have held appropriations to the FY 
1973 level. It failed by a vote of 141 to 248. His measure won a majority of the 
Republican caucus—but barely. 72 Republicans joined 175 Democrats in voting against 
it. Of the 72 Republicans, 23 of them had voted against the establishment of the NEA and 
NEH in 1965 and its reauthorization in 1968. Moreover, when it came time to vote on the 
final House version of the legislation and House-Senate conference legislation, a majority 
of the Republican caucus voted in favor of reauthorization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 116 Cong. Rec. 22151 (1970). 
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Table 3. House Votes in 1973 on Reauthorization Legislation25 
 Kemp Amendment Reauthorization House-Senate Conference 
  Aye Nay 
Not 
Voting Aye Nay 
Not 
Voting Aye Nay 
Not 
Voting 
Democrats 39 175 31 185 18 42 181 31 33 
Republicans 102 72 19 123 45 25 112 75 7 
Independent   1   1     1     
Total 141 248 50 309 63 67 294 106 40 
 
In the Senate, Proxmire’s bill would have slowed the increase in budget authorizations 
relative to the bill reported out of committee: $120 million versus $160 million in FY 
1974, $160 million versus $280 million in FY 1975, and $200 million versus $400 
million in FY 1976. That amendment was defeated by a vote of 61 to 30, with 
Republicans voting 29 to 10 in opposition. The Senate went on to approve the 
reauthorization by wide margin. 
Table 4. Senate Votes in 1973 on Reauthorization Legislation26 
 
 
                                                        
25 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “To Amend H.R. 3926, a Bill to Extend the National 
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act by Cutting Funding to $81 Million, a Reduction of $64 
Million,” June 14, 1973, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/93-1973/h153; U. S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, “To Pass H.R. 3926,” June 14, 1973, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/93-
1973/h155; and U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “To Agree to the Conference Report on S. 795, 
a Bill Amending the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965,” October 2, 1973, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/93-1973/h361.  
26 U. S. Congress, Senate, “To Amend S. 395, a Bill to Authorize Funds for the National Foundation on the 
Arts and Humanities for Fiscal Years 1974-76, so as to Provide $120 Million Increases in the Program 
through Fiscal Year 1976, Instead of $400 Million,” May 2, 1973, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/93-1973/s105; and U. S. Congress, Senate, “To Pass S. 795, a Bill 
to Authorize Funds for the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities for Fiscal Years 1974-76,” 
May 2, 1973, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/93-1973/s107.  
 Proxmire Amendment Reauthorization 
  Aye Nay Not Voting Aye Nay Not Voting 
Democrats 20 32 5 44 7 5 
Republicans 10 29 4 31 6 5 
Independent         1   
Conservative       1     
Total 30 61 9 76 14 10 
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The next two reauthorizations, in 1976 and 1980, also passed with broad bipartisan 
support. When the 1976 reauthorization legislation came before the House, Republicans 
supported it by a two-to-one margin. That same year, the Republican Party Platform 
reflected the GOP’s stance in favor of federal funding for the arts and humanities:  
The Republican Party is proud of its record of support to the arts and 
humanities during the last eight years…This upward trend in funding for the 
National Arts and Humanities Endowments deserves to continue but 
Washington’s presence should never dominate.”27 
 
Table 5. House Vote in 1976 on Reauthorization Legislation28 
  Aye Nay Not Voting 
Democrats 199 19 69 
Republicans 80 40 25 
Total 279 59 94 
 
In 1980, legislation reauthorizing the NEA and NEH for five years passed both houses of 
Congress on voice votes, with Congressman William D. Ford (D-MI) noting, “I do not 
believe this is a controversial measure.”29 
Backed by Democrats and Republicans, the NEH received a significant increase 
in appropriations, its budget reaching its all-time real-dollar peak in 1979.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 “Republican Party Platform of 1976,” August 18, 1976, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25843. 
28 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “To Pass H.R. 12838, to Amend and Extend the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, by Providing for the Improvement of Museum 
Services and by Establishing a Challenge Grant Program,” April 26, 1976, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/94-1976/h756.  
29 126 Cong. Rec. 29946 (1980). 
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Figure 2. NEH Appropriations: 1966 – 198130 
 
With Congress demonstrating its support, the NEA and NEH helped their own 
cause, taking on projects that bolstered their popularity among politicians. In this regard, 
the timing of the Bicentennial could not have been more fortuitous. The NEA and NEH 
took ownership of the federal government’s efforts to celebrate this milestone in the 
nation’s history, which they used as justification to ask Congress for more funding. 
Though the additional resources enabled some grants that were explicitly focused on the 
Bicentennial, the higher appropriations ultimately enabled the Endowments to do more of 
what they were already doing, as well as start new programs. Chairman Berman, in a 
chapter of his memoir, “Kidnapping the Bicentennial,” explains: 
The definition of the Bicentennial was changed: it no longer meant the 
celebration of a single occasion but the extended activity of NEA and NEH. 
Leonard Garment had done something taking the combined talents of Willie 
Sutton and the Duke of Urbino.31 
 
As Berman’s deputy chairman Robert Kingston recalls, were it not for the bicentennial, 
life for NEH would not have been as good.32 
                                                        
30 Humanities Indicators, “Federal Funding for the Humanities,” 
https://www.humanitiesindicators.org/content/indicatordoc.aspx?i=11.  
31 Berman, 32. 
32 Robert Kingston (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, April 30, 2014. 
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In this period of strong bipartisan support, the NEH benefitted from its connection 
to the NEA more so than the other way around. While the incorporation of the humanities 
was originally necessary to secure funding for the arts, by the 1970s, the latter had 
become the more popular of the two. Part of this was because of NEA chairman Nancy 
Hanks, who had “talent for political persuasion.”33 The arts were also more intelligible 
than the humanities, a term that many congressmen still did not understand. Berman 
recalls:  
The Arts Endowment had very quickly become the congressional favorite 
for a number of reasons. It served large audiences and it did things 
comprehensible to anyone who watched a performance. It had a fantastically good 
press. And it was backed by hundreds of institutions well experienced in lobbying 
for funds.  
 
Therefore, Berman was determined that the humanities would never be separated from 
the arts.34 Len Oliver, who served on staff at NEH beginning in 1971, remembers how the 
agency benefitted from its connection to the more popular NEA. As Oliver recalled, 
Hanks would go before the appropriations committees, and members would “ooh” and 
“ah.” Then, when it was Berman’s turn and members would ask what he wanted, he 
would request equivalent funding.35 
Still, the NEH also supported programs that increased the agency’s visibility. As 
Berman noted, he wanted to capture favorable media attention, which could bolster the 
agency’s standing among policymakers.36 NEH projects that enjoyed greater publicity 
included traveling exhibitions of art and historic artifacts. The most notable of these was 
                                                        
33 Mark Bauerlein and Ellen Grantham, eds., National Endowment for the Arts: A History, 1965-2008 
(Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Arts, 2009), 38. 
34 Berman, 10. 
35 Len Oliver (former NEH staffer) interviewed by author, May 21, 2014. 
36 Berman, 14. 
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“The Treasures of Tutankhamun,” which was seen by millions of people in several cities 
and is credited for “helping usher in the era of the blockbuster museum exhibition.”37 
Other notable NEH sponsored initiatives of the mid-1970s included:  
 histories of each state, produced under the auspices of the American Association 
for State and Local History 
  
 The Adams Chronicles, a TV miniseries that traced 150 years of the family that 
included U.S. presidents John and John Quincy, which ran on PBS and won four 
Emmy Awards  
 
 a highly publicized half-a-million dollar matching gift to the New York Public 
Library38 
 
Of course, members were pleased with what they saw the Endowments doing in 
their home districts and states. Congressman Gerald Ford, for example, took pride in a 
sculpture by Alexander Calder erected in his home city of Grand Rapids, Michigan. This 
was a project that had been made possible by a grant from the NEA and matching funds 
raised locally. Ford said that this project was “a good illustration of what can be done by 
the city, local leaders and the Federal Government working together.”39 In the Senate, 
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), who opposed Proxmire’s efforts to slow the growth of the 
agencies’ budgets, spoke at length about how NEA and the Arizona state arts council 
were providing opportunities for children on Hopi and Navajo Indian Reservations. Not 
only were the programs culturally enriching, but they also taught the children how to 
make crafts and other goods, like silver items, that could be sold and generate revenue for 
                                                        
37 Meredith Hindley, “King Tut: A Classic Blockbuster Museum Exhibition That Began as a Diplomatic 
Gesture,” Humanities 36, no. 5 (2015), 
http://www.neh.gov/humanities/2015/septemberoctober/feature/king-tut-classic-blockbuster-museum-
exhibition-began-diplom.   
38 See, Berman, 30-35, for a discussion of these grants and the public attention that the funded projects 
received.  
39 116 Cong. Rec. 22132 (1970). 
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the Indians. He noted that $182,000 in federal funds had helped stimulate $803,000 in 
local funds: “the kind of money that this conservative is interested in.”40 
It is important to note, however, that Republicans came to celebrate these kinds of 
projects and other initiatives by the cultural agencies after President Nixon had chosen to 
get behind the general idea of federal funding for culture, a decision that may have been 
motivated more by political calculation than a belief in the power of the arts and 
humanities to edify the life of the nation. Once the Republican Party became supportive, 
for as long as the issue of federal funding for culture remained groupless, members of 
Congress of both parties voted to provide significant appropriations increases. Yet by the 
mid-1970s, as the Endowments got bigger and greater amounts of funding were at stake, 
the parties’ positions began to shift in regard to what the NEA and NEH ought to 
symbolize and how they should carry out their mission. While the cultural agencies 
retained bipartisan support, more distinctly liberal and conservative positions emerged, 
with the debate framed in terms of elitism versus populism. 
2.3 ELITISM VERSUS POPULISM  
Something akin to the original Great Society vision of the NEH as a patron of 
high culture that awarded grants on the basis of professional standards retained adherents 
as the 1970s wore on. Yet those adherents were most likely to be conservative 
intellectuals and Republicans—not Democrats, even though it was largely Democrats 
                                                        
40 119 Cong. Rec. 13776 (1973). 
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who had brought the Endowments into existence. Politicians and thinkers on the Right 
seem to adopt this position not only on the basis of its merits, but also in reaction to the 
position staked out by Democrats, who began to insist that the cultural agencies, the NEH 
in particular, do more to benefit groups that were part of its constituency, such as 
organized labor, racial and ethnic minorities, and women. Democrats, in their insistence 
on broadening the distribution of the NEH’s grants, were viewed as populists. 
Conservatives and some Republican policymakers, in contrast, became vigorous 
champions of “excellence,” of keeping the Endowments focused on supporting projects 
of the highest quality, as determined by peer review. They came down squarely on the 
side of “elitism.”  
The elitism-populism cleavage, however, did not fall completely along partisan 
lines. Some Republicans maintained the party’s original opposition to the idea of federal 
funding for culture, a position that could also be described as “populist.” They viewed the 
NEA and NEH as “elitist,” but in a bad way. In their eyes, the cultural agencies 
represented arrogance and condescension; as the federal government viewing the 
common people as so benighted that it was necessary to create new bureaucracies to 
elevate their sights. At the same time, some politically liberal intellectuals were more 
likely to side with conservative thinkers and Republicans in opposing Democrats’ efforts 
to push the cultural agencies to use more “political” criteria in awarding grants. They, 
too, wanted the NEA and NEH to retain a commitment to funding cultural excellence.  
 The populist element on the Right never stopped believing that it was wrong for 
Washington to spend tax dollars on culture. When the National Foundation on the Arts 
and Humanities Act came up for reauthorization in 1970, though many Republican 
 76  
congressmen were following President Nixon’s lead, some Republicans vigorously 
registered their dissent. In a set of minority views attached to a report by the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, Congressmen William J. Scherle (R-IA), Edwin D. 
Eshleman (R-PA), and Earl F. Landgrebe (R-IN) asserted their opposition to the idea of 
federal funding for the arts and humanities on principle. They denounced the NEA and 
NEH, saying that they were predicated on a faulty notion: “the myth of American cultural 
backwardness.”41 This denial of the “myth of American cultural backwardness” was also 
part of the minority report by Republicans who opposed the establishment of the NEA 
and NEH back in 1965.42 Scherle, Eschleman, and Landgrebe argued that, in fact, 
America was rich in cultural activity. Not only did the federal government support 
colleges and universities, but Americans also voluntarily spent great amounts on 
“spectator activities and entertainment that may well be designated as forms of popular 
culture.” After describing the many ways in which Americans consumed popular culture, 
they noted:  
 We are quite aware that our self-constituted intellectual and artistic elite 
look with contempt on what they regard as these essentially vulgar and lowbrow 
entertainment and recreation preferences of the vast majority of the American 
people. 
 
Nonetheless, they argued, even if the majority’s tastes are “lowbrow,” democracy means 
that the government cannot force people to consume culture that they do not want. The 
dissenting Republican said that even if the public demanded that the government 
                                                        
41 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, National Foundation on 
the Arts and the Humanities: Report (to Accompany H. R. 16065), 91st Cong. 2d sess., 1970, H. Rep. 91-
936, “Minority Views,” 38. 
42 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, National Foundation on 
the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965: Report (to Accompany H. R. 9460), “Minority Views,” 89th 
Cong., 1st. sess., 1965, H. Rep. 618, 21. 
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subsidize culture, then “the Government if it were to remain genuinely democratic would 
be compelled to help them secure the kind of cultural fare they wanted and not what a 
small self-constituted elite decided they should be given even if they preferred something 
else.”43 
Throughout the 1970s, populist opponents of federal funding for culture 
continued to make hay out of grants that seemed to exemplify wasteful government 
spending and, even worse, subsidy for the radical Left. In that regard, some of the NEH’s 
grants in support of the observance of the Bicentennial came under fire. In 1975, Rep. 
Larry McDonald (D-GA), who happened to be the second president of the John Birch 
Society, introduced into the Congressional Record an article by Patrick Buchanan, 
“Propaganda Bath Looms for Nation’s 200th Birthday,” about the NEH’s American 
Issues Forum (AIF). The purpose of the AIF was to encourage citizens across the country 
to convene and discuss important themes of the American experience. Buchanan harped 
on the reading list put out by the NEH to foster discussion, claiming that the selections 
skewed heavily to the Left. While the list included the likes of Woodward and Bernstein, 
for example, it did not have any texts by William F. Buckley or Irving Kristol.44 In 1976, 
McDonald called attention to $3,000 that the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, an arm 
of the Weather Underground Organization, received from the American Issues Forum of 
Chicago—part of the broader American Issues Forum and a grantee of NEH. The funds 
helped support a National Hard Times Conference, which, according to McDonald, called 
for “mass demonstrations and violence” to disrupt the July 4th festivities in Philadelphia 
                                                        
43 U.S. Congress, House, Committee, National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, 38-39.  
44 121 Cong. Rec. 30144-5 (1975). 
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later that year.45 Yet this populist opposition became a minority stance among 
Republicans, most of whom followed the lead of Presidents Nixon and supported the idea 
of federal funding for the arts and humanities.  
The policymaker who probably did the most to elevate the elitist vision of the 
cultural agencies was NEH chairman Ronald Berman, a man who enjoyed both scholarly 
and conservative bona fides. A Shakespeare scholar who earned his doctorate in English 
Literature at Yale, Berman was a professor at UC San Diego. In addition to his literature 
scholarship, in 1968 he authored America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History, 
canvassing and analyzing the major thinkers and controversies of that tumultuous decade. 
The conservative rag Human Events reported that Berman was “a solid conservative,” 
who “was initially suggested by [National Review’s] book review editor, Frank Meyer” 
and “highly regarded by California’s Gov. Ronald Reagan.”46 His nomination was also 
endorsed by ALCS.47 President Nixon appointed him after scholarly organizations 
protested his first choice, Stephen Hess, a presidential aide. Frederick Burkhard, 
president of ACLS, had referred to Hess as “totally unqualified.”48 Human Events also 
criticized the choice of Hess, saying that he was a liberal Republican.49 
Berman drew charges of elitism early in his tenure as chairman. In August of 
1972, the New York Times reported on a conflict between him and staffers in the agency’s 
Division of Education. Shortly after arriving at the NEH, Berman expressed a desire to 
veto several grants for college courses that involved subjects such as genocide, lyrics by 
                                                        
45 122 Cong. Rec. 3094 (1976). 
46 “Conservative May Shake Up Arts and Humanities Foundation,” Human Events 31, no. 51 (1971): 3. 
47 Nan Robertson, “Scholar May Get Humanities Post,” New York Times, November , 1971, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers.  
48 Nan Robertson, “Humanities Post of U.S. in Dispute,” New York Times, June 25, 1971, 39.  
49 “Surprising Choice for Humanities Boondoggle,” Human Events 31, no. 23 (1971): 3. 
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Bob Dylan and The Beatles, the book The Greening of America, and film The Harrad 
Experiment (Berman was prohibited, however, from vetoing projects retroactively). 
Herbert McArthur, the director of that division, ended up resigning over his 
disagreements with the new chairman. McArthur said that he believed in interpreting the 
Endowment’s mandate broadly, encouraging innovation in humanities education and 
relating the humanities to current issues. Berman, when interviewed about the dispute, 
was adamant that a good humanities education involved introducing students to high 
quality works even if they proved challenging. According to the Times, Berman stated, in 
a prideful tone, “The humanities are a very hard thing.” Quoting Irving Kristol, he said, 
“So much that passes for educational innovation is an excuse for leveling down.” To the 
charge of elitism, Berman responded, “You can be accused of elitism if you confine it 
[education] to the elite, but you can’t be accused of elitism if you bring the best to the 
most.”50 
This idea of bringing the best to the most captured Berman’s approach to how the 
NEH ought to approach public programming, a major source of contention between him 
and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and a controversy which further encouraged the 
framing of debate over the agency as one of elitism versus populism. In his memoir, 
Berman explained:  
My own business in managing NEH was, I thought, to keep the humanities 
professional while making their benefits available to the public. Scholars could do 
the scripts for something like the Adams Family Chronicle and the public could 
enjoy good television. Art experts could arrange for the organization and 
interpretation of an exhibition on French Impressionism, and the public could 
enjoy museums even more unreservedly. What I should not do, I thought, was to 
                                                        
50 Linda Charlton, “Humanities Endowment Thrives Amid Internal Strife,” New York Times, August 18, 
1972, ProQuest Historic Newspapers.  
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redefine the humanities as in themselves sources of direct public benefit, or give 
to constituencies or pressure groups funds in the name of the humanities.51 
 
Of paramount importance to Berman was to maintain the integrity of the humanities, 
understood as professional academic disciplines with their own standards. Only thus 
could the humanities bring about the benefits they were actually capable of delivering, 
namely, helping people grow in intelligence. Berman resisted the notions found, for 
example, in the 1980 report, The Humanities in American Life, sponsored by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which claimed that the humanities could help foster goodwill 
and civic responsibility. As Berman noted, “The study of literature or of language, it had 
been acknowledged from Cardinal Newman on, did not make men better or more 
reasonable; it only made them more able.”52 To pretend otherwise, or, as he said above, 
view the NEH as a mere conduit of public funds to different groups, undermined what the 
humanities really were. 
Senator Pell, however, had a different view of how the NEH should go about 
uplifting the nation. Like Nixon, Pell’s perspective may have been driven by both 
political considerations and a sincere belief in what he was arguing. For Pell, it was 
insufficient for people to experience high culture produced by professionals. In Pell’s 
view, ordinary people themselves had to receive the actual grant money and carry out 
humanistic activities in the ways in which they saw fit. This position may have reflected a 
genuine belief that just as anyone could be an artist, anyone could also be a humanist.53 
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Yet Pell may also have taken this position in the interest of pleasing groups that were 
important components of the Democratic Party’s constituency.   
For years, Pell reiterated his interest in seeing the NEH directly benefit and 
support people other than academics. In 1970, when the NEH was up for reauthorization, 
Pell expressed to Chairman Barnaby Keeney his concern that “the humanities program 
might get too much into the esoteric field, supporting post-doctoral studies, and even 
helping graduate students through their doctorate.” He asked Keeney, “What about those 
who have no college degrees? A shoemaker who is a shoemaker by trade, but a humanist 
by avocation.”54 During Berman’s first confirmation hearing, Pell posed similar 
questions, asking the nominee’s views on “trying to spread the humanities around to the 
grassroots;” of awarding grants “to people who did not have the benefit of a Ph. D. or 
even an A.B. or a high school diploma, but were skilled or interested or believers in the 
humanities and were developing some area of expert knowledge.”55  
The disagreement between Berman and Pell came to a head during debate over 
the 1976 reauthorization, which coincided with Berman’s nomination by President Ford 
to a second term as chairman. In the Senate version of the reauthorization legislation, Pell 
proposed transitioning the state humanities councils (SHCs) to state government 
agencies, just like the state arts councils were. As will be described in the following 
chapter, the SHCs were nonprofit organizations, founded and funded by the NEH in 
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every state and federal territory beginning in the early 1970s, with the twin goals of 
engaging more citizens with the humanities and cultivating political support for the NEH. 
When the NEA and NEH were founded, the enacting legislation contained a provision to 
provide matching funds to states to set up state arts agencies. But there was no provision 
for state-based humanities affiliates (NEH undertook founding them in response to 
pressure from Congress). Pell wanted to provide a basis for the state humanities councils 
in the authorizing statute, as well as enable them to focus programming on the kinds of 
ordinary citizens that he wanted to reach.   
Berman, however, did not agree with Pell’s plan to transition the SHCs from 
nonprofits to state agencies. Under the arrangement between the NEH and SCHs at that 
time, the Endowment exerted considerable control over what the SHCs did, including 
restricting them to supporting public-facing programming geared toward out-of-school 
adults. The NEH did this to prevent the SHCs from replicating what the Endowment was 
doing at the federal level through its main grant divisions—research in particular. But 
under Pell’s plan, the SHCs would have the autonomy to fund whatever they wanted. 
Moreover, their governing boards would be appointed by governors. Until that point in 
time, the SHCs’ board members, many of whom were local academics, chose their 
successors.  
Berman was concerned with the prospect that, under Pell’s plan, the state councils 
would start funding scholarly research projects, but without the kind of vetting that the 
NEH’s rigorous peer-review process provided. Research proposals, he argued, were 
much more appropriate to be evaluated at the national level. The National Council on the 
Humanities, the NEH’s presidentially appointed advisory body, prepared a report critical 
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of Pell’s proposal, which Berman referred to during reauthorization hearings.56 While 
Pell appeared to liken the NEH to the NEA, Berman argued that it was more appropriate 
to view NEH as a counterpart to the National Science Foundation (NSF). Like NSF, the 
NEH was concerned with advancing knowledge that pertained to specific academic 
disciplines, which were listed in the founding statute. Berman said:  
To support serious work in either [the sciences or humanities], as the 
Council suggests, requires evaluation and judgment by the best minds available 
according to national—and even international—standards of merit. The Council 
fears a falling-away from such criteria, and my feeling is they are right.57  
 
State government agencies, in the view of Berman and the Council, could not be counted 
on to evaluate proposals according to the highest standards and generate truly meritorious 
humanities projects. Furthermore, because the SHCs had to apply for funding in the same 
way as other grantees, which meant that they themselves were also subject to peer 
review, there could be greater confidence in the quality of their programs.58  
Pell, however, was not convinced. He was displeased with how he perceived the 
NEH was allocating grants under Berman’s leadership. During hearings, Pell told 
Berman, “I would not be frank if I did not say that I have a certain sense of letdown on 
the Humanities side.”59 Too many grants, he believed, even among the state humanities 
councils, were going to academia. Pell believed that the state arts councils “have done a 
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far better job…in developing diversified, popularly supported, constructive programs at a 
grassroots level.”60  
Berman tried to convey his commitment to reaching “the grassroots” through 
discussing the high-quality initiatives that were broadly accessible. Notable efforts in this 
vein were The Adams Chronicles which aired on PBS and the NEH’s “Courses by 
Newspaper” program, through which scholars authored a series of articles on a topic in 
the humanities, which ran in hundreds of newspapers nationwide.61 Yet Pell still found 
the NEH’s efforts wanting. During Berman’s reconfirmation hearing, Pell said, “I said I 
expected people in those occupations [grocers and lumberjacks] as amongst others to be 
the beneficiaries of the Humanities programs in their own terms and in their own way.”62 
At another point in the reconfirmation hearing, Pell quizzed Berman on how much money 
had been awarded to “women’s organizations, business organizations, labor groups, 
bilingual groups, senior citizens groups, and handicapped organizations,” some of which 
were then important Democratic constituencies.63  
Pell blocked a vote on Berman’s confirmation to a second term as NEH chairman, 
which provoked an outcry among intellectuals, conservative ones especially, but some on 
the Left as well. Conservatives lionized Berman for opposing legislation that, in their 
view, would degrade the NEH, changing it from a bastion of high standards to a 
dispenser of pork. They also blasted Pell as a philistine. So vicious and numerous were 
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the detractors that Pell suggested he had been the victim of an “orchestrated campaign.”64 
William F. Buckley, for example, ridiculed Pell’s proposal and the notion that grants 
could enable mechanics and other laborers to write, paint, and sculpt in their leisure 
time.65 George Will, in a column for the Washington Post, “High Culture and Basic 
Politics,” praised Berman’s dedication to the principle of merit. Will lauded the NEH as a 
“success” in government and commended the agency’s system of evaluating proposals: 
It uses the guidance of 5,000 experts who are the (dare one use the 
words?) “best and the brightest” of the nation’s humanistic scholars. But there is 
nothing objectionable about this. NEH’s mission is to help sustain high culture in 
a commercial society. 
 
Though Will would later call for the abolishment of the NEH, in the mid-1970s, he 
expressed a perspective that resembled the Great Society vision for the agency. He closed 
the op-ed saying: 
But a government need not apologize for using agencies like NEH and 
persons like Dr. Berman to attend to matters of the nonscientific mind. Although 
less narrowly utilitarian than most government concerns, they are at least as 
important.66 
 
Some liberal intellectuals joined conservatives in defending Berman against Pell. The 
New Republic published an editorial, “Blocking Berman,” stating:  
For close to a year Pell has waged an erratic and hyperbolic vendetta 
against Berman, making ill-conceived demands that NEH become a local 
patronage dispenser, rather than the keeper and patron of standards in humanistic 
scholarship and mass education it has been.67  
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As will be explained below, some intellectuals, though politically liberal, opposed what 
they saw as Democrats’ efforts to broaden the distribution of NEA and NEH grants at the 
expense of excellence. 
Notions of “elitism” and “populism” continued to frame the debate over the NEH 
following Berman’s departure and his replacement by Joseph Duffey. It was widely 
believed that Duffey’s nomination had more to do with his political credentials than 
knowledge about the humanities—though he did have a Ph.D. from Hartford Seminary 
and had taught there and at Yale Divinity School as an adjunct professor (at a young age 
he was ordained a minister in the United Church of Christ). When President Carter 
appointed Duffey to head the NEH, the latter was serving as Assistant Secretary of State 
for educational and cultural affairs. He had been a delegate to the Democratic National 
Conventions in 1968, 1972, and 1976 and had worked on the Carter presidential 
campaign. He ran for the Senate himself in 1970 in Connecticut as an anti-war candidate, 
winning the Democratic primary but losing the general election, which was a three-
person race. He was national chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action from 
1969 to 1971. From 1974 to 1977, he was the chief administrative officer and spokesman 
for the American Association of University Professors. He was married to Ann Wexler, 
who was a deputy under secretary of Commerce under President Carter.  
Conservatives were alarmed about the potential implications of a Duffey 
chairmanship for the NEH. Hilton Kramer, who in the early 1970s had praised the 
National Endowment for the Arts for the professionalism of its bureaucracy,68 issued an 
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apocalyptic warning in the pages of the New York Times, where he served as art critic. 
Kramer left the Times in 1982 and founded The New Criterion, a conservative cultural 
affairs journal. Despite the title of Kramer’s article, “The Threat of Politicization of the 
Federal Arts Program,” much of it had to do with the humanities. Kramer pointed to a 
White House memo to the committee charged with finding a new chairman for the NEH, 
which stated that the nominee “should probably be familiar to organized labor, ethnic 
organizations, community and junior college organizations, and principal educational 
broadcasters, as well as more familiar non-academic humanities groups like research 
libraries,” and that “the endowment’s most important initiatives will almost certainly be 
in non-traditional and public areas, while its base remains in academia.” Kramer 
interpreted this direction from the White House as follows:  
The code words are unmistakable in their meaning. In short, numbers—
rather than quality, knowledge or distinction—are now to be the touchstone of 
achievement. 
 
Kramer decried attacks on the notion of “elitism,” denounced “Senator Pell’s philistine 
notions of culture,” and concluded with high praise for what the NEA and NEH had been 
during their first ten years, while warning of what they could become: 
…the endowments have by and large done an outstanding job in 
upholding the “leadership” of the “best” in both the arts and the humanities. In 
this sense, but in no other, they have indeed been elitist—and at times, perhaps, 
not even elitist enough. This is why they have earned our respect and gratitude. 
They have been a great success, and their loss would have terrible consequences 
for our culture. This is why so many are now so anxious about the new era we are 
entering.69 
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George Will expressed similar reservations about Duffey as NEH chairman in an op-ed 
for the Washington Post, “An Endowment that Should Stay ‘Elitist.’”70  
Subsequent media coverage appeared to vindicate conservatives’ fears about the 
direction that Joseph Duffey would seek to take the NEH. In December 1977, for 
example, the New York Times published an article by Robert Brustein, dean of the Yale 
School of Drama, “Whither the National Arts and Humanities Endowments?” Brustein 
traveled to Washington, D.C. to interview Duffey, congressional leaders such as Senator 
Pell, and the new chairman of the NEA, Livingston Biddle. Brustein’s conversations did 
not leave him confident that the Endowments would focus their limited resources on the 
most exemplary projects. He reported, for example, a conversation he had with Pell, who 
discussed his hope that the NEH might fund a program in which ordinary citizens in 
“barren” areas such as Montana and Nebraska would sit around wood-burning stoves and 
deliver papers on great books. Brustein reflected:  
It was true enough, as has been charged, that these agencies were being 
“politicized,” but the politicization went much deeper than the intervention of 
pressure groups, vested interests and meddling politicians…Once fully 
professional and oriented toward the artist and the scholar, the Endowments were 
now preparing to spread their relatively meager moneys among educationalists, 
audiences and amateurs as well, on the essentially political assumption that any 
resources generated by the people should benefit all the people immediately and 
simultaneously.71 
 
A 1979 story in the New York Times, two years into Duffey’s tenure, reported that 
the NEH had been making grants of a more “populist” nature. According to the Times:  
After several months of investigating the two agencies responsible for 
Federal cultural support, it is possible to say that there is now a discernable and 
growing trend toward the politically popular policy of assisting newer, more 
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regionally dispersed “populist” groups rather than traditional “elitist” cultural 
institutions.  
 
Several new NEH grantees highlighted by the Times included the Labor Institute for 
Human Enrichment, part of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Labor Study Center; the National Council 
of La Raza; the Farmers Union; and the Conference of Mayors Research and Education 
Corporation. The percentage of funds that went to organizations in New York, home to 
many “established humanities organizations,” declined from 23 percent in 1977 to 19 
percent in 1978, while funding to the ACLS went from $2.7 million to $2 million 
between 1976 and 1978.72 
In this context, the parties’ rhetoric about federal funding for culture became more 
distinct. Recall that when Nixon announced his support for the NEA and NEH, his 
rhetoric was indistinguishable from what agency proponents had said during the Great 
Society era. But in the mid-to-late 1970s, Democrats began to call upon the Endowments 
to do more to encourage the nation’s cultural diversity and serve minorities, not only by 
expanding access to the humanities to these communities, but also by giving greater 
recognition to their own unique cultural contributions. Republicans and conservative 
intellectuals, in contrast, stressed the importance of merit and excellence.  
Chairman Duffey, in his prepared statement for hearings on reauthorization 
legislation, discussed the NEH’s felt obligation to focus on neglected constituencies—
and not simply by bringing the best to the most. He stated, “our strength as a nation of 
nations is made manifest in the cultural pluralism that mirrors the diversity of our 
citizens.” The NEH, in Duffey’s view, needed to empower different groups to pursue 
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their own expressions of culture. He explained, “Of special concern to us is the need to 
provide assistance to ethnic and other minorities who seek to use the humanities to 
illuminate their separate cultural traditions, to enrich their personal lives, and to increase 
their contributions to our common cultural life.”73  
As chairman, Duffey sought to put this commitment to pluralism into practice. 
According to Stephen Miller: 
In order to show that he was trying to help blacks, Hispanics, and women 
to get more grants, Duffey created new staff positions—liaisons to minority 
groups. These staff members would help minority applicants with their proposals, 
if not exactly write them. Duffey also tried to ensure that more members of 
minority groups were chosen to serve as peer reviewers.74 
  
The increased use of minorities as peer reviewers was an objective that Congress tacitly 
affirmed in the 1980 reauthorization. In the section that authorized the chairmen of both 
Endowments to make use of advisory panels, Congress amended it to say that they “shall 
have broad geographic and culturally diverse representation” (the italicized words 
represent the addition that came in the 1980 amendments; the insistence on geographic 
diversity on panels was inserted in 1973).75 
These moves came as the NEH was being pressured by groups representing 
blacks and women. Representatives from the Congressional Black Caucus, for example, 
met twice with Chairman Duffey in 1977, in which they called for greater NEH support 
for blacks, whom the Caucus estimated received less than three percent of the agency’s 
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funding, and for Hispanics, whom were estimated to receive even less. Duffey also met 
with representatives from women’s groups, who “urged inclusion of more women in the 
peer review process, more grant awards to women, and more studies of subjects relating 
to women.”76 
The rhetoric of the Democratic Party Platform of 1980 reflected the party’s shift 
in emphasis toward making the NEA and NEH more supportive of ethnic minorities. The 
previous three platforms—1968, 1972, and 1976—had continued to explain the 
Democratic Party’s support for the Endowments in terms that had been used during the 
Great Society period: 
 1968: We will encourage support for the arts and the humanities, through the 
national foundations established by a Democratic Congress, to provide incentives 
for those endowed with extraordinary talent, enhance the quality of our life, and 
make productive leisure available to all our people.77 
 
 1972: Support for the arts and humanities is one of the benchmarks of a civilized 
society. Yet, the continued existence of many of America’s great symphonies, 
theatres and museums, our film institutes, dance companies and other art forms, is 
now threatened by rising costs, and the public contribution, far less than in most 
advanced industrial societies, is a fraction of the need.78  
 
 1976: We recognize the essential role played by arts and humanities in the 
development of America. Our nation cannot afford to be materially rich and 
spiritually poor.79 
 
Quality of life, productive leisure, civilized society, and materially rich and spiritually 
poor—and the explicit mention of higher forms of culture (great symphonies, for 
example)—were all part of the Great Society vision of how the arts and humanities could 
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edify American life. But in 1980, while pledging support for the NEA and NEH, the 
Democratic Platform also noted the Party’s commitment to:  
Seeking greater recognition for the rich cultural tradition of the nation’s 
minorities. We will work to meet the cultural needs of minorities, encourage their 
greater participation in the performing arts on a national level, and provide grants 
for the arts in low-income neighborhoods.80 
 
This was the first time that the Democratic Party Platform had noted its belief in serving 
minorities, specifically, through federal funding for the arts and humanities.  
Republican Party Platforms prior to 1980 had actually been ahead of the 
Democrats in terms of noting how the NEH, under GOP leadership, had sought to support 
minorities. The Republicans’ 1972 platform stated, “The [NEH] also supports programs 
to raise levels of scholarship and teaching in Afro-American, American Indian and 
Mexican-American studies, has broadened its fellowship programs to include junior 
college teachers, and stresses adult or continuing education, including educational 
television and film series.”81 The 1976 Republican Party Platform stated, “We 
Republicans consider the preservation of the rich cultural heritages of our various ethnic 
groups as a priority goal.”82 Perhaps the best way to interpret this rhetoric is to view it as 
part and parcel of the GOP’s efforts to use federal funding for the arts and humanities in 
an attempt at coalition expansion; in this case, to signal its concern for minorities.     
By 1980, however, Republican rhetoric about federal funding for the arts and 
humanities had come to focus on the notion of excellence. The 1980 GOP Platform made 
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no overtures toward minority groups. Rather, it criticized the Carter Administration for 
having “crudely politicized [the NEA and NEH], lowering their standards of excellence 
and increasing federal control over them.” In their platform, Republicans pledged to 
“restore…the integrity of federal programs in this area.”83 During the 1980 campaign, 
then-candidate Reagan echoed criticisms about “politicization” at the NEA; the notion 
that the Carter administration had made grant decisions based on geographical 
considerations as opposed to the quality of what was being proposed. Reagan said that, if 
elected, “merit and merit alone” would determine which artists received grants. He also 
said, “the arts, unlike some other activities, demand excellence and discipline.”84 
The most vigorous call to renew a commitment to excellence within the NEH 
came from the Heritage Foundation in its 1980 Mandate for Leadership: Policy 
Management in a Conservative Administration. This 1,000 page tome presented analyses 
and policy recommendations for all cabinet departments, independent regulatory 
agencies, and other select organs of the federal government. Mandate, a project that 
began in 1979, was intended to “[assist] the transition to a new administration in the 
event that a conservative president were elected in 1980;” to present a conservative 
agenda for the first 100 days.85 The chapter on the NEA and NEH was authored by 
Michael Joyce, who was then executive director of the conservative John M. Olin 
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Foundation. Future NEH chairman William Bennett, who was then heading the National 
Humanities Center in North Carolina, was a consultant to the assessment.86 
Joyce, in his analysis of the NEH, equated excellence with academic scholarship 
and research, as determined by peer review. Like the early proponents of a federal 
humanities foundation, Joyce suggested that the NEH could help provide ballast against 
some of the more unsavory aspects of American democracy (though with rhetoric that 
stressed the notion of excellence):  
At its best, the NEH stands for excellence, the highest fruit of the pursuit 
of liberty. As a true friend of democracy, the NEH can teach the nation the limits 
of equalitarian impulse.  
 
Joyce called for refocusing the agency on scholarship, “an important cultural goal,” as 
opposed to more public-facing programs. Joyce insisted that the NEH: 
rescind guidelines for racial or ethnic quotas applied to the grant review 
and evaluation processes…The criterion of excellence should be applied to 
selection of application reviewers as well as to the applications themselves…It 
must be explained that the discovery of excellence in minority groups, and its 
reward, is discouraged, not encouraged, by such quotas.  
 
Joyce recommended serious review or outright termination of certain grant programs, 
while saying that the Fellowship Division “could usefully receive more funding and other 
support…In general, the Fellowship Division is solid because of its concern for 
scholarship.”87  
Though champions of elitism and excellence were more common, or at least more 
vocal on the Right, some politically liberal intellectuals voiced similar concerns about the 
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direction of the NEA and NEH under the Carter administration. In April 1978, Brustein, 
quoted above, joined Michael Straight, who had served as deputy chairman of the NEA 
under Nancy Hanks, in publicly debating Duffey and Cornell history professor Mary 
Beth Norton, whom Carter appointed to serve on the National Council on the Humanities. 
The question that they debated dealt with the notion of elitism in the arts and humanities 
and policymaking at the Endowments.88 Straight, upon resigning as acting chairman of 
the NEA, lodged scathing attacks against the Carter administration’s management of 
cultural policy, criticizing the political nature of his appointments. Livingston Biddle, 
whom Carter had appointed chairman of the NEA, had served as an aide to Senator Pell. 
Straight also claimed that “pressure groups” of women and blacks aimed “to put 
Government funding of the arts on a quota basis.”89  
While Straight and Brustein were partisans of excellence over equity, neither 
could be said to be politically conservative. Straight had previously been a member of the 
Communist Party, a KGB collaborator, and speechwriter for FDR. Brustein, who spent 
most of his career in drama, began blogging on culture and politics for The Huffington 
Post in 2006, in which he has expressed admiration for President Barack Obama. Yet 
when it came to federal cultural policy, both men believed that the Endowments should 
be focused on supporting creative genius and less concerned with the constituencies that 
received funds. 
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89 Grace Glueck, “Endowment Head Decries ‘Politics,’” New York Times, October 12, 1977, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers. Straight said, “The cancer of political interference has begun to undermine the 
credibility of the endowments.”  
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2.4 THE FRAGILITY OF THE GREAT SOCIETY IDEAL 
For its first fifteen years, the NEH was subject to wildly varying political 
fortunes, going from embattled to thriving to being pressured to adjust how it interpreted 
its mission. Groups, as well as the absence of groups, were critical in these developments. 
Because there were no groups interested in the agency at first, there was an opportunity 
for coalition expansion, which President Nixon chose to embrace. But for this decision, it 
is questionable whether the NEA and NEH would have grown significantly or quickly. 
Prior to that decision, Republicans were generally opposed to the Endowments and they 
had attracted Democrats to the cause of keeping their budgets from growing significantly. 
If Nixon had not surmised that backing federal funding for the arts and humanities could 
be politically advantageous, the NEA and NEH could possibly have withered.  
By 1980, the vision that had inspired the founding of the NEH—the federal 
government as patron of high culture to counter democracy’s ills—still had champions. 
Yet whereas the original proponents of that vision had mostly been Democrats, by that 
time, they were more likely to be Republican and on the conservative end of the 
ideological spectrum. Democrats, whose constituency included racial and ethnic 
minorities, labor unions, and other groups, began to push for the NEA and NEH to be 
more responsive to the interests of those constituencies and distribute greater funding 
toward them, both through the national Endowments and the state councils. Republicans, 
in contrast, became advocates of excellence and the notion that the NEH ought to make 
decisions on the basis of scholarly peer review. 
Though the idea of federal funding for the arts and humanities had achieved 
bipartisan support, that support was potentially fragile. Democrats, though still supporters 
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of the NEA and NEH, were increasingly concerned with how the agencies were directly 
benefitting their constituencies. Republicans, for their part, backed federal funding for 
culture, but that support was not anchored in any constituency. Their championing of 
“excellence” and “merit,” though probably sincerely felt by some proponents, also may 
have been a position taken to distinguish themselves from Democrats and appeal to 
voters who opposed the idea of special privileges for minorities.   
 Given the agency’s political instability, it stood in need of advocates with the 
incentive to mobilize on its behalf. Because those advocates did not exist at the outset, the 
agency had to create them. That is the story of the origin of the state humanities councils, 
told in the following chapter.
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3.0  CONSTITUENCY BUILDING: THE FORMATION OF THE STATE 
HUMANITIES COUNCILS 
 As described in the previous chapter, the political vulnerability of the NEA and 
NEH was evident shortly after their enactment. Following their establishment in a 
moment of great headiness, enthusiasm in Congress for the arts and humanities dissipated 
quickly. Senator Pell, the legislative founder of the NEH in particular, was concerned 
about its chances for long-term sustainability. During the late 1960s, the Endowments 
gained little in the way of appropriations, as Democrats joined with Republicans to slow 
the growth of their budgets. Though the 1970s turned out to be a period of tremendous 
budget growth, it was because of President Nixon’s unexpected decision to champion the 
arts and humanities, a move at least partly intended to improve his own political standing.  
  As of 1970, even with support in Congress, the NEH lacked a constituency with 
the incentive to mobilize and advocate on the agency’s behalf. Though the American 
Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and other scholarly organizations had elevated the 
idea of a federal humanities foundation in public discourse, academics in the humanities 
were not inclined toward doing the work of advocating for the agency over the long term. 
Barnaby Keeney, the NEH’s first chairman, spoke of the professoriate’s limited appetite 
for lobbying. In a speech to the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa, Keeney recounted 
that in 1967, a congressman who was supportive of the NEH sent letters to a list of 
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65,000 people, many of whom were presumably scholars in humanistic disciplines, in an 
effort to generate letters back to Congress. Of those 65,000 recipients, only 500 took the 
time to write. “That was a real shocker, and discouraged members who believed that they 
had a background of public support.” Keeney then said of his fellow academics, “We’re 
in the habit, politically, of eloquently endorsing something, following our eloquent 
endorsement with silence and inaction, as happened before, and happened again.”1 
  But academics’ limited interest in lobbying is perfectly understandable in view of 
the incentives at stake. The NEH, from the very beginning, awarded grants on a 
competitive basis. While scholars and cultural institutions no doubt appreciated having 
another potential source of funding, there was no guarantee that they would be grantees. 
Lobbying Congress on the NEH’s behalf does not necessarily lead to a grant, especially 
considering how competitive some programs can be.  
  Senator Pell wanted more people writing letters, but this could not be expected 
from academics. The NEH needed a constituency with a strong incentive to do so. Herein 
lies the establishment of the state humanities councils (SHCs). Though Pell also sought 
policy objectives through the SHCs, they were founded very much in an effort to bolster 
the agency’s viability.  
  But at the same time, for all of the political advantages that the state humanities 
councils could confer on the NEH—such as channeling federal funds to states that were 
not receiving much in the way of agency dollars and increasing its visibility among the 
general public—they also represented a potential challenge to the Endowment, should 
they develop an agenda and priorities of their own. As Eric Patashnik has explained in his 
                                                        
1 Barnaby Keeney, Speech to United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa, University of Indiana, September 10, 
1970, 14-15, Box 110: VIII, 35, papers of Barnaby Keeney, John Hay Library, Brown University Archives. 
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study of the sustainability of general-interest policy reforms, while the cultivation of 
clienteles is often essential to sustain such reforms, those clienteles “can themselves 
become threats to the general good” (italics in the original). Patashnik says, “Reformers 
thus must worry not only about whether vested interests will emerge after reform, but 
about whether vested interests can be constrained if they do.”2 
The early history of the state humanities councils represents an attempt by the 
NEH to cultivate a clientele, reap the attendant political advantages, and still keep that 
clientele under its control. This helps account for the particular manner in which the 
Endowment formed the SHCs in the first place: as independent nonprofits, supported by 
the NEH, but restricted to a narrow set of activities, unlike the state arts councils after 
which they were modelled, which were state government agencies. The NEH was also 
partly responsible for founding the organization that would become the SHCs’ main 
advocacy group: the Federation of State Humanities Councils. The formation of both the 
SHCs and the Federation would eventually play integral roles in the sustainability of the 
NEH—as well as the determination of its budgetary priorities. The introduction of the 
SHCs inaugurated a change in the NEH’s overall interest-group context, from purely 
majoritarian politics to something that also bore the hallmarks of what James Q. Wilson 
referred to as “client politics,” in which there is “a dominant interest group favoring its 
goals.”3  
                                                        
2 Eric M .Patashnik, Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes Are Enacted (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008): 176-7. 
3 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989): 76. 
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3.1 A GRASSROOTS CONSTITUENCY FOR THE HUMANITIES  
Early on, Senator Pell urged the NEH to cultivate a broader base of political 
support and viewed the state arts councils as a possible model to emulate. As Pell 
explained to Keeney during a hearing on the agency’s 1970 reauthorization:  
…speaking as a politician, the lower the organizational level you get to, 
the more your grassroots support, the more visibility you have, and the easier it is 
to help yourself here on the Hill. In this regard the State arts councils have done a 
rather conspicuously excellent job.4 
  
State arts councils were a feature of the 1965 legislation that established the NEA and 
NEH. Through them, Congress sought to pursue several goals, including increasing 
access to the arts, providing a degree of local control over public funding of the arts, and 
fostering broader political support for public arts funding.5  
During the early 1960s, support for the idea of a national state arts program grew 
along with support for the idea of a federal arts foundation. The New York State Council 
on the Arts, established in 1960, set a precedent for what a state arts agency could 
accomplish in terms of increasing access to arts in underserved communities.6 Legislation 
to establish a state arts program was introduced in the Senate in 1962,7 and August 
                                                        
4 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Committee on Education and Labor and Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Amendments to the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act 
of 1965: Joint Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and 
Labor, House of Representatives and the Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities of the Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate on H. R. 15196 and S. 3238, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, 
77. 
5 Julia Lowell, State Arts Agencies 1965-2003: Whose Interests to Serve? (Arlington, VA: RAND 
Corporation, 2004): 5, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG121.html.  
6 Mel Scott, “The Federal-State Partnership in the Arts,” Public Administration Review 30, no. 4 (1970): 
379-80. 
7 See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Establish a U.S. National Arts 
Foundation: Report (to Accompany S. 741, as amended), 87th Cong., 2d. sess., 1962, S. Rep. 2260. 
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Heckscher, President Kennedy’ Special Consultant on the Arts, suggested it as a 
possibility in his 1963 report to the President.8  
The 1965 legislation authorized funding for the NEA to help states set up and 
maintain state arts agencies. The NEA provided planning grants to states that did not yet 
have arts councils and annual grants for operations thereafter, which were to be matched 
by state appropriations. Prior to 1960, only six states had arts agencies, and of those 
“Utah was the only one with an active program using state funds.”9 But, by virtue of the 
offer of federal matching funds, by 1966, every state and territory with the exception of 
Samoa had some form of arts agency (a Samoa council eventually launched as well).10 
However, it was not until 1974 that all 50 states put up appropriations of their own.11  
The state arts councils were formed as state agencies, governed by independent 
boards composed of unpaid private citizens appointed by public officials, typically the 
governor. The boards made decisions on grants with the advice of expert panels. The 
purpose of this structure was to insulate grant decisions from political pressure and help 
ensure that they were made on the basis of artistic merit.12  
                                                        
8 U.S. Congress, Senate, The Arts and the National Government: Report to the President Submitted by 
August Heckscher Special Consultant on the Arts, May 28, 1963, July 11, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st. sess., 1963, 
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Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 11308, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 
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12 Julia F. Lowell and Elizabeth Heneghan Ondaatje, The Arts and State Governments: At Arm’s Length or 
Arm in Arm? (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006): x, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG359.html.   
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Early on, many state councils struggled to obtain much in the way of state funds, 
and it is questionable how much actual grassroots support for the arts they really helped 
foster. According to Julia Lowell, “[State arts agencies’ (SAA)] initial role as conduits 
for federal arts money—combined with their emphasis on major urban institutions and 
mostly high art forms—meant that most SAAs didn’t enjoy strong grass-roots political 
support within their states.”13 Nevertheless, leading congressional advocates of federal 
support for culture were pleased with the state arts councils, or at least the concept. 
Senator Pell said of the state arts councils, “Quite honestly, this is what has given us the 
political support we have needed to keep the program going.”14  
The authorizing statute, however, did not contain a similar provision for state 
humanities programs. Though Pell wanted the NEH to start one, at least on an 
experimental basis, Chairman Keeney was reluctant to do so.15 Part of the difficulty, in 
Keeney’s view, was that it was unclear what a grassroots, locally-based humanities 
program would be, and how citizens might respond. Keeney told Pell during a 
congressional hearing:  
I think there would be certain difficulties with this, because there is not 
presently very considerable public activity in the humanities as there is in the arts, 
and a successful program requires public activity to continue.  
 
I rather suspect that that public activity needs to be stimulated over a 
period of years.  
 
Program quality was another open question. Keeney said:  
                                                        
13 Lowell, State Arts Agencies 1965-2003, 5, 8. 
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Committees, Amendments to the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (1970), 197.  
15 Keeney, soon after his chairmanship ended, publicly regretted not establishing state humanities councils, 
saying that doing so would have helped bring the humanities to the general public. But while heading the 
agency, he was always reluctant to go in this direction. Barnaby Keeney, Speech to United Chapters of Phi 
Beta Kappa, 7. 
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I think it is fair to say that I would expect that grants that would be made 
by that mechanism might be the lower intrinsic quality than grants that will be 
made through the national council, but possibly of greater interest. 16  
 
In a letter to Senator Pell, Keeney was even more direct: 
The truth of the matter is that I am not sure it will work. I am quite 
unimpressed with what the State Councils in the Arts do, excepting with their 
political impact, and I am afraid of that. 
 
In that same letter, he also raised the prospect of state humanities councils pressuring 
Congress to fund them at the expense of national programming. This was a danger he saw 
with respect to the arts councils, noting that “their pressure on the Arts Endowment now 
is such that if they get their way, the Arts Endowment will have less program funds for 
national programs in 1973 than in 1971, unless the authorization is made quite large.”17 
What became the main bone of contention between Chairman Berman and 
Senator Pell—the prospect that state councils would seek to replicate what the NEH was 
doing nationally, such as research, but without the quality control provided by serious 
peer review—was of serious concern at the outset. According to John Barcroft, the 
legendary bureaucrat who was responsible for launching the Endowment’s state 
humanities effort, this fear was felt throughout the agency.18 Armen Tashdinian, another 
early staffer, said that the NEH feared that implementing a state program would lead to 
“vanity projects” in local areas and divert funds from what was already a tiny budget.19  
Following the 1970 reauthorization, the NEH understood that to satisfy its 
congressional overlords, it would have to begin some kind of locally based humanities 
                                                        
16 Amendments to the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (1970), 77. 
17 Letter, Barnaby Keeney to Claiborne Pell, February 16, 1970, Records of the National Endowment for 
the Humanities, Office of the Chairman, Correspondence with Federal Agencies, 1965-1976, Box 2, 
Record Group 288, National Archives at College Park. 
18 John Barcroft, email message to author, September 6, 2014. 
19 Armen Tashdinian (former NEH staffer) interviewed by author, August 16, 2013. 
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program. But for the insistence of Senator Pell and other congressmen, it is questionable 
whether the NEH would have undertaken such an initiative. In 1982, NEH deputy 
chairman Geoffrey Marshall said the following about the origins of the state councils: 
…the state humanities program did not arise because of a clamor for it 
from the citizens of the nation. There was no significant grass roots pressure on 
the NEH or on Congress for a state humanities program. Professors had never 
heard of such a thing. Citizens had never experienced such a thing. Europeans 
didn’t do it and neither did the Russians.20 
 
But Pell thought that it was essential to cultivate greater grassroots support, and Congress 
made it clear that inaction on the issue would have consequences. In 1971, the House 
appropriations committee reduced the NEH’s budget relative to NEA’s by $2 million 
because of the lack of a state program.21 The NEH feared that if it persisted in not setting 
up a state program, Congress might cut its budget, or worse.22  
This pressure from Congress came just as Keeney’s term ended and Wallace 
“Wally” Edgerton took over as acting chairman. Unlike his predecessor, Edgerton was 
eager to get the state program started. A former Senate staffer, Edgerton believed a state 
humanities program could help foster congressional support for the NEH, just as the NEA 
had used the state arts councils to its advantage.23 Edgerton, who served as acting chairman 
for a year and a half—the amount of time it took for the Nixon administration to settle on 
                                                        
20 Geoffrey Marshall, “Our Circumstances in FY 1982,” Federation Reports 5, no. 1 (1982): 20. 
21 Memorandum, John Barcroft to Ronald Berman, “Program Definition and Problems, State-Based 
Program and Special Projects Program,” January 26, 1972, 3, NEH Digital Repository, Office of 
Federal/State Partnership, Administrative Files. See also, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1972: 
Report (to Accompany H.R. 9417), 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, H. Rep. 92-308, 30.  
22 Jamil Zainaldin (former president of the Federation of State Humanities Councils) interviewed by author, 
June 10, 2015. See also, Cheryl Dickson (former president of the Minnesota Humanities Commission), 
interview by Clarke A. Chambers, July 3, 1995, http://purl.umn.edu/49121. According to Dickson, “In fact, 
finally, in 1970, which is five years after the Endowment legislation, the Congress threatened the NEA [sic] 
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23 Tashdinian interviewed by author. 
 106  
Ronald Berman and for him to be confirmed—made starting a state program a priority of 
the NEH. 
3.2 THE FOUNDING OF THE STATE HUMANITIES COUNCILS 
The NEH, in its development of the state-based humanities program, sought to 
secure the political advantages of broadening its reach, while avoiding having to 
compromise its programmatic agenda and commitment to supporting scholarly 
excellence. If the NEH was to launch a state-based program, the agency wanted to be 
sure that it would leverage its political clout on behalf the agency’s agenda—and not 
develop its own competing set of priorities. These considerations lay behind the laborious 
efforts that the NEH put into launching the program, as well as the highly specified way 
in which it structured the program initially. 
Given pressure from Congress to begin a state humanities program quickly, the 
NEH considered early on the possibility of working through state arts councils because 
this would represent the fastest way of distributing federal funds at the state level. 
Though the NEH briefly experimented with this approach, as described below, the 
agency quickly decided not to pursue that path. Barcroft, at the time, said that working 
through the state arts councils would have been “disastrous, both in terms of program 
quality and in terms of long-term political efficacy.” The state arts councils lacked the 
knowledge to carry out good humanities programs and were unlikely to promote them as 
enthusiastically as their arts programs. Barcroft told Chairman Berman that the director 
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of the Michigan Arts Council had told him, “you must know that when you deal with arts 
councils you’re going to get our second best effort.”24   
Before describing in detail how the NEH went about establishing the state 
program, it is worth saying a bit about Barcroft. Those who knew him say that he was 
brilliant and driven, an all-around force of nature, which made him well suited to design 
and implement this ambitious initiative.25 Barcroft had been one of the NEH’s first 
staffers, arriving in June of 1966. Barcroft worked in the NEH’s Office of Planning and 
Analysis (OPA), eventually serving as director. As an undergraduate at Brown University 
in the 1950s, he had gotten to know Barnaby Keeney and remained friends with him 
during his graduate studies at the University of Minnesota, where he earned a Ph.D. 
Before joining the NEH, he taught early modern European history, English history, and 
Tudor-Stuart history at Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts. Barcroft left the NEH 
in 1969 to become provost of New College in Sarasota, Florida, only to return in January 
of 1971 as director of the Division of Public Programs.26 
                                                        
24 Memorandum, John Barcroft to Ronald Berman, “Program Definition and Problems, State-Based 
Program and Special Projects Program,” 3. 
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26 John Barcroft interviewed by author, September 5, 2014; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976: 
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 4, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 
881-2 (Biography of John Barcroft). 
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The NEH initially experimented with three different approaches in six pilot states. 
All three involved the state-based entity “re-granting” NEH funds, matched with private 
resources (either dollars or in-kind support), to sponsor “public activity in the 
humanities.”27 In Oklahoma and Maine, the NEH awarded funds to the state arts councils 
to launch a humanities component. In Missouri and Georgia, the NEH worked through 
university continuing education and extension programs. In Oregon and Wyoming, the 
state-based program took the form of a “de novo” committee.28  
The NEH staff determined that the best way to proceed was through de novo 
independent committees, which it went on to found in all 50 states, territories, and 
District of Columbia (the state-based efforts were called “committees” before they 
generally became referred to as “councils”). To get started in a given state, the NEH first 
recruited a “catalyst group” of five or six people who were involved or at least interested 
in the humanities. The groups usually included academics in the humanities, university 
administrators, heads of local cultural organizations such as libraries and historical 
societies, corporate people, and labor union officials. Forming these catalyst groups took 
considerable effort on the part of NEH staff, requiring extensive research, generating lists 
of dozens if not more than 100 prospects, cold-calling, and follow-up. The catalyst 
groups were then invited to Washington, D.C., where Barcroft briefed members on the 
goals of the state program and worked with them to brainstorm ideas for the program in 
their respective states.29 Bruce Sievers, who was the founding executive director of both 
                                                        
27 Memorandum, Wallace B. Edgerton to Members of the National Council on the Humanities, “State-
Based Public Humanities Programs,” August 11, 1970, 2-3, NEH Digital Repository, Office of 
Federal/State Partnership, Administrative Files. 
28 Geoffrey Marshall, “A Thumbnail History of the State Humanities Program,” 1978, 1, NEH Digital 
Repository, Office of Federal/State Partnership, Administrative Files. 
29 Marshall, “A Thumbnail History of the State Humanities Program,” 3-5; Barcroft credits a man named 
William Fleischmann—then an economics Ph.D. who was in between jobs—with doing the herculean task 
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the Montana and California humanities councils, recalls that Barcroft was particularly 
effective at energizing and inspiring the core groups to get things going.30 
When the catalyst group returned home, it would apply to the NEH and receive a 
planning grant. During the planning period, the core group would recruit additional 
members and grow the committee to between 12 and 20 people, all of whom would serve 
as unpaid volunteers, as well as hire a temporary staff. The committee would convene 
meetings throughout the state to introduce the initiative, gauge local organizations’ 
interest in applying for funds, and determine a theme for the re-grant program (a 
requirement of the NEH). Upon the conclusion of the planning period, the state 
committee would apply to the NEH for an operational grant, which would cover 
administrative expenses and be used to make re-grants to local humanities groups, 
provided re-grant funds were matched either dollar-for-dollar or with in-kind services. 
State committees would eventually incorporate as independent nonprofit (501c3) 
organizations.31  
The NEH was deliberate in the order of states in which it proceeded, starting with 
rural states that were, in some respects, more manageable than big, humanities-rich states 
such as New York and California, two of the last states to have committees.32 Starting 
with more rural states sent a message to Congress that the NEH was serious about 
                                                        
of recruiting the core groups. Hired as an NEH consultant, Fleischmann cold-called dozens of people in 
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reaching populations that did not already have much access to the humanities.33 It might 
not have been coincidental that many members of the Interior appropriations 
subcommittee, which determined the NEH’s budget, hailed from western states. 
The staff believed that this approach, though “laborious,” had significant 
advantages. By choosing the initial members of the catalyst groups, the NEH could have 
greater confidence that they would understand the Endowment’s goals. Barcroft foresaw 
a process, over the long-term, of “assimilating [groups] to a full understanding of NEH,” 
which would help strengthen the quality of state programs. Because members of the 
committees usually hailed from universities or had connections with scholars, they were 
well positioned to get academics in fields such as history, philosophy, and literature to 
consider how they might interest local communities—the state program’s main objective. 
Furthermore, it was in the Endowment’s interest to establish these independent 
committees quickly, so as to prevent state arts councils from becoming the designees of 
NEH funds. When it was clear that the NEH was about to begin a state program, the 
Associated Councils of the Arts urged state arts councils to change their names to “arts 
and humanities councils,” if they did not already bear that title. Barcroft feared that if a 
state agency set itself up to become the recipient of NEH state grants, it would be 
politically difficult to direct funds elsewhere.34  
The NEH was very specific about the kinds of activities the state committees were 
to undertake. The agency wanted to ensure that the committees’ programs were 
thoroughly based in the humanities, had the potential to generate wide audiences, and 
                                                        
33 Julie Van Camp (former program officer, Division of State Programs) interviewed by author, August 5, 
2014. 
34 Memorandum, John Barcroft to Ronald Berman, “Program Definition and Problems, State-Based 
Program and Special Projects Program,” 3-5. 
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would not replicate what the NEH was doing through national grant competitions in areas 
such as research, fellowships, and education. The NEH, therefore, established six 
principles, intended to promote a sense of uniqueness and coherence to the state 
humanities program. They were:  
(1) The humanities should be central to all aspects of the committee’s program. 
(2) Scholars in the humanities should be involved centrally in each project funded 
by the state committee. 
(3) All grants of a state committee should support projects dealing with public 
policy issues. 
(4) The committee should have a carefully chosen state theme, and the theme 
should be central to each project. 
(5) Projects should involve the adult, out-of-school public. 
(6) The committee objectives should be achieved by making grants.35 
 
The third principle, that all re-grants support projects that related the humanities 
to public policy issues, was perhaps the strangest attribute of the early state committees, 
though there were clear purposes behind it. Barcroft believed that the focus on public 
policy would make the programs of greater interest to average citizens and help cultivate 
a greater base of support:  
It undercuts a common public (and Congressional) perception of the 
humanities as frivolous fields which only a leisured class can enjoy, and permits 
the state-based groups to attract the interest of new constituencies for the 
humanities. (E.g., labor—the chairman of the Alaska humanities group is Dwayne 
Carlson, the president of the State AFL-CIO.)36  
 
The policy requirement also partook of the idealism of the era, in which many people 
believed that it was time for serious discussion and reflection about the nation’s values, 
and that the humanities had insights to contribute.37 Congress, in the agency’s 1968 and 
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1970 reauthorizations, explicitly encouraged the NEH to do more to relate the humanities 
to pressing issues, amending the statute’s definition of “humanities” to include “the study 
and application of the humanities to the human environment with particular attention to 
the relevance of the humanities to the current conditions of national life.”38 The NEH 
viewed its state program as a way of complying with its congressional mandate.39 
The Oregon committee, one of the pilot efforts, provides an example of early 
programming, in which the focus was on relating the humanities to public policy for the 
out-of-school adult public. The inaugural theme of the Oregon committee was “Man and 
the Land.” According to the NEH, “programs developed by historians, philosophers, and 
other humanists will aid public discussion of the ecological and land-use questions that 
are particularly of public concern in Oregon.”40 Three of the first projects sponsored 
under the auspices of “Man and the Land” were “aimed at rural areas of the state not 
usually serviced with educational programs” and were designed to “bring humanists and 
humanistic insights into dialog with the public.” The Oregon Historical Society was to 
produce a book and film strip about land use in Oregon. The Oregon State System of 
Higher Education was to produce a documentary and work through its extension agents 
to convene lectures and discussion groups based on it. And the Jackson County Library 
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was to develop traveling exhibits that would then be the subject of discussion sessions at 
local libraries.41 
Not all state committees were enthusiastic about the public-policy requirement, 
with some directors wanting to do purer humanities projects that were unrelated to a 
current issue. Tom Roberts, the first director of the Rhode Island Council on the 
Humanities, recalls that in many projects, the policy angle felt “thrown in.” He also 
remembers a time in which he was frustrated not to be able to partner with the Rhode 
Island Historical Society on a project because it did not involve public policy.42 Barcroft, 
however, viewed the public policy element as essential to the state program. The policy 
dimensions, combined with the other principles, helped give focus to the councils’ 
activities: 
It is clear, then, that this is not a general support program for the 
humanities at the state level. State-based groups do not give fellowships, support 
research, or make grants to educational institutions for internal purposes. Beyond 
this, it is not a general support program for public activity in the humanities; on 
the contrary, it is highly focused around a theme (and the better the theme is, the 
less generalized the state-based group’s support is), it concentrates on public 
problems, and it takes a rather hard-nosed view that the humanities, essentially as 
Congress has defined them, should be the focus of support.43  
 
The policy focus also gave the state-based program “its moral urgency.”44  
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Though the state committees were formally independent organizations, the NEH 
sought to maintain them as an integrated part of the Endowment. Unlike the state arts 
councils, which were state agencies with freedom to support whatever they pleased, the 
state humanities committees were limited in what they could do and managed much more 
directly by the NEH. The NEH conceived of the state committees as complementing its 
national initiatives and as potential vehicles for enhancing the impact of the programs it 
sponsored. Barcroft, for example, imagined that state committees might sponsor local 
programs about a film supported by the Endowment.45 In 1973, the NEH offered the 
following description of its state-based effort:  
The [State] Committee acts as an arm of the Endowment to fund locally 
initiated programs throughout the state. This program is an attempt to reach the 
citizen at the “grass-roots” level and to give the responsibility for mounting 
humanities activity to those who will directly participate in those activities.46 
  
Supported originally through grants from the NEH’s Division of Public Programs, 
the state committees had to apply for funding in the same way as any other prospective 
grantee, whether a university, museum, or historical society. The state councils were 
required to prepare funding proposals, which were then peer-reviewed, evaluated by the 
staff, reviewed by the National Council on the Humanities, and then approved by the 
chairman. The state arts councils, by contrast, received NEA funding as a matter of 
course, provided states put up matching appropriations. 
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The NEH, through implementing this vision for the state humanities councils, 
sought to preserve the integrity of its national grant programs, as well as meet Congress’s 
goal of expanding its reach among the general public and fostering greater public support 
for the agency. Barcroft believed that the NEH could not assume that the state 
committees would automatically support the Endowment or be of the same mind. He 
believed that the NEH was going to have to work hard to ensure that the committees 
remained supportive of its overall mission and their particular role in that mission. 
Barcroft explained to Chairman Berman: 
It is exceedingly important for state-based groups to have a sense that they 
are “part” of NEH; otherwise, they may become moribund, or worse, 
misunderstand and undervalue our national programs of fellowships, research, 
and education, as well as our national public programs…Down the road, we are 
going to have to find a way to keep them informed about and sympathetic to all 
NEH activity (just as the Arts Endowment does with their state arts agencies.) 
This will make them more effective spokesmen for us within the states, and also 
can help to avoid a situation in which our interests and theirs are not mutually 
supportive.47 
 
But to the NEH’s dismay, proposed legislation for the 1976 reauthorization opened up the 
possibility of undermining its intentions for the state program. 
3.3 THE 1976 REAUTHORIZATION 
Senator Pell, as discussed in the previous chapter, was disappointed in the 
performance of the state humanities committees. He believed that the arts councils were 
doing a far better job of reaching the populations of their respective states and that the 
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SHCs’ grant-making was too academic in nature. Moreover, the state humanities 
committees raised less in matching money than the arts councils.  
Pell attributed the SHCs’ shortcomings to the NEH’s (and Berman’s) attempt to 
exercise control over the program. He claimed that the NEH’s policy of “centralization” 
had “tended to cloak the Endowment programs in elitism and hindered imaginative 
efforts to bring the richness of humanistic studies to bear on the lives of the average 
American.”48 Pell did not admire how the NEH had been influential in the formation of 
the SHCs’ first boards and how the boards appointed successor members. Pell likened the 
NEH’s role to “the anointing by some Federal official of chosen people within the State 
who must pay very close attention to a Washington base.”49 During Berman’s hearing for 
re-confirmation, Pell noted that while Democrats usually tend to favor the federal 
government, in this case, he thought that the programs were better left in the hands of the 
states.50    
To remedy these problems, in the 1976 reauthorization process, Pell proposed 
legislation that would have placed the state humanities program under the control of state 
governments. In Pell’s proposed reauthorization measure, the language organizing the 
state humanities program was nearly identical to the language organizing the state arts 
program. Under his proposal, state governments would designate the entity to receive 
federal funding for its respective state humanities program, which would have the 
freedom to carry out the same kinds of activities as the NEH did nationally, whether 
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research or public-facing programs. Moreover, each state was guaranteed, at minimum, 
$200,000 in federal funding, though the federal government could fund, at most, 50 
percent of the state’s program; i.e., matching funds would be required.51  
Chairman Berman and the National Council on the Humanities firmly opposed 
Pell’s proposal, which, in their view, raised the specter of what the NEH had long sought 
to avoid: replication of national grant programs at the state level. In response to Pell’s 
proposal, the National Council on the Humanities authored a report arguing for retaining 
the state program’s original structure. The crux of the Council’s argument, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, was that because the humanities represented academic 
disciplines, they should be viewed more like the sciences than the arts. The Council 
reminded Congress that although the NEA and NEH were founded together, it was 
because of “administrative convenience coupled with political necessity.” Like scientific 
research, scholarship in the humanities is evaluated by standards that transcend 
geographic borders, which is why federal resources were best distributed through a 
national competition. The establishment of 50 separate entities, charged with advancing 
the humanities, “must inevitably imply the parochializatin [sic] of research and teaching, 
the duplication of experimental efforts, and the gradual dismantling of national strength 
in the humanities.”52  
The Council insisted that keeping the SHCs as independent nonprofit 
organizations, led by voluntary boards of directors, was superior to turning them into 
state agencies. As state agencies, the councils could be more reluctant to tackle 
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controversial issues, assuming that they would retain their focus on relating the 
humanities to public policy. State agencies would likely involve higher administrative 
costs, while the SHCs’ use of volunteers saved money. Ensuring “quality and extent” of 
humanities programs, not changing the administrative structure to become state agencies, 
was most important to broadening the constituency and political support for the 
humanities.53  
The state committees joined NEH in opposing Senator Pell’s proposal. At joint 
House-Senate hearings on reauthorization held in November of 1975, the chairmen of the 
Minnesota, Virginia, Nebraska, Vermont, and Rhode Island committees all testified to the 
accomplishments of their programs and opposed the plan to transition the councils to 
state agencies.54 Barcroft recalls being copied on hundreds of letters that the state 
committees sent to Congress stating their opposition to Pell’s plan.55  
The final reauthorization legislation did not require the SHCs to become state 
agencies; but neither did it preserve NEH’s full control over them. The SHCs received 
the freedom pursue the same activities as the NEH. The legislation also permitted the 
NEH to receive applications for state program funding from any appropriate entity within 
each state, including the existing nonprofit committees (opening up the possibility that 
another entity, other than the one initiated by NEH, could also apply to become the 
state’s humanities council). The reauthorization gave governors the opportunity to 
appoint two board members to the state committees and up to half the board members if a 
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state matched the federal grant with state appropriations. The state councils were required 
to adopt policies to ensure broad representation of people from within the state and a 
regular rotation of members.56  
In summation, the 1976 reauthorization complicated the NEH’s plans for how it 
would relate to and control its clientele. The legislation had given the SHCs greater 
independence from the NEH; no longer could the agency formally restrict them to certain 
activities. Moreover, the NEH was required by law to dedicate at least 20 percent of its 
budget to the state program. However, the legislation still required the state committees 
to apply to the NEH for funding, leaving in place a process through which the NEH could 
still exert some influence. While the SHCs interpreted the legislation as having given 
them independence and solidifying their existence, the NEH still felt a sense of 
ownership; that it was still the parent and the SHCs still the children. 
3.4 THE FEDERATION OF STATE HUMANITIES COUNCILS  
The relationship that developed between the NEH and state councils was, in the 
words of one state council director, “sometimes collaborative, sometimes 
confrontative”—and was so “since the beginning.”57 While the NEH and SHCs were 
interdependent, their objectives were sometimes in conflict. The task of managing these 
conflicts fell partly to an organization that was a creature of both the NEH and SHCs: the 
Federation of State Humanities Councils (as it later came to be called). The Federation 
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was a vehicle through which the SHCs asserted more of their own collective voice, as 
well as a means through which the NEH exerted some influence over them. From the 
beginning, the Federation was also viewed as a potential lobbying force for both the 
SHCs and NEH. Investigative journalist Michael Mooney, in his 1980 broadside against 
the NEA and NEH, The Ministry of Culture, cast the Federation as “an organization NEH 
created, funded, and maintained as its own lobby to carry out NEH’s own policies in the 
states.”58 But the reality was more complex, with the Federation inspiring suspicion from 
both the NEH and the SHCs. Though the Federation eventually came to see itself 
primarily as the SHCs’ voice in Washington, D.C., it took years for it to work out this 
sense of its identity and its standing vis-à-vis its members and the NEH.  
Pressure for such a national representative organization for the state humanities 
committees began in the mid-1970s. Some of the pressure was the result of administrative 
necessity. The NEH, a grant-making agency, was not suited to administer the state 
humanities committees spread throughout the country. It had become increasingly 
difficult for NEH staff and the state committees to communicate efficiently, for example, 
resulting in frustration on both sides. It is likely that if the Federation had not been 
established, the NEH would have found another organization, a university or corporation 
perhaps, to which to outsource various administrative functions.59 Pressure was also 
coming from the SHCs, which believed that a national organization could help provide 
them with greater collective voice and facilitate inter-council cooperation.  
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In the mid-1970s, several state committee executive directors—the paid 
professionals who oversaw day-to-day operations—began discussing the possibility of 
forming such a group. Barcroft, upon learning this, was appalled, viewing it as a potential 
challenge to NEH authority.60 But Barcroft also saw that a national organization of state 
committees was inevitable, so he ended up favoring the creation of a federation. Initially, 
however, he sought to form the federation working with the committees’ volunteer board 
members, not the puckish directors.61  
With financial support and guidance from the NEH, a group of state committee 
chairmen developed a plan for a national organization, which was endorsed 
overwhelmingly at the national meeting of state committee chairmen in Seattle in August 
of 1976. In 1977, the Federation for Public Programs in the Humanities came into being, 
its name reflecting the SHCs’ early focus on public-facing efforts.62 The organization’s 
bylaws allowed for both volunteer board members and paid executive directors to serve 
on each state committee’s delegation to the Federation’s governing body.63 By then, 
Barcroft was leaving the agency, and it is unclear whether the board members had similar 
reservations about the executive directors’ participation. 
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The Federation’s potential as an advocacy or lobbying entity was apparent from 
the start. This was a sensitive issue, given the Federation’s close ties to the NEH. When 
the House voted on the conference version of the 1976 reauthorization, Rep. Albert Quie 
(R-MN) spoke approvingly of the state councils’ plans to form a national organization, 
but said that he would object if the NEH were to fund it:  
If that were the case, it would lessen the potential organization’s 
independence from the endowment, and would mean that the endowment would, 
directly or indirectly, be funding whatever lobbying or political activities a 
national organization might engage in. 
  
Congressman Brademas echoed Quie’s concern and said that he preferred that the 
organization seek private funds.64 Because the Federation came into being with NEH 
support and was almost certain to receive at least some Endowment funds,65 it is not 
surprising that the group of chairmen who were planning the Federation disclaimed that it 
would be a lobbying organization. The committee was very intentional in its decision not 
to locate the Federation in Washington, D.C.66 Though the Federation would eventually 
move to the nation’s capital in 1986, it spent its first nine years based in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.   
When the Federation incorporated as a 501(c)(3) organization in 1979, the 
question of its advocacy role was still a sensitive matter. The Federation ultimately 
decided that it was appropriate to take on a limited set of “lobbying” activities as 
permitted by law. These activities primarily involved informing the state committees 
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about legislation and policies affecting the state humanities programs and informing 
Congress and federal agencies about what the SHCs were doing.67 These were activities 
that the founders of the Federation had foreseen; that it would “aid in the exchange of 
information with legislative and executive leaders in government.”68 In the run-up to the 
1980 reauthorization, for example, when Pell again sought to encourage the councils to 
transition to state agencies, Federation leaders worked to inform Congress of how the 
councils were succeeding in their nonprofit form.69 When the Reagan administration 
intended to cut the NEH’s budget in half, the Federation kept the councils informed about 
the state of the appropriations fight in Washington and urged present and former state 
committee members to contact their congressmen, notifying them of what cuts would 
mean locally.70   
Despite the initial misgivings of Representatives Quie and Brademas, there is 
little evidence to suggest that members of Congress were deeply concerned with what the 
Federation was doing in regard to lobbying, even as the NEH provided much of the 
organization’s funding through contracts for various services. Early on, the Federation 
was of far greater concern to staff inside the NEH, as well as an object of concern to 
some of the SHCs themselves. Because of the Federation’s murky origins, as a joint 
creature of both the councils and the NEH, parties on both sides viewed the organization 
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with some suspicion. Staff at the NEH perceived the Federation as a potential adversary, 
while some of the councils suspected that it was a means through which the NEH might 
try and exercise control. Some state council directors saw the Federation in this light 
when it began sponsoring orientation conferences for new state committee chairmen, with 
funding provided by the NEH. According to James Veninga, a longtime director of the 
Texas committee, “It probably was not a coincidence that these orientation meetings 
began as the state councils were claiming autonomy.”71   
In 1979, the House Appropriations Committee conducted an investigation of both 
the NEA and the NEH. In regard to the Federation, the Committee noted how staff at the 
NEH had serious concerns: 
In the opinion of some NEH staff, the Federation as presently conceived is 
an unofficial “lobbying” organization. Endowment personnel have advised the 
Investigative Staff the Federation is beginning to make NEH very “nervous.” 
Because of ill-defined goals and an inadequate statement of purpose, Endowment 
personnel believe the Federation represents a rather nebulous entity. According to 
NEH staff, the Endowment was responsible for the genesis and growth of the 
Federation. NEH, at the time, perceived an unqualified need for such an 
organization; however, according to NEH officials, the Endowment reached this 
conclusion without sufficient afterthought. As a result, the Endowment is now 
involved in a confrontation situation with an organization almost entirely funded 
with Endowment money. NEH personnel have advised the Investigative Staff the 
Federation has begun to challenge Endowment policies on divergent issues.72 
 
The NEH, in its response to the Committee, said that the Federation was an initiative of 
the state committees and denied that it was involved in lobbying. It did not, however, 
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address the charge that the Federation and the Endowment were “involved in a 
confrontation situation.”73  
However, despite the suspicion and occasional distrust, the Federation probably did 
more to defuse tensions between the SHCs and the NEH than exacerbate them. Steven 
Weiland, the first long-serving executive director of the Federation, believes that the NEH 
was smart to sponsor the Federation, in part because it gave the state committees a separate 
place to complain. The Federation and the NEH’s Division of State Programs generally 
worked well together, keeping one another informed about developments in the states and 
at the NEH.74 
3.5 TOWARD CLIENT POLITICS 
 During an appropriations hearing in 1979, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) spoke to 
Chairman Duffey about the importance of the state arts and humanities councils on the 
Hill: 
Your Endowment and the Arts Endowment have thrived because of strong 
State committees. As soon as you do away with those State committees, you will 
lose your support in the Congress. That is all there is to it. They are the people 
who contact us individually… Not a year goes by that my Alaska committee 
doesn’t see me here at their own expense and also insist on seeing me in Alaska… 
 
My point is that I really think you are making a big mistake—and I said 
this to your colleague with the National Endowment for the Arts—if you don’t 
encourage the growth of those committees. They are your lobbying group. They 
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are the people who get you the support and, I think, will maintain your 
Endowment.75 
 
Though Stevens may have overstated the political importance of the SHCs in 1979—after 
all, the NEH had obtained bipartisan support and entered a period of budgetary expansion 
before the state humanities program even existed—he was prescient in saying that they 
would maintain the Endowment.  
However, the SHCs did not end up gaining clout simply by virtue of spending 
money in their respective states and across congressional districts—important as that was. 
The SHCs became a dominant interest group with the potential to achieve their interests 
because of the rise of the culture wars and the Republican Party’s changing position 
toward federal funding for the arts and humanities. That story is the subject of chapter 
five; the following chapter is on how the culture war influenced changes in party 
positioning.    
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Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 
on H.R. 4930, Part 4, 96th Cong. 1st sess., 1979, 3521. 
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4.0  PARTY POSITIONING: 1980 – 1995 
On January 15, 1987, as many as 500 Stanford undergraduates marched in protest 
of the university’s core humanities curriculum, “Western Culture.” Joined by civil rights 
activist Jesse Jackson, the students chanted, “Hey hey, ho ho, Western Civ has got to go.” 
Among the program’s various requirements was that all students read the same 15 works 
of religion, literature, and philosophy, beginning with the book of Genesis and 
concluding with Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents. In 1986, Stanford’s 
Black Student Union had criticized the course as “racist” for its failure to include any 
books by black writers. Hispanic and feminist student groups followed suit, alleging that 
the curriculum was biased against them, too. Stanford’s Faculty Senate soon thereafter 
decided to replace “Western Culture” with a new program, “Culture, Ideas, and Values,” 
which included writings by more women and minorities. The protest and Stanford’s 
curricular change drew national headlines. In 1988, Secretary of Education William 
Bennett, who had previously served as chairman of the NEH, debated Stanford President 
Donald Kennedy on PBS’s MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour on Stanford’s decision.1    
                                                        
1 Larry Gordon, “Stanford Debates Its View of Western Culture,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1988,  
https://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford19880420-01.2.2; Leslie Saul and Erik 
Sten, “Kennedy, Bennett face off; CIV hits TV,” Stanford Daily, April 20, 1988, 
https://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford19880420-01.2.2#.  
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All this took place at the height of what has been called the “Canon Wars,” a 
dispute over the content of college humanities curricula that became an issue in the 
broader American culture wars. The debate centered on whether curricula should retain a 
focus on what were previously considered great works of the Western tradition or be 
more inclusive of writers representing marginalized groups. Several books published in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s helped elevate the Canon Wars in public discourse. These 
included The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom (1987), Cultural Literacy: 
What Every American Needs to Know by E. D. Hirsch (1987), Tenured Radicals by 
Roger Kimball (1990), and Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus 
by Dinesh D’Souza (1991).2  
The culture wars had significant political repercussions for the idea of federal 
funding for the arts and humanities. Most consequentially, the Republican Party returned 
to the position held by many of its members when the NEA and NEH were first 
established: culture is not an appropriate sphere for federal action. The growing 
importance of the Religious Right as a Republican constituency group, one that was 
hostile toward the Endowments, was a major driver of this position change. Excellence 
and merit, as it turned out, had no constituency. Conservative intellectuals, who 
previously championed those principles, along with strict reliance on peer review, 
became hostile toward funding an academy that they viewed as corrupt. When 
conservative intellectuals and politicians supported the NEH during this fraught time, it 
was increasingly because it was headed by people in whom they had confidence: William 
Bennett and Lynne Cheney, who garnered reputations as intransigent opponents of 
                                                        
2 Rachel Donadio, “Books on the Canon Wars,” New York Times, September 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/books/review/16dona-list.html.   
 129  
progressive intellectual trends in the academy. Democrats, to the extent that they 
supported the NEH, generally maintained the position that they had staked out in the 
1970s. With minorities being a key part of the Democratic base, the party insisted that the 
NEH do more to support the cultural expression of certain racial and ethnic groups. But 
by the early 1990s, even some Democrats were suggesting that culture was not an 
appropriate area for federal involvement. 
4.1 NO CONSTITUENCY ON THE RIGHT FOR EXCELLENCE 
To recap, beginning in the mid-1970s during the Pell-Berman controversy over 
reforms to the state humanities councils, conservative intellectuals argued that the NEH, 
at its best, was a symbol of excellence, and that by adhering to scholarly peer review and 
favoring research over public-facing programs, it could fulfill its mission of supporting 
high culture. Conservative intellectuals kept up the drumbeat for excellence as the Carter 
administration appeared to push the NEH in a more populist direction, with the Heritage 
Foundation intoning that the agency could “teach the nation the limits of equalitarian 
impulse.” Candidate Reagan insisted that the NEA award grants on the basis of “merit 
and merit alone,” and the 1980 GOP Platform criticized the Carter administration for 
having politicized the Endowments and lowering standards of excellence. Though the 
ideal of excellence may have exerted some influence within the Reagan administration 
early on, it failed to become a dominant or even minority position within the GOP as the 
1980s wore on.  
 130  
When Ronald Reagan was elected president, there was a divide on the American 
Right over what to do with the NEA and NEH. There was broad agreement that the 
Carter administration had politicized the agencies, but there was a lack of consensus 
about the appropriate response. Some of Reagan’s advisors, as well as Republican-
leaning intellectuals such as economist Milton Friedman and Ernest van den Haag, called 
for abolishing both the NEA and NEH. Others, however, believed that it was possible to 
reform the NEA and NEH and restore a commitment to high standards and excellence.3 
The New York Times took the latter view in an editorial most likely authored by Hilton 
Kramer, “Stop Funding Artistic Circuses.” The Times disparaged the direction that the 
NEA and NEH had taken under the Carter administration, but concluded, “The answer is 
not to eliminate the Endowments, or to cut their funds, but to redeploy them.”4 Because 
Reagan was a former actor, but also committed to trimming the federal budget, there was 
great uncertainty in regard to what course of action he would recommend concerning the 
Endowments.5  
In June 1981, Reagan formed the Presidential Task Force on the Arts and 
Humanities, charged with making recommendations on several questions, including how 
to increase private support for the arts and humanities and “potential improvements in the 
management, organization and structure” of the NEA and NEH.6 The body was co-
chaired by actor Charlton Heston (for the arts), University of Chicago president Hanna 
Gray (for the humanities), and Daniel Terra (for government). The task force, which 
                                                        
3 Hilton Kramer, “Reagan Aides Discuss U.S. Role in Helping Arts and Humanities,” New York Times, 
November 26, 1980, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
4 “Stop Funding Artistic Circuses,” New York Times, December 15, 1980, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
5 Richard Christiansen, “Reagan’s Funding Proposals Give Arts a Case of the Jitters,” Chicago Tribune, 
February 8, 1981, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
6 Ronald Reagan, “Executive Order 12308—Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities,” June 5, 
1981, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43910.  
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included such notable conservatives as Harvard professor Edward Banfield and 
philanthropists Joseph Coors and Richard Mellon Scaife, met with some initial 
skepticism and fear. Heston and Gray had to reassure the public that the group had not 
been created for the predetermined purpose of recommending the abolishment of the 
Endowments.7 When the Task Force issued its report in October, it did not propose 
terminating the NEA or NEH. It found, “Basically, the National Endowments are sound 
and should remain as originally conceived.” The Task Force had a few specific 
recommendations, such as reinvigorating the Federal Council on the Arts and 
Humanities, which had been established by the original statute but had seldom been 
active during the preceding 15 years; the establishment of a program of Presidential 
Fellows in the Arts and Humanities, to support young individual scholars and artists; and 
reforms to the tax code to encourage individual and corporate donors. But as for the NEA 
and NEH, the Task Force found that they “have functioned well in their present 
structure.” The Task Force endorsed the peer review process as “a fair and effective 
system for grant-making at both Endowments.”8  
 President Reagan accepted the Task Force’s recommendation, in that he did not 
propose zeroing out the Endowments, though he did seek to cut their budgets 
significantly—by half of what the Carter administration had requested for FY 1982 (or 44 
percent of FY 1981). When it came to NEH, the administration’s proposed cuts followed 
the principles that Michael Joyce had laid out in the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for 
Leadership, namely, the identification of excellence with serious scholarly research and a 
                                                        
7 Carla Hall, “White House Arts & Humanities Group Meets,” Washington Post, June 16, 1981, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers.  
8 Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities, “Report to the President,” October 1981, 2, 11. 
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skepticism toward the value of much of the NEH’s public-facing programs. Under the 
administration’s proposal, the entire Division of Public Programs was to be cut by 60 
percent and the Division of State Programs, which oversaw the state humanities councils, 
by 45 percent. Scholarly research, in contrast, was to be relatively spared. Fellowships for 
university scholars and college teachers, for example, were only to be cut by eight 
percent. Though the proposed budget eliminated one of the NEH’s fellowship programs, 
it was the one that had provided sabbaticals for professionals such as doctors, lawyers, 
and journalists.9 Incidentally, this was a program that Senator John Tower (R-TX), who 
favored abolishing the NEH, had singled out in 1980 as an egregious example of wasteful 
federal spending.10   
Congress, however, did not go along with the administration’s proposed cuts. In 
the end, the NEH budget was reduced by about 14 percent in FY1982, with reductions 
more evenly distributed across programs.11 For the next several years, Congress 
continued to appropriate more funding for the NEH than the administration requested. 
Chairman William Bennett and his deputy chairman, John Agresto, though, were pleased 
to request below what Congress wanted to appropriate. Agresto noted that requesting a 
smaller budget gave them leverage with Congress, which could not use the prospect of 
funding reductions to pressure the agency.12 As the following graph indicates, following 
the modest budget cuts early in Reagan’s first term, appropriations to the NEH remained 
relatively flat for nearly 15 years. Because inflation had been tamed, the agency did not 
                                                        
9 American Association for the Advancement for the Humanities, “NEH budget request: unprecedented 
retrenchment,” Humanities Report 3, no. 4 (1981): 15-16. 
10 126 Cong. Rec. 9822 (1980). 
11 See, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior 
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 3, 97th Cong., 2d. sess., 1982, 888-891 (budget justification materials). 
12 John Agresto (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, June 23, 2015. 
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lose much ground in terms of real dollars even as Congress held the budget flat for much 
of the 1980s. As explained below, in the early 1990s, with the NEH under Lynne 
Cheney’s leadership, Congress increased the Endowment’s budget to its all-time high in 
nominal dollars. Yet it was still well below the real-dollar peak reached in the late 1970s. 
Figure 3. NEH Appropriations: 1978 – 199513 
 
 Because the NEH’s budget was so tiny relative to other federal expenditures, 
members of Congress generally ignored the agency.14 But when it came time to 
reauthorize the NEA and NEH in 1985, Democratic and Republican priorities for the 
cultural agencies reflected the importance of constituencies within their respective 
coalitions. Democrats, as they had beginning in the late 1970s, insisted that the NEA and 
NEH be more favorable toward women and minorities. On the Republican side, 
“excellence,” it turned out, had little purchase. Some Republican members were focused 
                                                        
13 Humanities Indicators, “Federal Funding for the Humanities,” 
https://www.humanitiesindicators.org/content/indicatordoc.aspx?i=11.  
14 Jason Hall (former director, NEH Congressional Liaison Office) interviewed by author, March 24, 2015. 
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on the moral quality of what the NEA was funding, echoing concerns of the Religious 
Right, while others pushed for greater support for rural Americans.  
 The reauthorization measure put forward by the House Committee on Education 
and Labor did not propose any structural changes to the NEA and NEH. The Committee 
did, however, urge the Endowments to be more favorable toward populations that had 
previously been underserved or underrepresented in cultural fields. In the Committee’s 
report, “cultural diversity” and “heritage” had become watchwords. While the Committee 
encouraged both Endowments to do more on behalf of cultural diversity, it singled out 
the NEH as a laggard in this regard, noting its “very grave concerns” with the agency.15  
The Committee reported that during hearings it had “heard of declines in and 
underrepresentation of gender studies and women scholars and black studies and minority 
scholars.”16 One person to testify to this development was Marjorie Lightman, a historian 
representing the National Council for Research on Women. She argued that the NEH was 
not funding research about gender in proportion to the academy’s interest in the theme. 
Lightman explained that NEH’s support of gender-related research had declined by more 
than half from 1981 to 1983, and that while the total amount had rebounded in 1984, the 
vast majority of grants were small. She suggested that the reason for the NEH’s treatment 
of women may have had to do with the way in which the agency was selecting peer 
reviewers.17 (How the NEH’s grant-making system operated under Republican-appointed 
chairmen, beginning with William Bennett, is the subject of chapter nine.) 
                                                        
15 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Arts, Humanities, and 
Museums Amendments of 1985: Report together with Supplementary and Additional Views (to Accompany 
H.R. 3248), 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, H. Rep. 99-274, 14. 
16 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 
1985, 14. 
17 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Reauthorization of 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Select 
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 The Committee also struck back at the ideal of “excellence” that had been a 
rallying cry for conservatives. In its report, the Committee approvingly quoted from the 
testimony of Bruce Sievers, who was then executive director of the Walter and Elise 
Haas Fund and a founding director of two state humanities committees. During hearings, 
Sievers called upon the NEH to “encourage an interpretation [of the humanities] beyond 
a single mainstream conception of the western tradition of the humanities.”  Sievers also 
said, “There is a danger of being seduced by a kind of ideology of quality in which 
‘excellence’ becomes a code word for conventional.”18  
 The Committee proposed a series of amendments to encourage the Endowments 
to be more favorable toward women and minorities. Amendments affected the following 
areas, among others:  
 Preamble: The Committee added a provision to the statute’s declaration of 
purpose, stating that education in the arts and humanities should enable 
Americans to “recognize and appreciate…the diversity of excellence that 
comprises our cultural heritage.” 
 Definition of Humanities: The Committee modified the definition of the 
humanities, stating that it included “the study and application of the humanities to 
the human environment with particular attention to reflecting our diverse 
heritage, traditions, and history and to the relevance of the humanities to the 
current conditions of national life” (added language in italics).  
 Authorized activities: The Committee authorized the chairman of the NEH to: 
 
                                                        
Education and the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 
99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 475. 
18 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 
1985, 15. 
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o “initiate and support programs and research which have substantial 
scholarly and cultural significance and that reach, or reflect the diversity 
and richness of our American cultural heritage, including the culture of, a 
minority, inner city, rural, or tribal community.” 
o In regard to supporting publications of scholarly works, the Committee 
amended the statute such that the chairman “shall give particular regard to 
scholars, and educational and cultural institutions, that have traditionally 
been underrepresented”   
 National Council on the Humanities: In regard to the selection of members, the 
Committee added the following admonition: “In making such appointments, the 
President shall give due regard to equitable representation of women, minorities, 
and persons with disabilities who are involved in the humanities.”  
Though the Committee was generally approving of the work of the cultural agencies, 
through these amendments and similar measures affecting the NEA, it sought to make the 
Endowments more responsive to various segments of the population.19  
 When the Committee bill was considered by the full House, Republicans offered 
hardly any resistance to this new focus on particular groups. Only one Republican, 
Congressman E. Thomas Coleman (R-MO), objected to the aforementioned aspects of 
the bill. Coleman praised the NEA and NEH’s historic “focus on quality” and use of peer 
review to make funding decisions. He articulated the agencies’ mission in a way that 
harkened back to the high ideals of their founding; as the “support of excellent projects 
which provide an understanding and appreciation of the foundation of our civilization and 
                                                        
19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 
1985, 37, 45-46, 53. 
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country.” Coleman was “dismayed” by what the Committee had done in charging the 
Endowments to give special regard to particular groups, noting that Congress had shown 
“remarkable” restraint in having resisted this direction since the establishment of the 
Endowments 20 years earlier. He argued that the Endowments were already open to 
anyone who wanted to apply, that the staff were more than willing to help any and every 
applicant, that the NEA and NEH were already giving grants to underserved populations, 
and that not even a majority of witnesses who testified called for such changes. 
According to Coleman, “Only a few witnesses, representing particular special interests, 
called for special privileges for applications from their own groups.” Though he 
supported the reauthorization of the agencies, he chose to register these concerns about 
the proposed changes to the law.20  
During the debate on the House floor, Republicans demonstrated far greater 
concern about the moral quality of projects that received funding from the National 
Endowment for the Arts than the ideal of excellence. Earlier that year, Congressman Dick 
Armey (R-TX) charged the NEA with having awarded “grants for poetry, stories, and 
other writing that is extremely pornographic in nature.”21 As it turned out, the poems that 
Armey referred to had not been funded by the NEA—only that the Endowment had made 
grants to the poets who had authored them (the grants sponsored other work). Armey, 
however, was still disturbed that the offending poems were part of the portfolios that 
NEA panelists had used to review and recommend grants. When the reauthorization bill 
was in committee, Congressman Steve Bartlett (R-TX) had proposed an amendment that 
                                                        
20 131 Cong. Rec. 24807-8 (1985). 
21 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, National Foundation of 
the Arts and the Humanities Amendments of 1985: Report together with Supplemental and Dissenting 
Views (to Accompany H.R. 2245), 99th Cong. 1st sess., 1985, 12 (“Dissenting View of Richard Armey). 
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would have kept the NEA from funding anything that panelists deemed “patently 
offensive to the average person and lack serious literary or artistic merit.” The 
Committee, however, rejected this proposal.22  
Armey, determined to correct the deficiencies he saw at the NEA, introduced an 
amendment on the House floor that was in the spirit of what Bartlett had proposed. 
Armey’s amendment included a provision requiring advisory panels to recommend grants 
only for projects that “in the experts’ view, foster excellence, are reflective of exceptional 
talent, and have significant literary, scholarly, cultural, or artistic merit.” Armey’s 
amendment passed. Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX), who criticized the NEA on 
similar grounds as Armey, followed with an amendment to limit the reauthorization from 
four years to two, which also passed.23  
Armey and DeLay’s efforts reflected the growing influence of the Religious Right 
as a constituency in the Republican Party. As early as 1980, there were reports that the 
Moral Majority, then only a year old, favored abolishing the NEA and NEH.24 When 
Armey introduced his amendment, he referred to getting calls from people who had seen 
a disconcerting report on the NEA aired by the Christian Broadcasting Network.25  
In making their critiques of the NEA, Armey and DeLay channeled some of the 
populist sentiment about federal funding for culture that had been part of the GOP since 
the founding of the Endowments, even as a majority of Republicans had come to back 
                                                        
22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 
1985, 67 (“Additional Views of the Honorable Richard K. Armey”). 
23 131 Cong. Rec. 27129-27133 (1985). 
24 Carla Hall, “Reagan and the Endowments,” Washington Post, November 23, 1980,  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1980/11/23/reagan-and-the-endowments/ae59df74-
1976-43ae-9464-d6e49c0d1054/?utm_term=.3a988eb243be; and Sandra Reeves, “The Reagan Era Begins 
With Mixed Signals For the Humanities,” Humanities Report 3, no. 1 (1981): 11. 
25 131 Cong. Rec. 27130 (1985). 
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them. Armey, during hearings, justified imposing stricter standards on what the NEA 
could fund in terms of responding to the interests of the people: “He who pays the tab 
plays the judge.”26 DeLay grounded his amendments in the democratic principle of 
majority rule, saying that the NEA “must…remain focused to the desires of the majority 
of the people and should look for ways to fund arts that will give enjoyment to the 
greatest number of people in this country.”27 This call for the NEA to mind the “desires 
of the majority,” though, contravened the original spirit of the law, which, as discussed in 
chapter one, was a self-consciously elitist measure, aiming to edify the nation at large 
through supporting professional artists and humanists. But because of many Republicans’ 
growing distrust of “elite” culture and resistance to that culture among an important 
constituency, this original understanding of the Endowments was becoming harder to 
accept on the Right (though some never accepted it to begin with). 
During debate over the reauthorization, Republicans even joined Democrats in 
pushing the legislation in the direction of having the Endowments focus on previously 
underserved groups, rural populations in particular. Congressman Steve Gunderson (R-
WI) introduced an amendment with several provisions geared toward that objective. His 
amendment modified one of the more sublime parts of the organic statute’s statement of 
purpose (inserted language in italics, deleted language in [brackets]): 
That democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens and that it 
must therefore foster and support a form of education and access to the arts and 
the humanities, designed to make [men] people of all backgrounds and wherever 
located masters of their technology and not its unthinking servant   
 
                                                        
26 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Reauthorization of Foundation on the Arts and the 
Humanities Act of 1965, 562 (Statement of Congressman Richard Armey). 
27 131 Cong. Rec. 27132 (1985). 
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Gunderson’s amendment also modified a new section which required the NEA to collect 
national data on the state of the arts in America. His amendment called on the NEA to 
collect data specifically concerning rural communities and report on the extent to which 
its programs reached these areas. Gunderson’s amendment passed without objection.28  
The 1985 reauthorization passed the House with strong bipartisan support, 349 to 
57.29 Yet as the debate over the legislation indicated, the original Great Society vision for 
the agency as patron of high culture (with a fair amount of consensus as to what that 
“culture” was) had increasingly less purchase within the parties. Democrats were 
concerned with encouraging the NEH to support the cultural expression of minority 
groups within its coalition. Republicans, for their part, wanted the cultural agencies to 
support rural Americans and, in response to complaints from the Religious Right, 
demanded stricter oversight of what the NEA sponsored. Further, as suggested by the 
testimony of scholars who criticized the NEH for insufficiently supporting identity 
studies, there were signs that the NEH would not be a neutral player in the escalating 
culture war. The chairmen who led the agency during this fraught time—William 
Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and Sheldon Hackney—reinforced this perception about the role 
of the NEH. 
                                                        
28 131 Cong. Rec. 27129 (1985). 
29 131 Cong. Rec. 27138 (1985). 
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4.2 AGENCY REPUTATION IN THE CULTURE WAR  
When the NEH was founded, it was assumed that the agency would award grants 
on the basis of nonpolitical expertise, just as the National Science Foundation did. At that 
time, there was a fair amount of consensus as to what the humanities were. Strom 
Thurmond, for example, never quibbled with his Democratic colleagues’ paeans to 
Shakespeare, Aquinas, Michelangelo, Greek, and Latin. But as the humanities themselves 
ceased to be perceived as nonpolitical, many came to view the NEH as a political 
agency—in that it favored more canonical or multiculturalist notions of the humanities. 
The individuals tapped to lead the agency garnered reputations as being strongly on either 
side of this divide. Their reputations, in turn, rubbed off on the NEH. This had 
consequences particularly for the Republican Party’s positioning toward the agency.30 So 
long as the NEH was headed by an opponent of progressive intellectual trends, 
Republicans could still have some confidence in how it would operate. Yet once that 
situation no longer obtained, and with the Religious Right generally opposed to federal 
funding for culture, the GOP had little reason not to become hostile.  
William Bennett and Lynne Cheney cultivated their reputations as opponents of 
progressive intellectual trends through a vigorous use of the bully pulpit. More so than 
previous chairmen, Bennett and Cheney addressed the American people directly. As the 
culture war escalated, Bennett and Cheney helped make the humanities more of a public 
                                                        
30 For a discussion of how the reputation of an agency head can influence the agency’s overall reputation, 
see Patrick S. Roberts, “FEMA and the Prospects for Reputation-Based Autonomy,” Studies in American 
Political Development 20 (Spring 2006): 57-87.  
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issue, criticizing developments in K-12 and university curricula, as well as what they 
perceived to be anti-Western sentiments on the rise in the humanities.    
 When Bennett was appointed chairman, Irving Kristol, who had lobbied President 
Reagan on his behalf, advised him to manage the NEH in a way that did not make 
waves—lay low, do your job, never apologize, and never explain. Bennett, however, 
declined to follow this advice. According to John Agresto, Bennett had two rules: tell the 
truth and have fun.31 In 1985, William Kristol discussed Bennett’s leadership style at 
some length in a profile of three Reagan appointees. Kristol quotes Bennett who gave a 
“first law” for political appointees: 
Before someone else tells the world what you’re doing, what you’re about, 
get the bull by the horns and tell everyone—loudly and clearly and repeatedly—
what it is you intend to do, and why you’re doing it. You need, first and foremost, 
to articulate a vision of what the agency should be. If you don’t act as if you had 
the ball, if you don’t put yourself on the offensive, setting the terms of debate 
around your agency, then you’re on the defensive, and that’s no place to be.32 
 
Throughout the entirety of his chairmanship, Bennett was on the offensive, stating clearly 
what he viewed as the value of the humanities and what the agency should and should not 
support.  
Within four months of being sworn in as chairman, Bennett made headlines for 
criticizing a project that the NEH had funded indirectly. The project in question was a 
documentary film supported by the Wisconsin Committee for the Humanities, “From the 
Ashes…Nicaragua,” which ran on public television. In a front-page New York Times 
story, “Humanities Chief Calls PBS Film Propaganda,” Bennett was quoted as saying 
                                                        
31 John Agresto interviewed by author. 
32 William Bennett, quoted in William Kristol, “Can-Do Government,” Policy Review 31 (Winter 1985): 
63. 
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that, in his view, the film did not represent the humanities. Bennett deemed the film a 
biased presentation, a “hymn to the Sandinistas,” and undeserving of federal funds.33   
Bennett proactively sought to spur greater public discourse about trends in the 
humanities and challenge views that were ascendant in the academy. In 1984, at a time 
when some humanities educators were questioning whether works that were previously 
deemed “canonical” deserved pride of place in curricula, Bennett sought to show that 
there was actually a fair amount of consensus on texts that students ought to know. He 
asked 250 people from across the political spectrum to send him their list of ten books 
that they thought all high school graduates should be familiar with—and asked 
Washington Post columnist George Will to invite his readers to do the same. Based on 
the submissions received, there was, in fact, a fair amount of consensus around certain 
texts. According to Bennett, “Almost every person agreed on five vital sources: the Bible, 
Shakespeare, America’s founding documents, the great American novel “Huckleberry 
Finn” and classical works of mythology and poetry, like the Iliad and the Odyssey.”34 
William Kristol, in the profile referenced above, was impressed by Bennett’s use of the 
press in this instance. Kristol said, “the coverage of that story did as much as to further 
his agenda of fostering a kind of back-to-basics movement in the humanities as any of the 
NEH’s grants or any of his formal speeches.”35  
Bennett’s most consequential public act as chairman, though, was likely his 
authorship of, “To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education,” 
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published in November 1984, just months before he would depart the NEH to become 
Secretary of Education. While he prepared this report in consultation with an advisory 
group of teachers, scholars, and administrators, he claimed sole authorship. In the report, 
Bennett criticized what he viewed as the decline of humanities education in colleges and 
universities, placed much of the blame on professors and university administrators, and 
called for restoring the serious study of Western Civilization to the core of the college 
curriculum. Reported on widely by the press, “To Reclaim a Legacy” became a focal 
point in the growing debate over multiculturalism in higher education. Reviews of the 
report appeared in publications such as The New Republic (twice) and The New York 
Review of Books, while several academic journals published articles in response.36 When 
Bennett was up for confirmation as Secretary of Education, the New York Times ran a 
brief story on him, calling attention to how he had influenced public discourse over the 
humanities. According to the Times, “William J. Bennett has been such a staunch 
advocate of the classical approach to the studies of humanities that he has stirred a loud 
debate not expected to be found in those staid precincts.”37 
Lynne Cheney, Bennett’s successor, picked up where he left off. The wife of a 
Wyoming congressman (and future Secretary of Defense and Vice President), Cheney 
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entered office already enjoying a degree of notoriety. She also had an interest in speaking 
directly to the public. Just like Bennett, Cheney began her tenure by assailing an NEH-
funded program that appeared on public television: “The Africans,” a nine-part series that 
explored the continent’s geography and climate, along with its social, cultural, religious, 
and political heritage. Other sponsors had included the BBC, PBS, the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting, and the Annenberg/CPB Project. Cheney criticized the series for 
lacking a balanced treatment of the issues involved, saying, “The thesis is to blame all the 
moral, economic and technological problems on the West.”38 Cheney successfully 
obtained permission from the Federal Communications Commission to remove the NEH 
from the list of the sponsors of the series.39 
As chairman, Cheney issued a series of reports about the state of the humanities in 
America, calling attention to problems at both the K-12 and collegiate levels. Though 
Congress only required the NEH to issue a report on the state of the humanities every two 
years, Cheney authored them annually. In her inaugural report, “American Memory: A 
Report on the Humanities in the Nation’s Public Schools” (1987), Cheney highlighted the 
loss of serious, content-rich curricula in subjects such as literature and history. Her final 
report, “Telling the Truth: A Report on the State of the Humanities in Higher Education” 
(1992), warned of how colleges and universities were elevating political agendas over the 
pursuit of truth, describing how this trend was manifested in speech codes, as well as the 
pressure that some students felt to censor their opinions in the classroom, among other 
problems. In the intervening years, Cheney issued four additional annual reports on issues 
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in humanities education, relishing the role of truth teller and seeking to maximize the 
potential of the agency’s bully pulpit.40 News coverage of Cheney’s reports not only 
highlighted the report’s concerns with the humanities, but they also resulted in greater 
publicity for the chairman herself. For example, following the release of her 1989 report, 
“50 Hours: A Core Curriculum for College Students,” the Boston Globe ran a piece about 
Cheney entitled, “Champion of the Basics.”41  
Conservative opinion leaders, who were already inclined to respect Lynne Cheney 
because of her husband, lionized her for her calls to strengthen humanities education and 
opposition to ideologically progressive developments in academia. Don Gibson, a civil 
servant who spent 20 years at the NEH, says that Cheney cultivated support among 
conservative commentators such as George Will, Charles Krauthammer, and the editorial 
page of the Wall Street Journal.42 And when culture-war controversies struck the 
Endowments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Cheney only increased her prominence 
and gained an even stronger reputation among conservatives. 
One of those controversies was the Senate’s rejection of President George H. W. 
Bush’s nomination of Carole Iannone for a seat on the National Council on the 
Humanities. Iannone, who had a doctorate in English Literature, was then an adjunct 
instructor at NYU, in addition to holding positions at the National Association of 
Scholars, a nonprofit that is generally associated with conservative academics. 
Organizations such as the Modern Language Association (MLA) and American Council 
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on Learned Societies (ACLS) opposed the nomination, with those critical of Iannone 
arguing that she lacked appropriate credentials; in particular, that she did not have a 
strong publication record. Iannone’s writing had appeared mainly in non-peer reviewed 
conservative outlets such as Commentary, the Wall Street Journal, and National 
Review.43  
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee defeated the nomination by a 
nine to eight vote, with all Republicans and one Democrat, Jeff Bingaman of New 
Mexico, voting for the nominee and all other Democrats in opposition. According to 
coverage in the New York Times, committee co-chairmen Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) “engaged in an often fiery exchange” as Iannone’s nomination was 
debated. Hatch, with “his voice rising in frustration,” noted, “If this is not political 
correctness, what is it?”44 Following the vote, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) took to 
the Senate floor to denounce the Committee’s action. Moynihan took umbrage at the fact 
that Iannone’s opponents had dismissed her publication record, given that some it had 
appeared in Commentary. Moynihan noted that many of the early writers for 
Commentary came from New York’s working class—a constituency that, in his view, 
was increasingly unwelcome within the Democratic Party. Toward the end of his speech, 
Moynihan suggested that Iannone’s identification with that constituency was part of the 
reason for her rejection:  
I very much fear Professor Iannone’s troubles arose not from the quality of 
her work, but from her genes, social and otherwise. She is an Italian, Catholic 
ethnic with a working class background.  
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Moynihan concluded, “Professor Iannone has now been banned in the Democratic Party. 
What greater fortune could befall an American intellectual in this decadent fin de siecle. I 
wish her well.”45  
 The conservative commentariat seized on this incident as yet further confirmation 
of how biased the academic humanities had become—and how Lynne Cheney was 
valiantly fighting the intellectual trends that would corrupt and destroy America. George 
Will, in a piece for Newsweek on the Iannone nomination, referred to Cheney as 
“secretary of domestic defense.” Will said:   
The foreign adversaries her husband, Dick, must keep at bay are less 
dangerous, in the long run, than the domestic forces with which she must deal. 
Those forces are fighting against the conservation of the common culture that is 
the nation’s social cement. She, even more than a Supreme Court justice, deals 
with constitutional things.46  
 
Cheney also drew praise for keeping the NEH from being plagued by the kind of 
scandal that dogged the NEA: the sponsorship of morally offensive projects. In 1989, it 
was discovered that NEA funds had supported exhibitions featuring Andre Serrano’s Piss 
Christ, a photograph of a crucifix submerged in a jar of urine, and photographs by Robert 
Mapplethorpe that contained homoerotic content, as well as others that some thought may 
have constituted child pornography.47 As the NEA was under fire, the NEH distinguished 
itself as the more responsible Endowment, surpassing the budget of its sister agency for 
the first time in history in 1993.  
The media and commentators attributed the NEH’s success to Cheney’s 
leadership. The Wall Street Journal ran a story praising Cheney for keeping the NEH 
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from being harmed by the scandals at the NEA and for “leading a national debate over 
the role of the humanities.”48 The New York Times published a piece, “The Endowment 
that has Stayed out of Trouble,” reporting that some viewed Cheney’s “political skill” as 
responsible for President George H. W. Bush proposing a greater budget increase for the 
NEH than NEA.49 Irving Kristol, in a 1992 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “What Shall We 
Do With the NEA?,” sung Cheney’s praises. It is worth quoting from at length: 
Another idea making the rounds is to figure out a way the NEA could be 
reconstructed to bear a greater resemblance to its sister organization, the National 
Endowment for the Humanities. The NEH may get as many zany proposals as the 
NEA, but Lynne Cheney, its chairman, along with her staff and her Advisory 
Council, cull them more intelligently and more bravely. As a result, NEH has for 
the most part avoided the bitter public and political controversy that swirls around 
the NEA. In addition, the NEH did sponsor the television series on the Civil War, 
which was a world-wide success. Obviously, under Ms. Cheney it is doing 
something right.  
 
The trouble with cloning the NEH, however, is that there is only one 
Lynne Cheney, and comparable leadership for the NEA is going to be hard to 
find. It is now being suggested, therefore, that Ms. Cheney become chairman of 
both the NEH and the NEA, with deputies serving as chief operating officers. It is 
an attractive idea, and we may be hearing more about it.50 
 
Kristol’s op-ed exemplified a change in conservatives’ outlook on the NEH that had 
developed throughout the 1980s. When the decade began, conservative intellectuals said 
that the NEH could serve America provided it adhered to standards of excellence, resisted 
quotas, and relied on peer review. But as a result of the culture war and conservatives’ 
alienation from much of the academic humanities, as well as the growing importance of 
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the Religious Right, Republicans’ and conservatives’ support of the agency had much, if 
not everything, to do with the person leading it.  
Cheney further reinforced this perspective on the NEH and the idea that it was not 
a nonpolitical agency when she announced her resignation shortly after the election of 
Bill Clinton as president in 1992. Her resignation was to be effective Inauguration Day, 
16 months before her term was set to expire. Gibson, the civil servant citied above, 
though a man of the Left and in disagreement with many of Cheney’s views about the 
humanities, wished that his boss had finished out her term. Under the agency’s statute, 
the chairman serves for fixed four-year terms, not at the pleasure of the President. This 
allows the chairman to overlap administrations. Joseph Duffey, whom President Carter 
had appointed, for example, served as chairman during much of Ronald Reagan’s first 
year in office. Gibson believed that Cheney’s decision to depart at the outset of a new 
administration further reinforced the notion that the NEH was a political agency, not one 
that simply supported the humanities.51  
Cheney’s successor, University of Pennsylvania president Sheldon Hackney, 
inspired little confidence in conservatives that the NEH would resist the ideological 
trends within humanities that they found so alarming. A scholar of American history, 
Hackney had a record of teaching and publishing in the humanities, as well as experience 
as a high-level administrator. But in light of two incidents that took place at U. Penn 
during the spring semester of 1993, right around the time of his appointment, Hackney 
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became for conservatives a symbol of all that was wrong with the academy—”the pope of 
political correctness,” as critics referred to him.52  
 Both incidents involved conflicts between black and white U. Penn students and 
accusations that Hackney had violated the free speech rights of the white students 
involved. In the first, a freshman student, Eden Jacobowitz, was charged with racial 
harassment under Penn’s speech code for directing the term “water buffalo” at a group of 
black sorority sisters who were making noise outside his dorm room one Saturday night. 
Jacobowitz, an Israeli, claimed that his use of “water buffalo” was not a racial slur, but 
the translation of a Hebrew slang term for a loud or rowdy person. In the second incident, 
a group of black students attempted to steal a print run of the independent newspaper, 
Daily Pennsylvanian (DP). The students sought to confiscate the papers in response to 
the writings of DP writer Greg Pavlik, who had previously used his column to criticize 
the ethics of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and what he viewed as U. Penn’s hypocrisy in 
responding to student misconduct when black students were involved. The offending 
students received little in the way of punishment.53 
 Regardless of whether Hackney was in the right, his reputation among 
conservatives was irredeemable. George Will and Charles Krauthammer penned critical 
op-eds, referring to his actions at U. Penn.54 The Wall Street Journal editorial board 
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expressed concern that if Hackney was confirmed, he would “[imbue] NEH…with the 
ethos of the American campus today.”55 Even after his chairmanship ended, Hackney’s 
reputation as a PC scourge persisted. Beginning in 1997, U.S. News and World Report 
columnist John Leo established the mock “Sheldon Award.” At first, the award went to 
the college president “who did the most to look the other way when students stole and/or 
burned whole stacks of campus newspapers.” Leo later broadened eligibility to include 
offenses against free speech on campus generally.56 
 In Congress, some Republicans indicated their reservations about the NEH now 
that it was no longer under conservative leadership. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who 
voted against Hackney’s nomination, gave a speech on the Senate floor to that effect. 
Helms praised Bill Bennett for “infusing the agency with the courage to stand up to the 
smug bureaucrats and their acolytes in academia who, until then, had pretty much 
dictated who and what was favored in the disbursement of NEH funds,” and feared that 
Hackney would “undo the good” that Bennett had accomplished.57 During hearings on 
agency reauthorization in 1993, Dick Armey said that he did not believe that either the 
NEA or NEH ought to exist. Up until then he had directed most of his criticism toward 
the NEA, but because Lynne Cheney had departed the NEH, he no longer “[had] a reason 
to feel deferential” in that regard.58   
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 Once in office, Hackney further alienated conservatives through his signature 
initiative, the National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity. The purpose of 
the National Conversation was to encourage citizens across the United States to gather and 
discuss difficult, often divisive issues respectfully and intelligently. To that end, the NEH 
developed a set of questions and guidelines that could help frame discussions and awarded 
grants to local organizations to convene the meetings. The Endowment developed the 
program in consultation with a blue-ribbon advisory group, which attempted to span the 
ideological spectrum and represent various perspectives on multiculturalism. Members 
including Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Diane Ravitch, James Q. Wilson, William Galston, 
Martha Nussbaum, Nathan Glazer, and Stanley Katz, among others.59 In a speech entitled, 
“Beyond the Culture Wars,” Hackney presented the conversation as a helpful response to 
a degraded public discourse.60 Between 1994 and 1996, the NEH sponsored more than 
1,500 conversations in 225 towns and cities.61 Though the Conversation made an effort to 
respect different ideological perspectives, some conservatives were unreceptive. George 
Will, for example, mercilessly mocked the enterprise.62 Even vaunted literature professor 
Stanley Fish said of the National Conversation, “This is typical liberal talk.”63 
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4.3 THE NEW REPUBLICAN POSITION: TERMINATE THE NEH  
By the run-up to the 1994 mid-term elections, the NEH’s standing among 
Republicans had weakened considerably. The GOP’s lingering support for the agency 
was largely a legacy of President Nixon’s efforts at coalition expansion decades earlier, a 
legacy that had been sustained at least partly because the agency been chaired by 
Republican appointees. But with Sheldon Hackney as chairman, many conservatives had 
become skeptical about what the NEH was going to fund. Moreover, the Religious Right, 
which was generally hostile to federal funding for culture, was an ever more important 
part of the GOP coalition.  
Just before the election, a scandal broke that gave conservative politicians, 
activists, and influencers all the more reason to believe that the NEH was bound to fund 
projects of an anti-American bent—and therefore should be terminated. The scandal 
involved a set of proposed national history standards that the NEH had sponsored. This 
was part of an initiative launched by President George H. W. Bush, who in 1991 called 
for voluntary national tests in core subject areas. The NEH, then chaired by Cheney, and 
the Department of Education awarded grants to the National Center for History in the 
Schools (NCHS) at UCLA to develop the standards.  
 The NCHS, led by education professor Charlotte Crabtree and historian Gary 
Nash, was itself an NEH initiative. In 1987, the Department of Education set out to 
establish research centers dedicated to studying K-12 education in areas such as math, 
literature, science, and all elementary school subjects (it later added the arts). That same 
year, the NEH announced that it would dedicate $1.5 million to establish a similar 
research center focused on the teaching of history—and chose UCLA as the site. Cheney 
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admired Crabtree’s work on the development of California’s History-Social Science 
Framework for the K-12 curriculum.64 The Framework promoted a greater emphasis on 
history as opposed to social studies, which some education reformers faulted for not 
being sufficiently grounded in traditional academic disciplines, among other problems. 
The Framework also sought to strike a “middle ground between the new multiculturalism 
and a traditional canon.” Crabtree and the other minds behind the Framework “proposed 
a model of multiculturalism that, while expanding the canon to include hyphenated 
Americans, nevertheless took for granted a shared conception of American national 
identity.”65 While Nash had a reputation as a liberal, Cheney found him acceptable 
because of Crabtree’s recommendation (she had applied to the NEH for the grant in 
support of the center). Nash had also been involved in editing the Houghton-Mifflin 
textbook series that was aligned with California’s Framework, books that Cheney 
referred to as “the best history/social science curriculum in the nation.”66 
 When the standards were released in 1994, Cheney was not pleased with the final 
project and acted immediately to set the terms of national debate. In an October Wall 
Street Journal op-ed, “The End of History,” Cheney excoriated the standards, claiming 
that they emphasized America’s failures, minimized the country’s achievements, and 
neglected some of its great citizens and statesmen. Cheney explained that, according to a 
member of the committee which oversaw the drafting of the standards, “the 1992 
presidential election unleashed the forces of political correctness.” When it came to 
preparing standards for world history, according to that same member, the American 
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Historical Association (AHA), the national association of professional historians, pushed 
for a diminished focus on Western civilization. Cheney’s op-ed concluded with a call to 
arms:  
 Preventing certification will be a formidable task. Those wishing to do so 
will have to go up against an academic establishment that revels in the kind of 
politicized history that characterizes much of the National Standards. But the 
battle is worth taking on. We are a better people than the National Standards 
indicate, and our children deserve to know it.67  
 
The completion of the standards and Cheney’s denunciation of them could not 
have come at a worse time for the NEH. In the November elections, Republicans won 
majorities of both chambers of Congress for the first time in 40 years, backed by strong 
support from the Religious Right. Following the election, the Christian Coalition issued 
“Contract with the American Family.” Among the policies advocated in that document 
was the privatization of the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment 
for the Humanities, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The Christian Coalition 
evinced the same kind of populist perspective on federal funding for culture that the 
Endowments’ right-wing opponents had voiced since the 1960s. The Christian Coalition 
argued that culture was simply not an appropriate object of federal spending and should 
be left to the private sector. The National History Standards and the offensive NEA 
grants were evidence that the agencies could not be trusted to steward public funds 
worthily, and that it was time to privatize them.68 
Republican congressmen in the House called for terminating the cultural agencies 
and received strong support from none other than Bennett and Cheney. In hearings held 
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by the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, both former chairmen testified on behalf of 
abolishing the NEA and NEH. When Congressman Sidney Yates (D-IL), with whom 
Bennett had sparred years ago when he was chairman, asked if the NEH could be a force 
for good depending on who was in charge, referring back to the latter’s tenure, Bennett 
answered emphatically, “No. No. No, it cannot. You cannot. I mean, we tried this but I 
think the corruption is too endemic.”69 Though Bennett did not address the NEH’s peer 
review system directly, he noted that peer-review panels could be unfairly biased. He 
recalled, for example, a panel that opposed awarding a religious studies fellowship grant 
to a Baptist minister on the grounds that the applicant was a religious believer and 
therefore could not be objective.70  
Cheney, like Bennett, argued that it was impossible to keep the Endowments from 
funding politically tendentious projects. In her testimony, which was adapted as an op-ed 
in the Wall Street Journal, “Kill My Old Agency, Please,” she stressed the sorry state of 
the humanities and spoke of the problem of grantees departing from what they had 
originally proposed, as she claimed had happened with the national history standards.71 In 
her testimony and in a subsequent op-ed she authored for the New York Times, “Mocking 
America at U.S. Expense,” she highlighted her willingness to veto proposed projects 
“that had politics as their goal.” Yet, she said, “one can hold back the ocean only so 
long.”72  
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Conservative pundits added to the chorus of voices calling for the termination of 
the Endowments. Following the GOP victory in November 1994, Charles Krauthammer 
admonished Congress to abolish the NEA and NEH, saying that the history standards had 
proven that they cannot “be kept out of the hands of the academic left” and were “beyond 
redemption.”73 George Will, who less than 4 years earlier had praised the NEH as “the 
best part of the government,” called for ending both Endowments in an op-ed in January 
of 1995, “Give Them the Ax.”74   
Amidst these calls for ending the NEH, Catholic University history professor 
Jerry Muller, a self-identified Republican and “cultural conservative,” weighed in with an 
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, “A Conservative Defense of the Humanities 
Endowment.” Though Muller agreed with Bennett in his assessment of various 
intellectual trends that had a corrupting influence on the humanities, he disagreed that the 
NEH was exacerbating the problem. Based on his own assessment of the NEH’s grant-
making, Muller contended that the agency focused far more on supporting scholarship, 
editions, and other programs that upheld “the best that has been thought and said in the 
world.” Then, in words that harkened back to the rhetoric of right-of-center intellectuals 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, Muller remarked:  
Conservatism properly understood (as it is not by the libertarians, religious 
fundamentalists and populists who have sometimes usurped the label) is 
elitist…The task of cultural conservatives ought to be to chastise our cultural 
elites when they embrace trash, and to combat the declining moral level of our 
commercial culture. 
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The NEH, according to Muller, had not reached the level of corruption that Bennett and 
Cheney had claimed and could still carry out the task of ennobling the broader society.75 
Yet the grander vision behind Muller’s defense of the NEH had come to have little to no 
purchase within the American Right. Given the ascendency of the Religious Right as a 
major component of the Republican Party’s constituency, supporting the NEA and NEH 
was no longer in the GOP’s electoral interests, as it may have been in the 1970s, when 
President Nixon thought that it could burnish the party’s standing with the general public.  
Even some Democrats, too, expressed an openness to terminating the NEA and 
NEH. While most Democrats remained generally supportive of federal funding for 
culture, albeit with waning enthusiasm, some centrist Democrats, also called “New 
Democrats,” favored devolving the arts and humanities, along with other policy areas, to 
the state and local levels of government. In 1993, the Progressive Policy Institute, a 
center-left think tank that was called “Bill Clinton’s idea mill,” published Mandate for 
Change. Like Heritage’s Mandate for Leadership, though not nearly as long, Mandate for 
Change presented a slate of policy proposals and analyses on numerous issues. In regard 
to the arts and humanities, Mandate stated, “no federal role is justified,” something that 
Lynne Cheney did not fail to point out in her congressional testimony.76 Leon Panetta, 
President Clinton’s chief of staff, also took the New Democrat line on the Endowments.77  
In 1995, the Great Society vision for the NEH became a casualty of the culture 
wars. The idea of the NEH as a patron of high culture, necessary to help counter some of 
                                                        
75 Jerry Z. Muller, “A Conservative Defense of the Humanities Endowment,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 
1995, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
76 David Osborne, “A New Federal Compact: Sorting Out Washington’s Proper Role,” in Mandate for 
Change, eds. Will Marshall and Martin Schram (New York: Berkley Books, 1993): 251.  
77 Division of State Programs, National Endowment for the Humanities, Transcript: “Consultative Group: 
NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 9, 1994, Henley Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., 194, NEH 
Digital Repository, Office of Federal/State Partnership, Administrative Files. 
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democracy’s excesses and encourage spiritual uplift, was, politically speaking, dead. Yet 
despite the loss of support for the original idea that had inspired its establishment, the 
NEH as an organization proved durable, thanks in no small part to the influence of the 
state humanities councils. As the culture wars escalated and conservatives and 
Republicans grew hostile towards academia and “elite” culture, the state councils 
improved their political standing, such that they could promote the durability of federal 
funding for culture more broadly, albeit with changed priorities. 
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5.0  THE STATE HUMANITIES COUNCILS AND THE NEH: THE TAIL 
WAGS (AND SAVES) THE DOG  
The culture wars may have doomed the prospects for a national consensus about 
the idea of federal funding for culture. But the culture wars have not yet resulted in the 
termination of the NEH. When the NEH was under fire in the mid-1990s, the state 
humanities councils (SHCs) proved their worth as a supportive clientele, but also 
leveraged their political influence to pursue their own priorities at the expense of the 
Endowment’s. The state councils lobbied to save the Endowment—and meanwhile, they 
ended up achieving many of the objectives they had long sought, including a greater 
share of the NEH’s budget and more autonomy and respect. These were objectives that 
the NEH had resisted up until that point. 
The state councils’ enhanced political clout did not occur simply as a result of 
spending federal money in states and congressional districts countrywide, as important as 
that was. Several other factors contributed to enhancing their standing with politicians, 
especially among Republicans, including changes in the content of their programs and the 
people that they recruited to serve on their boards. As the culture wars escalated, some on 
the Right became more supportive of the state councils than the Endowment, reversing 
what had been the conservative position. The culture wars, in effect, ended up 
empowering the councils vis-à-vis Congress, and therefore, also vis-à-vis NEH. But for 
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the culture wars, it is questionable how quickly and successfully the councils would have 
been able to achieve their goals when they conflicted with those of the NEH. 
5.1 DISTANT AND TENSE 
“Distant and tense” was how Sheldon Hackney, upon assuming the chairmanship, 
described the relationship between the state humanities councils and NEH.1 For nearly 20 
years following the 1976 reauthorization, the NEH and state humanities councils were 
locked in a relationship that was both mutually beneficial and sometimes uneasy. They 
were interdependent, in that the state councils depended on the NEH for funding, while 
the NEH depended on the councils to be able to claim a broader reach into states and 
congressional districts that did not receive many grants through the agency’s other 
programs. At the same time, the SHCs and NEH had different interests and priorities. The 
SHCs wanted a greater share of the budget, as well as greater autonomy vis-à-vis the 
NEH. The SHCs perceived a condescending attitude from the NEH, sensing that many 
agency bureaucrats, like much of academia, looked down upon the idea of public 
humanities programs.  
Following the 1976 reauthorization, tensions persisted over how the SHCs would 
take advantage of the programmatic freedom that Congress had granted. The NEH was 
still concerned that the states might seek to replicate what the Endowment was doing on a 
national level. In late 1977, the Division of State Programs suggested an amendment to 
                                                        
1 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 8, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 40 (“Statement of Sheldon Hackney”). 
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the authorizing legislation that would “limit state committee grant-making to projects 
designed for the benefit of adults, chiefly those not in school.” The proposed amendment 
would have discouraged the committees from sponsoring fellowships, research, and 
education programs focused on schools which, up until that point in time, had been the 
NEH’s exclusive domain.2 
Jacob Neusner, a Brown University religious studies professor who was appointed 
to the National Council on the Humanities in 1978, voiced these concerns in a letter to 
Steven Weiland, executive director of the Federation:  
There can be no more confrontations. There can be no more power-plays. 
There can be no “demands” laid up against the people in Washington. The state 
commissions cannot demand what the NEH does not have, which is, more money 
than Congress appropriates; nor can they pretend to be what they are not; nor can 
they lay claim to tasks and to functions which, in point of fact, they are not 
constituted to carry out and do not have the staff to effect.  
 
Neusner told Weiland that the NEH’s work in areas such as fellowships, research, 
education, and public programs were beyond the reach of the state councils: “these are 
not areas on which the state commissions can hope to contribute, let alone to take over.”3 
Weiland, in response, took exception to Neusner’s claim that the councils sought to “take 
over” NEH activities. Given the councils’ limited resources, they were focused on 
continuing their existing programs. But Weiland also said that they “certainly can 
contribute to the other divisions of the Endowment if called on to do so.” He said that the 
                                                        
2 Office of State Programs, National Endowment for the Humanities, “The State Programs in the 
Humanities: A White Paper,” December 1977, 10, NEH Digital Repository, Office of Federal/State 
Partnership, Administrative Files.  
3 Letter, Jacob Neusner to Steven Weiland, December 7, 1978, Box 1, Folder 7, Martin D. Schwartz Papers, 
Ball State University Archives and Special Collections. 
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councils felt that many at the NEH, save for staff in the Division of Public Programs, 
dismissed what they were doing.4 
Though Congress had guaranteed every state a minimum level of funding, the 
NEH still required the councils to apply for grants every two or three years, just as if they 
were scholars applying for fellowships or museums applying for funding for a specific 
exhibition. Unlike the NEA, which awarded funding to state arts councils (state 
government agencies) as a matter of course, the NEH technically did not have to award 
the funding allocated for state programs to the existing state humanities councils. It was 
hypothetically possible that another organization in a state could attempt to compete with 
the existing humanities council and apply to become the designee of NEH funds—though 
this never happened. While the NEH sometimes put conditions on the councils’ grant 
awards, requiring that they improve programming or their administration in varying 
respects, no SHC was ever denied funding.5 According to Jamil Zainaldin, former 
director of the Federation and director of the Georgia council, there was a fair amount of 
“pantomime” about the whole application process, since it was understood that it was 
next to impossible for a council to be turned down.6 James Veninga, longtime director of 
Humanities Texas, has written that state councils were “irritated” by the NEH’s speaking 
of “funding proposals,” given that Congress had appropriated dedicated funding for the 
state councils. Though the councils accepted the need to report on their activities in the 
interest of accountability, “some councils were concerned that the NEH was seeking too 
much control over the councils.” Veninga further explained: 
                                                        
4 Letter, Steven Weiland to Jacob Neusner, December 28, 1978, Box 1, Folder 7, Martin D. Schwartz 
Papers, Ball State University Archives and Special Collections. 
5 B.J. Stiles (former director, Division of State Programs) interviewed by author, August 26, 2015. 
6 Jamil Zainaldin interviewed by author, June 6, 2015. 
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This tension between a federal agency desirous of control and many state 
councils desirous of independence, grounding their accountability more in their 
responsibility to the citizens of their respective states than to the federal 
government—a matter that Senator Pell had sought to encourage in the 1970s—
festered throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, heightened, undoubtedly, 
by state council responses to some of the policies and emphases of Bill Bennett 
and Lynne Cheney, appointees of Presidents Reagan and Bush to the NEH.7 
 
A policy that likely did much to increase tensions between the NEH and the 
councils in the 1980s was William Bennett’s introduction of a competitive element into 
the funding process. Prior to Bennett’s installation as chairman, while the requirement to 
prepare and submit a proposal may have been laborious and annoying, at least it had no 
implications for the councils’ funding; the NEH awarded funds over the congressionally 
required minimum according to a formula that took the size of the state into 
consideration. Yet Bennett, like other conservatives of that era, wanted to push the NEH 
in the direction of “excellence.” To that end, he inaugurated Chairman’s Awards for 
Excellence—grants of up to $75,000, for which councils were invited to apply. This was 
within Bennett’s right, as the authorizing statute gave the chairman discretion over a 
portion of the funds allocated to the states, over the minimum amount that each was 
guaranteed.8 Bennett, as discussed at greater length below, had been openly skeptical 
about the SHCs’ program quality even since before becoming chairman. As chairman, he 
perceived some of their activities as amounting to left-wing political advocacy, as noted 
in the previous chapter. The councils also funded a higher rate of applications than the 
NEH did. Whereas the NEH had a funding rate of approximately 25 percent, according to 
                                                        
7 James F. Veninga, Prefatory Material, “Three New Threats to the State Humanities Programs” (1981), in 
The Humanities and the Civic Imagination: Collected Addresses and Essays, 1978-1998, ed. James F. 
Veninga (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1999): 62-3. 
8 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 11, 97th Cong., 2d. sess., 1982, 1090-1092. 
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Bennett, the SHCs funded projects at a rate of “two or three out of four applications.” 
Therefore, he said, “It is not unduly, rigorously competitive.”9 
The state councils were not pleased with the prospect of having to compete 
against each other for funding, especially at a time when the NEH’s overall budget was 
being cut and the councils were guaranteed less money. Cynthia Buckingham, the 
assistant director of Utah Humanities, wrote an article in Federation Reports indicating 
the councils’ frustration with the new funding competition, comparing the councils to 
students who ask their teachers, “Does this count for my grade?” Buckingham explained:  
During its first decade, NEH’s state program was considered a “noble 
experiment” in public education. Nobody claimed to have the right answers, or 
even to have posed all the right questions. Advice—from NEH, other state 
humanities councils, academia, or the community—on how to conduct an 
effective program was likely to boil down to ‘try it and see how it works.”  
 
Under the new dispensation, however, the NEH graded state councils on an A-F scale, as 
opposed to pass-fail, as it were, and the grade could matter in terms of how much funding 
a council might receive.10  
What made the excellence awards particularly frustrating for the councils was that 
many found it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain why some were graded more highly 
than others. In the aforementioned article, Buckingham profiled six councils that the 
NEH considered excellent in 1983. She refrained, however, from offering an evaluation 
as to why the NEH felt them deserving of special funding, saying, “that would require 
comparisons with the other proposals submitted last spring (not to mention a crystal 
ball).” The NEH made its decisions based on reports from the SHCs on how well they 
                                                        
9 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 
on H.R. 5973, Part 2, 98th Cong. 2d. sess., 1984, 261.  
10 Cynthia Buckingham, “The Recognition of Excellence,” Federation Reports 7, no. 1 (1984): 23-4. 
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thought that their programs met the Endowment’s criteria for excellence. Yet just as 
when it comes to grading papers, the evaluation of these assessments “involves much 
subjectivity.”11  
 Timothy Glines, a program associate for the Minnesota Humanities Commission, 
penned an article in Federation Reports that also tried to make sense of the Endowment’s 
exemplary projects program. His main takeaway from reviewing the proposals behind the 
seven projects that received awards was that none of the councils, save perhaps the Texas 
council, was doing anything too far out of the ordinary. Glines surmised that the NEH 
probably did not have a priori ideas about what it considered excellent and that it came to 
those decisions after seeing what the councils were doing.12 
The most extensive, spirited critique of excellence awards and the review process 
in toto came from Robert Cheatham, director of the Tennessee Committee for the 
Humanities. He argued that the problems were not attributable to the NEH staff or who 
the chairman happened to be. The root problem was that the NEH had not revised its 
protocols in response to the 1976 reauthorization and remained stuck in the mentality that 
prevailed when the Endowment first launched the state programs. Though Congress had 
given the councils a basis in statute, guaranteed funding, and granted them the freedom to 
determine their own programming, the NEH still felt a responsibility for their success or 
failure. Moreover, the NEH was used to awarding grants for concrete projects, not 
fostering the development of living institutions, which is what the SHCs were.13  
                                                        
11 Buckingham, 23-4. 
12 Timothy C. Glines, “Grants for Exemplary Projects in the States, 1983: A Review,” Federation Reports 
7, no. 2 (1984): 20. 
13 Robert Cheatham, “The 1984 Southern Regional Meeting and After: Ruminations on the Relationship 
Between the NEH and the State Councils,” Federation Reports 8, no. 1 (1985): 33-34. 
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In his essay in Federation Reports, Cheatham gave several reasons why the same 
processes used to review, say, a proposal for a project on Milton, were inappropriate for 
evaluating state councils. First, there was the issue of determining the panelists. While it 
is feasible to identify the leading Milton scholars and assemble a panel from that group, it 
is less clear who are the appropriate peers or experts regarding the state councils, partly 
because the NEH did not allow people who were then currently involved in state councils 
to serve as reviewers (“presumably because we could not be trusted to be fair to our 
colleagues”). But, as Cheatham argued, past service as a state council director or board 
member was not necessarily an indication of being qualified: “As we all know, there are 
council members and there are council members, project directors and project directors.” 
Secondly, while the Milton scholars likely have a consensus about “what constitutes good 
Milton scholarship,” the state councils did not share a uniform set of standards to 
evaluate programs. An approach that works well in one state might not be appropriate for 
another state. And third, there is the issue that what is really being evaluated is the 
proposal, not the actual institution. Cheatham said:  
Give a master of prose a living being to describe, let him understand his 
audience, and he can make that audience love that being, not by lying or by being 
false in any way, but simply by bringing to life in words a conception of that 
being which his audience can love.”14  
 
But despite Cheatham’s complaint and the frustrations felt by other councils, the system 
remained as it was for the next decade.  
When Sheldon Hackney was nominated to replace Lynne Cheney as chairman, 
during his confirmation hearing, he said that he believed that the relationship between the 
                                                        
14 Cheatham, 35. 
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SHCs and NEH could be “improved” and that he would focus on the issue if confirmed.15 
Hackney, upon becoming chairman, expressed an interest in opening up discussion about 
relations between the NEH and the councils.  
In April 1994, Hackney seemed to follow through on this intention. That month, 
the NEH convened a consultative group on the topic of “NEH-state councils partnership,” 
which brought together Endowment officials, leadership from the Federation of State 
Humanities Councils, and state council leaders. The proceedings indicate that many of 
the same decades-old tensions persisted. Participants who represented the state councils 
spoke to frustrations with funding levels, the proposal process and exemplary awards, and 
the general attitude they felt was coming out of the NEH. Of that attitude, Ken Gladish, 
then executive director of the Indiana Humanities Council, said that he perceived a 
degree of disrespect; that certain divisions were skeptical about the “quality” and 
“intellectual integrity” of the SHCs’ programs. According to Gladish:  
there is some perception from time to time, that really what the state 
councils are doing, (because we are not doing original research or whatever the 
case may be), is kind of, it is nice, it is civic, it is public, but it is not really the 
heart of the real work of the agency.16  
 
Robert Cheatham, also in attendance, claimed that sometimes he was approached by 
applicants with low-quality projects who had been told by the NEH to bring their shoddy 
work to their state council.17  
                                                        
15 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Nomination: Hearing of the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources on Sheldon Hackney, of Pennsylvania, to be Chairperson of 
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Funding levels remained a significant concern. Bennett, who was skeptical of the 
value of the state councils, sought to keep them funded at the congressionally mandated 
minimum of 20 percent of NEH program funds.18 During the early years of the 
chairmanship of Lynne Cheney, who was more favorably disposed toward the councils 
(described below), their share of funding increased. But toward the end of her tenure, as 
the agency’s overall budget grew, the allocation for the state councils rose at a slower rate 
than for other areas. As a result, the portion of grant program funds that went to the SHCs 
declined, bringing the amount back toward the congressionally mandated minimum.  
Figure 4. Percentage of NEH Program Funds Appropriated for State Humanities 
Councils: 1987 – 199319 
 
 
During the consultative group, Cheatham also spoke about frustrations over 
money. He found it galling that when the NEH presented its FY 1995 budget request to 
Congress, the agency had asked for an increase in funding for its own administration, 
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while keeping its request for state councils flat. This would mean that any increase in 
spending on administration for state councils would result in reduced programming. 
Cheatham suggested that if the NEH did not make any overtures to the councils in regard 
to funding, the SHCs might pressure the Federation to petition Congress to increase their 
allocation to 35 percent in the next reauthorization legislation.20 
Furthermore, participants at the consultative group questioned the appropriateness 
of maintaining the application process and the competitive exemplary awards. Arnita 
Jones, director of the Organization of American Historians who also served on the 
Federation board, said that the process seemed “like a dinosaur” and “increasingly 
perfunctory.”21 While some of the participants said that having to do the proposal was 
helpful in that it encouraged long-range planning, it did not make sense to have a process 
that resembled a competition, given that it was almost impossible to get turned down. 
Cheatham said that he would prefer a system that more closely resembled accreditation, 
one that involved dialogue between the state councils and the NEH, rather than a process 
that “results in a review letter that really doesn’t comprehend our program.”22 Marion 
Cott, who was a longtime director of Humanities Kansas, in an interview, spoke of 
increasing frustration with the old funding process. She said that at first it was helpful, 
then burdensome, and finally ridiculous. It was hard to take seriously the idea that people 
in Washington could helpfully evaluate what the council was doing in Kansas.23  
                                                        
20 “Consultative Group: NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 9, 1994, 189-190. 
21 “Consultative Group: NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 9, 1994, 68-69. 
22 “Consultative Group: NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 9, 1994, 85. 
23 Marion Cott interviewed by author, June 29, 2015. 
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5.2 STATE COUNCILS IMPROVE THEIR STANDING  
As the tensions between the SHCs and NEH persisted, the councils’ political 
standing improved. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the councils faced skepticism and 
hostility from certain elements of the Right, such as proponents of humanistic excellence, 
as well as Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christians. Some Republican congressmen 
were also concerned about councils’ sponsoring ideologically liberal programs. But as the 
1980s wore on, the councils improved their standing, causing less controversy and 
putting themselves in a position to win support in Congress. Again, as noted above, this 
was not simply the result of spending federal money in states and locales. Several factors 
contributed to the councils’ growing clout.  
The state councils’ focus on relating the humanities to public policy, originally a 
requirement imposed by NEH, drew sharp criticism. Many academics were resistant to 
the whole concept of public humanities programs,24 with some finding the public-policy 
dimension particularly absurd. William Schaefer, who served as executive director of the 
Modern Language Association from 1971-1978, did not mince words in his assessment 
of the councils:  
…most of the NEH state-based programs with which I am familiar have 
been an embarrassing waste of time and money in their efforts to evoke useful 
commentary from humanist scholars on such subjects as soil erosion, medical 
ethics, censorship, or pollution of the environment…our intrusions into these 
areas have come off badly and tend to do more harm than good.25  
 
                                                        
24 John Barcroft interviewed by author, January 4, 2016.  
25 William D. Schaefer, “Still Crazy After All These Years,” Profession 78 (Modern Language Association, 
1978): 5, quoted in Robert Bennett, “The Humanities as Experience and a Plea for State Program 
Leadership in Promotion of the Study of the Humanities,” Federation Reports 2, no. 9 (1979): 38. 
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Benjamin De Mott, an Amherst College English professor and a member of the 
Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy, also had harsh words. In 
regard to a project that sought to use Madame Bovary as a means of drawing insights into 
the problems of doctors in working in provincial areas, De Mott said, “I guess it worked, 
but that’s about as goddman remote as you can get. The whole enterprise was hilarious 
and repugnant.”26 Robert Nisbet, a conservative Harvard sociologist who served on the 
National Council on the Humanities during the 1970s, accused the NEH of “[subjecting] 
the humanities to the values of populism and egalitarianism” and said of the councils, 
“There is nothing too trivial, hackneyed, irrelevant, even obscene to get its funding.”27  
Conservative intellectuals, like many academics, were critical of the idea of 
relating the humanities to public policy. Though the 1976 reauthorization had relieved the 
SHCs of this requirement, to relief of some council directors, some councils continued to 
sponsor projects that sought to bring humanistic wisdom to bear on current issues. 
Bennett strongly criticized the public policy focus of many state councils before he 
became chairman of the NEH. In 1978, the Federation invited Bennett, then serving as 
executive director of the National Humanities Center in North Carolina, to speak on a 
panel at its national meeting. Bennett acknowledged that there were “successes” when it 
came to the state councils, but was critical in his overall judgment, saying that some of 
their programs were “very boring…principally because their speakers are boring.” The 
incorporation of public policy had forced humanists to speak on subjects about which 
                                                        
26 Quoted in Charles Trueheart, “State Humanities Committees: Difficulties Remain, But They Fare Well,” 
Federation Reports 2, no. 6 (1979): 36. 
27 Robert Nisbet, Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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University of North Texas Press, 1999): 79-80. 
 174  
they knew little and for which they had little personal passion. In Bennett’s view, it was 
absurd to:  
hire speakers who know about Shakespeare or medieval history or moral 
philosophy, to talk about soil erosion or terrorism or the Bakke case, subjects 
which they did not love, for which they did not have any affection, and about 
which they often lacked any knowledge.”28 
 
Bennett made similar criticisms upon becoming chairman. In an interview for the NEH’s 
magazine, Humanities, Bennett warned that expecting humanists to offer insight into 
public policy issues would be to “write a check that we can’t cash.” Bennett questioned 
the idea that humanists could somehow make people moral and resisted what he saw as 
the implied premise behind programming that sought to combine the humanities and 
public policy, namely, that the humanities are worthless unless they have some 
immediate tie-in to current events.29 The report on the NEH in the Heritage Foundation’s 
Mandate for Leadership also criticized this dimension of state council programming.30 
The focus on public policy also entailed a danger that programming could veer 
into advocacy, an accusation that some Republican congressmen leveled against the 
SHCs in their home states (recall that Bennett made similar accusations regarding the 
film Out of the Ashes…Nicaragua sponsored by the Wisconsin state council). In 1983, 
Senator Steven Symms (R-ID) and Congressman Denny Smith (R-OR) requested a GAO 
investigation in response to projects about Russia that their states’ humanities councils 
had undertaken. The Oregon Committee for the Humanities had awarded grants for two 
projects called, “What About the Russians?” One of these projects was a five-day 
                                                        
28 William Bennett, “Who’s Doing the Talking?” Federation Reports 2, no. 5 (1979): 10-11. 
29 Ruth Dean, “A Conversation with William J. Bennett,” Humanities 3, no. 2 (1982): 3. 
30 Michael Joyce, “The National Endowments for the Humanities and the Arts,” in Mandate for 
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symposium, for which the applicants proposed featuring “presentations on religion, art, 
literature, history, and social/political thought in Russia.” Because the program 
organizers believed in disarmament, a group of local citizens protested the project, 
claiming that federal funds were being used for “political action.” The Idaho Association 
for the Humanities had sponsored a project called “Russian Awareness Week,” involving 
“an examination of the values, attitudes, lifestyle, and cultural makeup of the Soviet 
people and the discussion of current Soviet/American relations from a historical 
perspective.” Russian Awareness week included “presentations in schools, community 
based events, and a 1-day conference entitled, “What About the Russians?” The 
conference keynote address was delivered by former Idaho senator Frank Church, a 
Democrat.31 
The GAO found that while the Oregon council likely avoided funding advocacy, 
the conference sponsored by the Idaho council did not. An NEH official who attended the 
Idaho conference reported that the “thrust and timing of the conference as a whole 
seemed to be focused less on the humanities background than on current political issues.” 
Senator Church’s keynote “had nothing of the humanities in it…it was strictly 
advocacy…no attempt at balance.” The GAO suggested that recent events may have 
contributed to the diminishment of humanities content in the program. Shortly before the 
conference, the Soviet Union had shot down a Korean Air Lines flight, and participants 
were asked to address the incident. The GAO concluded that, overall, given the nature of 
projects that sought to relate the humanities to public policy issues, questions of 
advocacy—and instances of advocacy itself—would be impossible to eliminate entirely. 
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But the GAO also found that the NEH and state councils were serious about trying to 
prevent advocacy from occurring, and that “there have only been a few projects in which 
advocacy questions or concerns have been raised.”32   
 Neither were Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christians supportive of the SHCs 
early on, namely because they interpreted “humanities” as secular humanism. In the early 
1980s, citizens in Maine heckled, picketed, and protested state humanities council 
activities, believing them to be “godless” in nature. The council in Oklahoma met with 
similar difficulties. According to Anita May, then the Oklahoma council’s executive 
director, “Humanist means atheist among some of our church-related groups.”33 Such 
was the discontent among conservative Christians, that some viewed them as a potential 
threat to the endurance of the state councils. Stephen Miller, in his 1984 study of the 
NEH, noted, “Although the opponents of so-called secular humanism have mounted only 
sporadic attacks on NEH, in the future they may increase their outcry, especially against 
state humanities committees.”34 In 1981, Veninga said that “growing antagonism to 
humanistic thought from religious and political groups to the far right” represented a 
threat to the state humanities program.35  
Yet as the 1980s wore on, the opposite happened. In fact, as the religious right 
became an ever more important part of the Republican Party’s constituency, the councils’ 
                                                        
32 U.S. General Accounting Office, 8-9. 
33 Donna Shoemaker, “State Committees in Maine and Oklahoma Enter a Second Decade,” Humanities 
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34 Stephen Miller, Excellence and Equity: The National Endowment for the Humanities (Lexington, KY: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1984): 56. 
35 James F. Veninga, “Three New Threats to the State Humanities Program” (1981), in The Humanities and 
the Civic Imagination: Collected Addresses and Essays, 1978-1998, ed. James F. Veninga (Denton, TX: 
University of North Texas Press, 1999): 65. 
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standing among GOP leaders improved. Various factors were at work, beginning with a 
more supportive chairman.    
Lynne Cheney put forward a very different attitude toward the councils than her 
predecessor. Cheney, who hailed from Wyoming and spent part of her career as editor of 
Washingtonian magazine, had more populist sensibilities than Bennett. Cheney’s 
misgivings about the state of the humanities in higher education also likely contributed to 
her viewing the councils more favorably. In her 1988 report, “Humanities in America,” 
Cheney praised what she referred to as the “parallel school,” the constellation of 
organizations that had developed alongside established educational institutions that were 
teaching citizens about history, literature, and philosophy and inspiring them to ask 
fundamental questions. Cheney presented the state councils as an important component of 
this parallel school, praising them for reaching millions of people annually and for having 
“become increasingly skilled at bringing what Matthew Arnold called ‘the best that has 
been thought and known’ to diverse audiences.”36 In a 1990 appropriations hearing, 
Cheney said, “There has never been a Chairman of the Endowment that has supported the 
State Councils to the degree that I have…”37  
This is not to say, however, that there were not some tensions between Cheney 
and the councils, many of which were led by directors of a far more liberal political 
persuasion. According to Veninga, “Many in the state humanities councils were 
concerned that, despite legislatively-granted autonomy, they too might be criticized, 
                                                        
36 Lynne V. Cheney, Humanities in America: A Report to the President, the Congress, and the American 
People (Washington, D.C.: NEH, 1988): 24. 
37 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1991: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 12, 101st Cong., 2d. sess., 1990, 226. 
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especially through the proposal review process, for supporting projects that often drew on 
newer scholarship, especially minority and women’s studies.”38 Eugene Leach, who 
served as chairman of the Connecticut Humanities Council, wrote an essay for the final 
issue of Federation Review (as Federation Reports was renamed) arguing that the state 
councils did not share the view of Victorian culture critic Matthew Arnold and his 
modern-day acolytes. Leach rejected a vision of the state councils as “colonial outposts of 
the academic humanities, inviting the natives to appreciate the superior wisdom that 
originates in the universities.” Public humanities programs should entail a shared 
authority between scholars and the people, “whose experience, interests, and instincts 
deserve to be taken into account.”39 Though Leach associated the Arnoldian legacy 
explicitly with Bill Bennett, the article could also be read as an act in defiance of Cheney. 
She had written her doctoral dissertation on Matthew Arnold, invoked him as her lodestar 
when she was about to take the reins as chairman, and characterized the work of the state 
councils in Arnoldian terms.40 Nonetheless, the councils still recognized that she was far 
more supportive of them than Bennett, at least in her rhetoric. Robert Vaughn, founding 
president of the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, said in 1990, “We have been 
                                                        
38 James F. Veninga, Prefatory Material, “National Public Radio Commentary” (1988), in The Humanities 
and the Civic Imagination: Collected Addresses and Essays, 1978-1998, ed. James F. Veninga (Denton, 
TX: University of North Texas Press, 1999): 111. 
39 Eugene E. Leach, “Beyond the Arnoldian Legacy: Reflections on the Mission of the Public Humanities,” 
Federation Review 9, no. 5 (1986): 65, 66. 
40 See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Nomination: Hearing Before 
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources on Lynne Vincent Cheney, of Wyoming, to be Chairperson 
of the National Endowment for the Humanities, 99th Cong., 2d. sess., 1986, 8. In her nomination hearing, 
she opened with the following explanation of her understanding of the humanities:  
My own favorite definition comes from Matthew Arnold, a man with whose writings I 
spent some rather intense years as a graduate student. Over and over again, Arnold in his writings 
refers to the humanities as “the best that has been known and thought in the world.”  
He believed that study of this excellence would enable us to view the world from a wider 
vantage than we usually do, from a perspective where questions of transcendent importance were 
at the forefront of consciousness.  
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blessed recently by the NEH Chair’s enthusiastic endorsement of public programs and 
her outspoken endorsement of state councils.”41 And according to Veninga, “No previous 
chairs of the NEH championed public programs and the state councils like Lynne 
Cheney.”42 
Councils also began to focus more on sponsoring programs that were less likely to 
generate controversy. Freed from the public policy requirement, many councils pursued 
projects in areas such as local history, culture, and art, partnering with museums, 
libraries, and historical societies.43 Cheatham, in an interview, explained how the 
Tennessee council’s programs helped make it easier to persuade Republicans about its 
value. He said, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, “We do apple pie.”44 Ester Mackintosh, 
president of the Federation of State Humanities Councils, believes that the state 
humanities’ programs became “safer” throughout the 1980s and 1990s.45  
Trends within the history profession supported the councils’ focus on local 
history. Social history, which stresses the study of “so-called ordinary people” and 
“history from the bottom up,” is an approach that aligns well with the humanities 
councils’ efforts to engage communities throughout their states.46 As part of this focus on 
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44 Robert Cheatham interviewed by author, September 4, 2015. 
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local history, for example, both the NEH and state councils have been involved in 
funding oral history projects.47 At the 1994 working group, Cheatham noted, “I think in 
fact the history profession is further along in understanding the state councils than even 
the other disciplines...Because we work more closely with them, and there are ways that 
our programs are developing scholarship, even.”48  
Through their re-grants to support local cultural organizations and educational 
efforts, councils developed constituencies throughout their states.49 Veninga suggests that 
the early councils were focused on constituency building perhaps even to a fault, and 
possibly at the expense of quality or coherence in their programs:  
If a particular community in your state has not benefited from humanities 
funds, and a grant application finally arrives, there is an innate tendency to fund 
the project, even if it might suffer from content weaknesses, for it is assumed that 
all citizens in the state—in all locations—should be given the opportunity to 
benefit from the program.50  
 
At the 1994 consultative group, the state councils’ broad reach was a recurring theme. 
Anita May said, “it’s obvious that the strength of state humanities councils is it gets the 
Endowment to every nook and cranny of the country.”51  
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48 “Consultative Group: NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 9, 1994, 131-2. 
49 “Undoubtedly, our constituency has expanded greatly over the past number of years, especially among 
those institutions and organizations that must be our allies: museums, libraries, historical organizations.” 
Veninga, “Three New Threats to the State Humanities Programs” (1981), 64.  
50 Veninga, “The Humanities and Public Life” (1982), 74. 
51 “Consultative Group: NEH and State Councils Partnership,” April 8, 1994, 141. 
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Councils that dealt with more conservative congressional delegations learned to 
describe their work in more congenial ways. Cott explained that when interacting with 
the Kansas delegation, she presented the council’s work in terms of a focus on the state’s 
“heritage.”52 Pressures that the councils felt during the Bennett and Cheney 
chairmanships may have contributed to how they articulated what they did. At the 1994 
consultative group, Cheatham said that during the 12 years of “totalitarianism,” “the 
states adapted their language to the new realities, but they didn’t have to adapt their 
vision.”53 
Beyond program content, the state councils’ board structure has proved an 
essential component of their political influence. Structured as nonprofit organizations, the 
state humanities councils are governed by volunteer boards. From their inception through 
the early 1990s, the boards were comprised of roughly half academics and half members 
from the public.54 The Federation, skittish early on about doing lobbying of its own, 
conceived of the volunteer board members as having responsibilities for advocacy.55 A 
great advantage of the board structure has been to bring on influential citizens, some of 
whom had access to Republicans—or were prominent Republicans themselves. Tom 
Roberts recalls, for example, that Iowa senator Chuck Grassley, a Republican, would 
attend the Federation’s Humanities on the Hill event because of people he knew on the 
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Iowa council.56 In addition, some Republican state council members have ended up 
getting elected to Congress. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), a key Republican backer 
of the NEH, served on the Kansas council in the 1970s before her election in 1978. 
Congressman Leonard Lance (R-NJ), the Republican co-chair of the Congressional 
Humanities Caucus in 2015, was formerly a member of the New Jersey Council on the 
Humanities. 
5.3 THE CLIENT COMES THROUGH—AND COMES OUT ON TOP  
With their bolstered standing, the state councils were in a position to advocate for 
the NEH when threated with termination in 1995. Jamil Zainaldin, who served as 
Federation president during the defunding crisis, stressed the importance of the state 
councils, maintaining that they were integral in saving federal funding for both the arts 
and the humanities. In his recollection, “the arts were in a place where they could not 
have a national voice at that time. They were, quote-unquote, the problem.” Zainaldin has 
stressed the importance of the state council board members in particular:  
The humanities councils came forward and did some very major advocacy 
and frankly lobbying, and not them, but their board members. Because, by this 
point, by the mid-90s, the board members of the state humanities councils 
are…decision makers in your own state. You can pick up the phone and make the 
call to the member of Congress. And occasionally that member of Congress was 
the chair of an appropriations committee, or the chair of a subcommittee, or in the 
leadership. And they did. They picked up the phone, and the call was made.57 
 
                                                        
56 Thomas Roberts (first director of the Rhode Island Council on the Humanities) interviewed by author, 
January 8, 2016. 
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Zainaldin says that state council board members with ties to the Christian Coalition 
helped convince the organization’s leader, Ralph Reed, to remove the NEH from the 
Coalition’s “target list.”58 Esther Macintosh, who was also at the Federation in 1995, said 
that in the midst of the funding crisis, the councils were able to rally letters from their 
constituents. Councils were able to show that cuts to the NEH would affect local 
programs, to which even more “hard-nosed” congressmen would be sympathetic.59  
 When the NEH was threatened following the 1994 midterm elections, Chairman 
Hackney made several decisions that appeared to reflect an acknowledgment of the 
Endowment’s dependence on the councils. Hackney eliminated the NEH’s Division of 
State Programs and replaced it with a new Office of Federal State Partnership, which was 
placed directly under the chairman’s office. The number of program staffers was cut from 
10 to 5, signaling that the NEH would exercise less oversight of the SHCs. Hackney did 
away with exemplary awards, which meant that councils no longer competed against one 
another for funding budgeted for the councils; from then on it, funds were to be 
distributed according to a formula. Councils also gained the opportunity to compete for 
grants from the Endowment’s other divisions, over and above their allotment of state 
program funds.60 
The ensuing debate over the cultural agencies in Congress reflected the rising 
standing of the councils relative to the rest of the NEH. Republicans, who no longer 
embraced a vision of the NEH as a patron of high culture, were inclined to favor the state 
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councils and culture that was generated locally. Even in the House, where there was the 
greatest pressure to terminate the NEA and NEH, the state councils were treated more 
favorably. The House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities passed a 
bill to defund the NEA and NEH after a period of three years, during which time 80 
percent of the Endowments’ funding would go to state arts and humanities councils. The 
Committee argued that “arts and humanities priorities are best established at the State and 
local levels” and praised the state arts agencies and humanities councils for their focus on 
“local art, history and literature.” In the Committee’s view, “State and local programs not 
only help individuals understand who they are and where they are, but, more importantly, 
they offer an alternative to mass media markets and decisions made hundreds or 
thousands of miles away.” The Committee argued that local projects are more likely to 
generate matching funds, states and locales could be more effective than the Endowments 
in education projects, and that devolving funds would advance “the promotion of 
community” and the “promotion of State and local traditions.”61  
The Senate, though less inclined to eliminate federal funding for the arts and 
humanities, also demonstrated a growing affinity for the state councils. The Committee 
on Labor and Human Resources, chaired by Senator Kassebaum, passed a bill to 
reauthorize the Endowments for five years, which, unlike the House version, did not 
phase them out. Under the Senate bill, the NEH would have three grant categories: 
Partnership, National Significance, and Research and Scholarship. Partnership, the 
category that covered the state humanities councils, was to receive 30 percent of the 
                                                        
61 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, Arts, 
Humanities, and Museum Services Amendments of 1995: Report together with Minority Views (to 
Accompany H.R. 1557), 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, H. Rep. 104-170, 10-11. 
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agency’s program funds, an increase from the 20 percent minimum set in 1976. In 
addition, state councils would assume teacher training programs in the humanities, an 
area that had previously been under the purview of the agency’s national grant-making.62  
 Neither the House nor Senate measure made it to the floor for a vote. But despite 
the lack of reauthorization, Congress agreed to appropriate funds and keep the 
Endowments alive. While both chambers approved steep cuts to the NEH’s overall 
budget, they left the councils relatively spared. The House bill cut the NEH by 47 
percent, explaining that the new funding levels were consistent with the plan to phase out 
the NEH over three years. The brunt of the cuts were directed toward the Divisions of 
Research, Education, and Public Programs, collectively slashed by 69 percent, from 
$75.4 million down to $28.6 million. The Office of Preservation and Access, which 
supported efforts to save deteriorating collections at libraries, museums, historical 
societies, and archives, received a smaller cut of 23 percent, from $22 million to $17 
million. State councils were targeted with the smallest reduction: a cut of 16 percent, 
from $28 million to $23.4 million.63 The Senate, like the House, favored the state 
councils, focusing cuts on other NEH program areas. Research, Education, and Public 
Programs were reduced by 52 percent and Preservation and Access by 23 percent. The 
Senate did not cut the state councils at all, leaving them with $28 million.64 In the 
conference legislation for FY 1996, the House and Senate compromised on the Senate’s 
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higher overall appropriation levels.65 The state councils were cut 5 percent, but because 
there were unobligated funds from the previous fiscal year, they ended up not 
experiencing a reduction in federal support.66  
The outcome of the 1995 defunding crisis vindicated Senator Claiborne Pell’s 
insistence that the NEH develop a state-based program. As he told Barnaby Keeney, “the 
lower the organizational level you get to, the more your grassroots support, the more 
visibility you have, and the easier it is to help yourself here on the Hill.”67 When the 
agency was under fire, the SHCs may have been the only meaningful group to pressure 
Congress on the NEH’s behalf. According to a study of lobbying for higher education, 
academic humanists made few efforts to urge Congress to support the NEH: 
…most academics have no intention of lobbying and often ignore local 
and national politics. For example, even as Republican leaders considered 
eliminating the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) in 1995-1996, 
most faculty humanists did not respond with communications to members of 
Congress.68  
 
Again, part of this boils down to incentives. Scholars, colleges, and universities will 
endure with or without the NEH. The same cannot be said for the state humanities 
councils. 
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The crisis also effectively empowered the state councils to achieve their agenda vis-
à-vis the NEH. But for the threat of termination, it is questionable whether the NEH would 
have changed its relationship to the councils as quickly and as dramatically as Chairman 
Hackney did following the 1994 election. The consultative group, discussed above, took 
place in April of 1994, and while some concerns were expressed about the NEH’s political 
insecurity, with one staffer bringing up moderate Democrats’ interest in devolving the arts 
and humanities to the states, Don Gibson said that the agency was “reasonably sanguine” 
about the prospects of being reauthorized.69 During the conversation, Carole Watson, who 
was director of the Division of State Programs, defended the existing relationship between 
the NEH and the councils. Watson articulated a vision of the state councils as part of the 
NEH; that each division had its distinctive mission.70  This was an understanding that 
harkened back to John Barcroft’s views in the early 1970s. Watson also defended the 
seriousness of the NEH’s process of requiring the councils to apply for funding and 
subjecting their proposals to peer review.71 It is perhaps even more doubtful that the NEH 
would have gone along with a reallocation of funding priorities, shifting resources away 
from what had been the agency’s core areas from the beginning, such as research and 
education, and toward the state councils. 
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5.4 A NEW POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE NEH  
The defunding crisis marked a clear end to the era of bipartisan support for the 
idea of federal funding for the arts and humanities and inaugurated a new political 
context. With the migration of the Religious Right into the GOP and the sea change in the 
humanities in higher education, it no longer made political sense for Republicans to back 
the idea of the federal government as a patron of high culture. Democrats, at the time, 
were divided, with moderates in the caucus favoring devolving the arts and humanities to 
the states. In this context, the state humanities councils, which supported 
noncontroversial local history projects and populated their boards with local influencers, 
were in the best position to defend the agency, as well as advance their interests. Hence, 
the NEH’s political context had changed from one characterized by majoritarian politics, 
with the maintenance of the agency largely dependent upon the national consensus about 
the value of the arts and humanities, to one that also bore the hallmarks of client politics. 
As will be explained in the following chapter, in this new context, the NEH’s durability 
has depended largely upon the influence of the state councils, which have gained an 
increasing share of congressional appropriations for the Endowment. Though politicians 
remain supportive of the NEH as an institution, it is not because they are supporting a 
grander vision of cultural uplift.   
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6.0  NEH IN A FRACTURED REPUBLIC 
 Yuval Levin notes in Fractured Republic how striking the Great Society’s 
emphasis on culture appears in hindsight. Federal funding for the arts and humanities and 
public broadcasting, he argues, was a conscious effort to foster and preserve the cultural 
and civic unity that emerged during the first half of the 20th century, a time in which 
American life became consolidated on many fronts.1 So far, this policy history has traced 
how the NEH has fared and coped as that unity has dissolved. This final chapter of Part I 
on organizational maintenance describes the state of the agency since the defunding crisis 
of the mid-1990s through the beginning of the presidency of Donald J. Trump, an era in 
which that fracturing Levin describes has continued apace.  
6.1 PARTY POSITIONING: 1995 – 2017 
 Since the mid-1990s, federal funding for culture has receded as a prominent issue. 
Though various Republican leaders and conservative influencers have called for 
abolishing the NEA and NEH, Republicans in Congress have not seriously attempted to 
do so. While Democrats have retained their historic support for the cultural agencies, 
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rarely have they been in a position to increase funding significantly. Democrats have held 
the presidency, House, and Senate simultaneously for just two out of the 22 years 
beginning in 1995. Moreover, nondefense domestic discretionary spending has been 
squeezed in general, particularly since 2010.2 The parties no longer argue about the NEH 
like they once did; talk of elitism, populism, merit, and diversity are very much in the 
past. Some Republican and Democratic rhetoric has even converged to a degree. In 
defending the continued existence of the NEH, members of both parties have come to fall 
back on the value of promoting cultural heritage. Agency reputation throughout this 
period has continued to be closely connected to the person of the chairman. Presidents 
Clinton and Bush’s appointments (post-Sheldon Hackney) helped defuse Republican 
hostility toward the NEH, just as the appointment of Jim Leach by President Obama 
helped reignite the opposition of conservative opinion shapers.   
 After the failed attempt to defund the NEA and NEH, the 1996 Republican Party 
Platform still called for terminating these agencies. Yet in Congress, for the duration of 
the Clinton administration, Republicans were content (or resigned) to maintaining them. 
Republican hostility even waned in the House, where the enthusiasm to defund the NEH 
had been greatest. In 1997, Congressman Steve Chabot (R-OH) proposed an amendment 
to the Interior appropriations bill to abolish the NEH, just as he had in 1995. Though the 
measure was defeated in 1995, at least then a majority of the Republican caucus had 
supported it. This was not the case in 1997. 36 Republican members who had voted to 
defund the NEH in 1995 switched to oppose termination two years later.  
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Table 6. Votes on Chabot Amendments in 1995 and 1997 to Defund the NEH3 
  1995 Vote 1997 Vote 
  Aye Nay Not Voting Aye  Nay Not Voting 
Republican  136 93 2 92 132 3 
Democrat 12 183 7 4 195 7 
Independent   1     1   
Total 148 277 9 96 328 10 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the defunding crisis, Republican lawmakers also continued 
to show more support for the NEH than the NEA. In the final budget agreement for FY 
1996, Congress awarded the NEH $10.5 million more than the NEA. When the FY 1997 
budget was under consideration, a group of 20 House Republicans sent a letter to Ralph 
Regula (R-OH), the pertinent committee chairman, advocating for keeping the NEH’s 
budget at that higher level, though made no mention of the NEA.4  
 President Clinton likely placated many Republicans through his choice of William 
Ferris to succeed Sheldon Hackney as chairman. Ferris, like many Republican leaders in 
Congress, was from the South. He was an anthropologist and folklorist from the 
University of Mississippi, where he was also director of the Center for the Study of 
Southern Culture. Both of Mississippi’s Republican senators, Trent Lott and Thad 
Cochran, approved of his nomination. Ferris was confirmed unanimously, without even a 
hearing. Clinton also appointed a southerner to chair the NEA. William Ivey of 
Tennessee, who was executive director of the Country Music Foundation, was supported 
by that state’s two Republican senators, Fred Thompson and Bill Frist.5  
                                                        
3 Vote on H. Amdt. 551 (Chabot) to H.R. 1977 (104th), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-
1995/h518; Vote on H. Amdt. 232 (Chabot) to H.R. 2107 (105th), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1997/roll270.xml.  
4 Paulette V. Walker, “Humanities Endowment Appears to Be Gaining Political Support,” Chronicle of 
Higher Education, May 24, 1996, A24. 
5 Paulette V. Walker, “Clinton Picks Mississippi Scholar to Lead the Humanities Endowment,” Chronicle 
of Higher Education, September 5, 1997, Nexis Uni; Paulette V. Walker, “Clinton Seeks Increases for Arts 
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 Ferris, as chairman, responded to the political pressures of the moment by pushing 
the NEH in what many perceived to be a more populist direction. For example, he 
established an initiative called “Extending the Reach” to direct more grants toward states 
that had previously not fared as well in securing NEH funding, as well as institutions that 
Presidential Executive Orders had identified as deserving of special favor, such as 
historically black colleges and universities, Hispanic-serving institutions, and tribal 
colleges. Ferris also sought to spearhead an initiative to start ten regional humanities 
centers throughout the country, which would focus on research, education, and public 
programming about each region’s “distinctive culture.”6 Congress, still led by 
Republicans, was sufficiently satisfied with the performance of the NEH under Ferris and 
appropriated small budget increases for FYs 2000 and 2001.7  
 Though Ferris managed to keep Congress appeased, scholars were displeased 
with the shift in emphasis away from more classical fields and activities. Progressive- and 
traditional-leaning scholars expressed disappointment in the direction of the NEH, 
harkening back to a similar situation that occurred during the Carter administration, when 
liberal and conservative defenders of high culture were united in criticizing Chairman 
Joseph Duffey’s perceived efforts to base grant decisions on political considerations 
(geography and constituency) instead of scholarly excellence. Stanley Katz, who had left 
the ACLS and was director of the Princeton University Center for Arts and Cultural 
Policy Studies, noted scholars’ disappointment with Ferris, saying of the chairman, “He’s 
                                                        
and Humanities, Hoping for New Climate in Congress,” Chronicle of Higher Education, February 13, 
1998, Nexis Uni.  
6 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 2001: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 4, 106th Cong., 2d. sess., 2000, 955.   
7 Humanities Indicators, “Federal Funding for the Humanities,” 
https://www.humanitiesindicators.org/content/indicatordoc.aspx?i=11. 
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got no strategic view of the humanities. He doesn’t have a vision of what the academic 
humanities are or where they fit.” Steve Balch, president of the more conservative 
National Association of Scholars, said of Ferris’s interest in regional centers and folklore, 
“you’re not talking about the type of high culture that the N.E.H. was created to support,” 
such as history and ancient languages.8  
 In 2001, when Ferris’s term as chairman was set to expire, Senators Cochran and 
Lott called upon newly elected President George W. Bush to nominate him for a second 
term.9 Yet President Bush opted instead for University of Indiana art historian Bruce 
Cole, who had previously served on the National Council on the Humanities. When Cole 
took office, in Congress the NEH enjoyed a fair degree of bipartisan good will, or at the 
very least bipartisan forbearance. But while Republicans were no longer seeking to 
terminate the agency, they still kept spending down. By 2001, the NEH’s annual budget 
stood at $120 million, $10 million more than it had after the 1995 defunding crisis—but 
below the $150 million that President Clinton had requested.10   
 Throughout the Bush presidency, Congress kept the NEH’s budget flat, with the 
exception of a new initiative: “We the People.” The NEH launched “We the People” in 
the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks to promote education about American history and 
the nation’s ideals. President Bush formally announced “We the People” at a ceremony in 
the White House Rose Garden in September of 2002. In his speech, the President 
explained that children have “seen that evil is real” and that they needed to know “why 
                                                        
8 Ron Southwick, “Scholars Fear Humanities Endowment Is Being Dumbed Down,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, October 6, 2000, Nexis Uni. 
9 Ron Southwick, “Top Republicans Urge Bush to Keep Ferris as Head of Humanities Endowment,” 
Chronicle of Higher Education, February 23, 2001, Nexis Uni. 
10 Ron Southwick, “Democrats Support Cultural Endowments,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 13, 
2001, Nexis Uni. 
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their country is worth fighting for.” “We the People” was one of three federal initiatives 
that the President announced that day. The others were “Our Documents,” a project of the 
National Archives and National History Day, and a White House Forum on American 
History, Civics, and Service.11  
 Congress did not meet the administration’s full request of $25 million for “We the 
People,” instead appropriating $10 million. Even still, this $10 million increase 
represented the biggest single-year boost in the agency’s budget since 1991. Congress 
went on to increase funding for “We the People” to $11 million in FY 2005, and then to 
$15 million annually from 2006 through 2008. “We the People” even remained an NEH 
initiative, with dedicated funding from Congress, years after Bruce Cole’s tenure as 
chairman ended.12 With additional appropriations for “We the People,” the NEH was able 
to expand grant-making in existing programs, as well as launch new ones. For example, 
the NEH increased funding for editions of the writings of important American figures 
such as Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Thomas Edison, 
and Frederick Douglas. New initiatives under the “We the People” banner included:  
 Landmarks of American History program, which sponsored workshops for K-12 
teachers at historic sites 
 We the People Bookshelf, which sent collections of books related to a specific 
theme (each year had a new theme, such as “courage” and “freedom”) to libraries 
nationwide 
 An annual “Heroes of History” lecture 
                                                        
11 George W. Bush, “Remarks Announcing the Teaching American History and Civic Education 
Initiatives,” September 17, 2002, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64688.    
12 The record of funding for “We the People” can be found in NEH budget justifications.  
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 “The Idea of America” essay contest for high school juniors13 
 Toward the end of Bruce Cole’s tenure, the NEH began another special initiative under 
“We the People,” “Picturing America,” which sent reproductions of masterpieces of 
American art, along with teaching guides, to schools across the country.14  
 Some scholars and practitioners in the humanities were initially concerned about 
“We the People,” fearing that pressure from the administration might lead to biased 
programming at the NEH.15 But in the end, most scholars and practitioners, as well as 
politicians of both political parties, admired what became of the initiative. If nothing else, 
“We the People” meant an increase in funding for the agency.16 Clement Price, the 
member of the Obama administration’s transition team in charge of evaluating the NEH, 
said that “We the People,” at first, struck him as “old-school” American history. But after 
learning more about the initiative and seeing programming it had sponsored, he 
concluded that “We the People” was “not a conservative stalking horse.”17 Jim Leach, 
Cole’s successor, also thought that “We the People” was an “excellent” program and tried 
to expand it.18  
 Conservative intellectuals also supported “We the People” and were generally 
pleased with Chairman Cole’s leadership. George Will praised Cole for “repairing the 
                                                        
13 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Interior, Environment, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 2006: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 4, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005, 986-8 (NEH budget justification materials).  
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Interior, Environment, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 4, 110th Cong., 2d. sess., 2008, 940-1 (NEH budget justification materials). 
15 Brian C. Jones, “History Lesson,” Providence Phoenix, October 11, 2002, accessed August 2, 2013, 
http://www.providencephoenix.com/archive/features/02/10/10/RIH.html.  
16 John Hammer, head of the National Humanities Alliance, said that “We the People” “was the best thing 
that’s happened in eight years.” Anne Marie Borrego, “Humanities Endowment Returns to ‘Flagging’ 
Nontraditional Projects,” Chronicle of Higher Education, January 16, 2004, Nexis Uni.   
17 Clement Price interviewed by author, July 23, 2013. 
18 James Leach interviewed by author, May 25, 2016. 
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ravages of the 1990s, when his two immediate predecessors made the NEH frivolous”19 
and lauded “Picturing America” specifically.20 At the close of Cole’s tenure, the National 
Association of Scholars published a tribute to him on its website, stating, “After eight 
years of trivialization and drift, Bruce restored the Endowment to its original mission, 
enrichment of the humanities as a source of national strength.”21 Conservative 
intellectuals such as Heather Mac Donald and Yuval Levin authored praises of Cole after 
his death in 2018.22 
 But following the election of Barack Obama, conservative elites and leading 
Republican politicians renewed calls for terminating the agency—especially after the 
GOP retook the House in 2011, backed by the populist Tea Party movement. In 2011, the 
House Republican Study Committee presented a budget plan that included abolishing the 
NEA, NEH, and Corporation for Public Broadcasting—just as the Contract-with-America 
Congress had sought.23 During the 2012 presidential campaign, the Republican nominee, 
former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, called for defunding those agencies, noting 
that while he appreciated what they did, the country needed to find areas to cut 
spending.24 In 2015, the House Budget Committee, chaired by Congressman Paul Ryan 
                                                        
19 George F. Will, “History’s Cultural Comeback,” Washington Post, December 26, 2002, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/12/26/historys-cultural-comeback/583976f3-24af-
4001-b095-727513fcab72/?utm_term=.c2a397d6f8a8.  
20 George F. Will, “A Tiny Bit of Artful Government,” Washington Post, December 25, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/24/AR2008122401587.html.  
21 Steve Balch, “Bruce Cole: A Tribute,” National Association of Scholars, November 14, 2008, 
https://www.nas.org/articles/Bruce_Cole_A_Tribute.   
22 Heather Mac Donald, “A Defender of the Humanities, City Journal, January 12, 2018, https://www.city-
journal.org/html/defender-humanities-15670.html; Yuval Levin, “Bruce Cole, 1938-2018,” National 
Review, January 9, 2018, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/455299/remembering-bruce-cole-yuval-
levin.  
23 Mike Boehm, “House Republicans unveil plan to end federal arts and humanities agencies and aid to 
public broadcasting,” Culture Monster, Los Angeles Times, January 20, 2011, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/culturemonster/2011/01/congress-republicans-nea-neh.html.  
24 Andy Serwer and David Whitford, “Mitt Romney: Rich taxpayers will pay their share,” Fortune, August 
15, 2012, http://fortune.com/2012/08/15/mitt-romney-rich-taxpayers-will-pay-their-share/.  
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(R-WI), who had been Governor Romney’s running mate and later Speaker of the House, 
made the same recommendation, arguing, “Federal subsidies…can no longer be justified. 
The activities and content funded by these agencies go beyond the core mission of the 
federal government.”25  
Jim Leach, who served as chairman of the NEH between 2009 and 2013, 
provoked hostility toward the agency from conservative intellectuals and journalists. A 
former Republican congressman from Iowa, Leach had endorsed Barack Obama for 
President in 2008. Unlike all of his predecessors, Leach did not have a doctorate in a 
humanistic field, though he had been a supporter of the NEH in Congress, helping found 
the Humanities Caucus in the House. His nomination was viewed by some as a reward 
for having supported the President.26  
As chairman, Leach launched a special initiative called “Bridging Cultures,” 
which focused on “the role of civility in bridging differences and sustaining democracy in 
America” and enhancing Americans’ understanding of the Muslim world.27 In his speech 
in September 2009 announcing “Bridging Cultures,” Leach spoke to both of these 
priorities. He referred to President Obama’s June speech at Cairo University on relations 
between the United States and Muslim world, describing it as “one of the great humanist 
speeches of our time.” As for what he viewed as the decline of civility in the public 
discourse, Leach referred to Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC), who, during the 2009 
State of the Union, cried out, “You lie!” in response to President Obama’s claim that his 
                                                        
25 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, The Path to Prosperity: Fiscal Year 
2015 Budget Resolution, April 2014, http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy15_blueprint.pdf.  
26 Andrew Ferguson, “Civility, Obama Style,” The Weekly Standard, August 8, 2011, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/civility-obama-style/article/577787.  
27 Rasmi Simhan, “Bridging Cultures, an NEH Special Initiative,” June 16, 2011, 
http://www.neh.gov/news/bridging-cultures-neh-special-initiative.  
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proposed health care reform would not provide insurance for illegal immigrants. Leach 
noted how citizens accused the President of policies that are “communist” or “fascist,” 
saying that while such words are protected by the First Amendment, “the question is 
whether they nonetheless are part of a vocabulary of hate, jeopardizing social cohesion 
and even public safety.” Toward the end of his remarks, Leach explained his decision to 
endorse Barack Obama for President: “I had become convinced that seldom had a more 
natural humanist been chosen to represent his party for national office.”28 
Leach’s speech alarmed conservatives, who worried about what it portended for 
the direction of the NEH. Peter Wood, president of NAS, weighed in with an article, 
“Politicizing the NEH.” While NAS had expressed satisfaction with President Obama’s 
choice of Leach several months earlier,29 Wood was deeply concerned about “Bridging 
Cultures.” Wood accused Leach of being “perilously close to politicizing the National 
Endowment for the Humanities,” in that he was attempting to use the agency to advance 
the President’s agenda. Wood, an academic anthropologist by training, also criticized the 
content of Leach’s remarks, arguing that the new chairman evinced a confused, shallow 
understanding of the concept of “culture.”30 The Powerline blog, a conservative site, 
chimed in with a post, “Jim Leach’s Bridge to Nowhere,” charging Leach with having 
“become something of an Obama mouthpiece.”31  
                                                        
28 Jim Leach, “Bridging Cultures: NEH and the Muslim World” (speech, Carnegie Corporation of New 
York, New York, NY, September 29, 2009), http://www.neh.gov/about/chairman/speeches/bridging-
cultures-neh-and-the-muslim-world.  
29 National Association of Scholars, “NAS Pleased By Leach Nomination to NEH,” June 4, 2009, 
https://www.nas.org/articles/NAS_Pleased_By_Leach_Nomination_to_NEH.  
30 Peter Wood, “Politicizing the NEH,” National Association of Scholars, October 10, 2009, 
https://www.nas.org/articles/Politicizing_the_NEH.  
31 Scott Johnson, “Jim Leach’s Bridge to Nowhere,” Powerline, October 13, 2009, 
http://www.Powerlineblog.com/archives/2009/10/024698.php.  
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Two initiatives that took place under the auspices of “Bridging Cultures,” The 
Muslim Journeys Bookshelf and the Civility Tour, seemed to vindicate conservatives’ 
predictions that Leach would use the NEH to advance President Obama’s agenda. The 
Muslim Journeys Bookshelf took a similar format as the We the People Bookshelf. This 
program, sponsored in part by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and 
Doris Duke Foundation for Islamic Art, and carried out in partnership with the Ali Vural 
Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University and the American 
Library Association Public Programs Office, sent a collection of books and films dealing 
with Islam to libraries across the country. The NEH described the Bookshelf as “an 
invitation to hear from a diverse set of voices—those of Muslim men and women across 
time and place—about their daily experiences with their families and communities, and 
with literature, art, and religious belief.”32 Conservatives assailed the selection of books 
for presenting what they argued was a biased version of Islam and for not addressing 
more contentious issues, such as the question of the connection between terrorism and the 
religion’s teachings, as well as the treatment of women in the Muslim world.33 Under the 
auspices of the Civility Tour, Chairman Leach visited all 50 states, giving lectures and 
talks on the danger “polarizing attitudes” and “divisive rhetoric of anger” posed to a 
healthy democracy.34 He also criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of 
                                                        
32 NEH, “About Muslim Journeys,” http://bridgingcultures.neh.gov/muslimjourneys/about.  
33 Marvin Olasky, “Stacking Library Shelves,” World Magazine, May 17, 2013, 
https://world.wng.org/2013/05/stacking_library_shelves; Daniel Pipes, “The National Endowment for the 
Humanities’ Latest Project,” National Review Online, May 24, 2013, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349208/national-endowment-humanities-latest-project-daniel-pipes. 
34 Curt Suplee, “Leach Completes Civility Tour,” NEH, June 19, 2011, http://www.neh.gov/news/leach-
completes-civility-tour. 
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Citizens United v. FEC (2010) that dealt with campaign spending, calling it, in one 
speech, the Court’s “gravest historical error,” second only to Dred Scott.35   
Conservative opinion shapers skewered “Bridging Cultures” and Leach himself. 
Scott Johnson of Powerline wrote in a recap of Leach’s chairmanship, “In no area was 
Leach a more willing tool than in his use of the NEH to propagandize for the Obama 
administration’s wishful thinking about Islam.” Powerline blasted Leach’s call for civility 
as “little more than an excuse to call out and condemn Obama’s political opponents, 
including the Tea Party, for the effrontery of their dissent from the administration’s 
agenda.”36 The New Criterion, the conservative standard bearer of cultural criticism, 
published editorials calling for the abolishment of both the NEA and NEH, citing 
Powerline’s watchdogging of Chairman Leach and calling attention to a conference that 
the NEH had sponsored at the University of Hawaii’s East-West Center, which was 
sympathetic to Japan and cast the United States as imperialistic and oppressive.37  
 William “Bro” Adams, Leach’s successor, proved far less controversial and, like 
Chairman Ferris, directed agency resources in ways that was more likely to satisfy 
Republicans. A career academic and university administrator, Adams was also an Army 
veteran, who served a yearlong tour in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. His signature 
initiative, “The Common Good: The Humanities in the Public Square,” was less 
controversial than Leach’s focus on Islam and the Civility Tour. One of the initiatives 
                                                        
35 Jim Leach, “Democracy for Sale,” Boston Globe, October 14, 2012, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/13/jimleach/LzSFIrx20POtAKoxCASxiL/story.html (op-ed 
was adapted from speech delivered at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, MA on 
October 7, 2012).   
36 Scott Johnson, “How Chairman Jim Turned the NEH Into a Tool of the Obama Administration,” 
Powerline, June 6, 2013, http://www.Powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/06/how-chairman-jim-turned-the-
neh-into-a-tool-of-the-obama-administration.php.  
37 “The NEH vs. America,” The New Criterion 29, no. 4 (2010): 1-3; “NEA-ification of the NEH,” The 
New Criterion 29, no. 7 (2011): 2-3. 
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that the NEH pursued under the auspices of the Common Good was sponsoring programs 
for veterans, such as discussion groups that make use of humanistic texts.38  
 This is not to say that conservative opinion shapers did not take issue with some 
NEH grants during Adams’s tenure. The Washington Free Beacon, a right-of-center news 
site, picked up where Powerline left off as the Right’s NEH watchdog. The Free Beacon 
published several stories on NEH grants that appeared frivolous or tendentious, such as: 
 a $250,000 grant for a traveling exhibit on mass incarceration39  
 a $156,340 grant for public forums in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania partly about food 
deserts40 
 a $6,000 summer stipend for a scholar working on a study of French lesbian 
activism41  
 a $25,200 grant for a project entitled, “Traditional Spiritual Practices and the 
LGBT Community in a Black Pentecostal Church Coalition Project”42 
Yet throughout the remainder of the Obama presidency, the NEH provoked less 
controversy on the Right than it did under Leach.  
 The Democratic Party has remained generally supportive of the NEA and NEH. 
This is partly because the states that receive the most funding from the NEH are 
                                                        
38 The NEH initiative focused on veterans is called Standing Together: The Humanities and the Experience 
of War, http://www.neh.gov/veterans/standing-together.  
39 Elizabeth Harrington, “Feds Spend $250,000 for Traveling Exhibit on Mass Incarceration,” Washington 
Free Beacon, February 2, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/issues/feds-spend-250000-traveling-exhibit-mass-
incarceration.   
40 Elizabeth Harrington, “Feds Spend $156,340 to Talk about ‘Food Deserts,’” Washington Free Beacon, 
February 3, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/issues/feds-spend-156340-to-talk-about-food-deserts.   
41 Elizabeth Harrington, “Feds Spend $6,000 Studying ‘History of French Lesbian Activism,’” Washington 
Free Beacon, March 25, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/issues/feds-spend-6000-studying-history-of-french-
lesbian-activism.  
42 Elizabeth Harringon, “Feds Spend $25,200 Studying the Experiences of Black LBGT Pentecostals,” 
Washington Free Beacon, December 18, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/issues/feds-spend-25200-studying-
the-experiences-of-black-lgbt-pentecostals/.  
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represented by Democrats. In 2014, the top three states to receive NEH funding were 
New York, Massachusetts, and California, states whose congressional delegations are 
predominantly Democratic (those three states took in a combined 28 percent of total NEH 
grant dollars).43 When the Democratic Party controlled Congress for the first two years of 
the Obama presidency, it increased the NEH’s budget to $168 million in 2010, the 
highest it had been since 1995. Yet following the Republican takeover of Congress in 
2011, the Endowment’s budget has decreased and remained below $150 million for 
several years beginning in 2012. These budget cuts reflect, in part, an overall tightening 
in regard to discretionary federal spending. Arts activists, however, were disappointed 
with President Obama’s budget requests for the NEA. 44 Yet given the Republican Party’s 
control of Congress, big requests would most likely have gone nowhere.  
Figure 5. NEH Appropriations: 1995 – 201645 
 
                                                        
43 Humanities Indicators, “Federal Funding for the Humanities.”  
44 Mike Boehm, “Obama Budget: Good for D.C. Museums, not for NEA and art grants,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 5, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-obama-arts-budget-
smithsonian-nea-national-gallery-kennedy-center-20140304-story.html; Mark Vallen, “Obama’s 2016 Arts 
Budget,” Art for a Change, February 3, 2015, http://art-for-a-change.com/blog/2015/02/obamas-2016-arts-
budget.html.  
45 Humanities Indicators, “Federal Funding for the Humanities.” 
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 Since the year 2000, all Democratic Party Platforms except for 2004 have stated 
support for the NEA and NEH, often presenting federal funding for the arts and 
humanities as supporting America’s “cultural heritage.” On the occasion of the 
Endowments’ 50th anniversary, President Obama sent a brief congratulatory message 
using precisely that terminology. The President said, “President Johnson’s vision—of a 
society that honors its artistic and cultural heritage and encourages its citizens to carry 
that heritage forward—endures as an essential part of who we are as a Nation.”46  
 President Donald Trump, after assuming office, adopted what was, by 2017, the 
quasi-official Republican Party position: abolish the NEA and NEH.47 Many opinion 
leaders on the Right praised the President’s proposal, restating many of the arguments 
that conservative opponents of the Endowments have made since they were initially 
established: that they were unconstitutional, catered primarily to the interests of wealthier 
Americans, and had been captured by the cultural Left. American Greatness, a right-of-
center commentary website that was founded to flesh out and advocate for policies that 
aligned with the general themes of Trump’s campaign, featured two articles about 
whether to abolish the NEH specifically. Even though the contributors, University of 
Texas philosophy professor Robert Koons and New Criterion editor Roger Kimball, 
disagreed over whether to defund the agency, both contended that it was corrupt to core. 
Koons proposed repurposing the NEH to advance education about Western Civilization, 
                                                        
46 Barack Obama, “50th Anniversary Message from President Obama,” September 28, 2015, 
https://www.neh.gov/news/press-release/2015-09-29.  
47 Office of Management and Budget, America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again, 
2017, 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blueprint.pdf.  
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partly through instituting national exams for high school and college seniors. Kimball 
replied that because “elite culture” was so corrupt, the NEH was irredeemable.48  
 2017 might have been the most politically precarious moment for the NEH in its 
history. Previous Republican presidents—Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. 
Bush, and George W. Bush—had all supported the cultural agencies. And when previous 
Republican-controlled Congresses proposed abolishing the NEA and NEH, they faced a 
Democratic President (Clinton and Obama). In 2017, in contrast, the circumstances 
seemed aligned to favor abolishment.   
 Yet Congressional Republicans rebuffed President Trump’s proposal to eliminate 
the NEA and NEH. In 2017, the House Appropriations Committee voted, instead, only to 
trim their budgets by $5 million each. The Committee gave three sets of reasons for its 
decision to continue support for the NEH. First, the Committee noted “the broad 
bipartisan support” for what the NEH was doing on behalf of veterans. Second, the 
Committee praised the NEH’s support for Native Americans “in preserving their cultural 
and linguistic heritage.” And third, the Committee commended the NEH’s support for the 
state humanities councils, praising them for “the scope and reach of public humanities 
programming in Congressional districts across the nation, which serve rural areas, 
promote family literacy, and support cultural tourism that contributes to local 
economies.” The Committee made not a single mention of what the NEH did for research 
                                                        
48 Robert C. Koons, “A Call to Mend, Not End the NEH,” American Greatness, April 24, 2017, 
https://amgreatness.com/2017/04/24/call-mend-not-end-neh/; Roger Kimball, “The NEH Can’t Be Mended, 
So End It,” American Greatness, April 25, 2017, https://amgreatness.com/2017/04/25/neh-cant-mended-
end/.  
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or education in the humanities, or even the national public-facing programs that it 
sponsors.49  
 Republicans in Congress simply refused to embrace the calls of party elites, from 
Speaker Ryan to President Trump, to terminate the cultural agencies. But as the 
Appropriation Committee’s report made clear, while congressional Republicans were 
willing to support the NEH, they was not primarily concerned with supporting the 
humanities as such. Rather, the Republicans were voting to support veterans, Native 
American’s cultural heritage, and activities taking place in their respective states and 
congressional districts through the state councils.  
 The NEH’s budgetary priorities reflect Congress’s interest in supporting the state 
councils and special chairman’s initiatives—at the expense of what used to be the 
agency’s core program areas. In 2011, the NEH’s total program budget stood at $113 
million, with the state councils taking 38 percent. In 2017, the program budget stood at 
$111 million, with the councils taking 41 percent.  
Table 7. Share of NEH Program Budget by Area50 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Research 14% 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 12% 
Education 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 11% 
Public Programs 13% 12% 12% 13% 13% 12% 11% 
Preservation and Access 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 
State Councils 38% 37% 37% 39% 39% 39% 41% 
Digital Humanities 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Chairman’s Initiative 4% 6% 6% 3% 3% 5% 7% 
 
                                                        
49 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior, 
Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2018, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, 90-1, 
https://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/23918.pdf (draft).  
50 Data taken from NEH budget justification materials. 
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6.2 THE NEW FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP 
Since the 1995 defunding crisis, the state humanities councils have remained a 
critical, if not the critical, constituency for the NEH. In a political context in which 
opinions about federal funding for culture generally range from hostile to indifferent, the 
state councils have taken steps to strengthen themselves as institutions. The NEH’s 
primary concern in regard to the councils has been to encourage their strength as 
institutions; the Endowment has been far less interested, indifferent, even, in what the 
councils do programmatically. Ever since the mid-1990s, when the councils became all 
the more politically essential, the NEH has largely ceded to their demands for greater 
autonomy, a more streamlined funding process, and greater overall respect.  
A new funding process was one of the major changes that the NEH implemented 
in an effort to make its relationship with the councils more of a partnership. Recall that 
prior to the defunding crisis, the state councils were treated like other grantees, required 
to apply for grants, with their proposals subject to peer review, even though it became 
unheard of for a council to be turned down. The NEH, which still felt a sense of 
ownership and responsibility over what the councils did, offered the councils substantive 
feedback on a number of issues, such as whether dollars were too concentrated in certain 
parts of the state, whether some disciplines were overrepresented in programming, and 
whether scholars were being used properly.51 Even into the early 1990s, the NEH looked 
closely at what the councils were doing programmatically. Rick Ardinger, who began 
working for the Idaho Humanities Council in 1991, remembers that when he started, a 
                                                        
51 Julie Van Camp (former program officer, Division of State Programs) interviewed by author, August 5, 
2014; Edie Manza (former director of Federal/State Partnership) interviewed by author, January 5, 2016.  
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program officer from the NEH told him that the Council was not rejecting a high enough 
percentage of applicants.52  
Since the mid-1990s, the funding process has borne greater resemblance to an 
accreditation, precisely what Robert Cheatham had suggested at the 1994 consultative 
group discussed in chapter 5. The NEH has developed a process that is more of a 
collaborative effort and less of the agency exercising oversight. When a state council is 
up for review, it prepares and submits to the NEH a narrative self-assessment. The NEH 
reviews that assessment and convenes a specially-formed site visit team, which includes 
an NEH staffer and two outside members. The NEH chooses the external site visitors 
from a list of suggestions submitted by the council. Over a two-to-three day period, site 
visitors interview council staff, board members, program partners, and participants. The 
site visitors prepare a report, which the council then has the opportunity to review before 
it goes to the NEH, and ultimately to the National Council on the Humanities. There is no 
longer any form of peer review, nor do the councils receive grades. At the conclusion of 
the process, the councils receive five-year funding commitments. Edie Manza, who 
headed the Office of Federal-State Partnership for nearly 20 years before retiring in 
December of 2015, said that the NEH’s goal was to have a process that the councils saw 
as beneficial and not just a hoop through which they had to jump. The NEH wants the 
councils to feel at liberty to identify their strengths and weaknesses; it has no interest in 
making them feel “reprimanded” or “scolded.”53  
Unlike in the past, under the new Federal-State Partnership, the NEH is far less 
“picky” about what the councils choose to do programmatically and more concerned with 
                                                        
52 Rick Ardinger interviewed by author, June 26, 2015. 
53 Edie Manza interviewed by author. 
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good organizational governance. The NEH is particularly interested in seeing the councils 
form strong boards. Prospective board members have to understand what is expected of 
them and be willing to work hard, especially as boards have taken on additional 
responsibilities. One advantage of strong organization is that by ensuring a fair and open 
process for making grants and supporting projects in the states, councils can improve 
their reputations, which is critical when the idea of government funding for the 
humanities is challenged. The NEH encourages the councils to examine how they recruit 
board members, form board committees, develop partnerships in their states, relate to 
state legislatures, and develop their own staff.54   
The state councils themselves have also focused on reforming their boards since 
the defunding crisis. When the NEH’s state program began, the primary responsibility of 
a state-council board was to review proposals and make re-grants with NEH money. 
When this was boards’ primary task, they were generally split between academics and 
other interested citizens; sometimes local corporate and labor leaders, as well as leaders 
of local cultural institutions. But as federal funding has gotten tighter and the political 
climate more uncertain, state councils have changed board composition. Given the 
councils’ increasing need to fundraise, they have sought to bring more foundation and 
corporate people onto their boards. According to Jamil Zainaldin, former president of the 
Federation of State Humanities Councils and president of the Georgia Humanities 
Council, “Today many Council governing boards have more in common with the local 
United Way than with higher education, though this reflects funding and resource needs 
                                                        
54 Edie Manza interviewed by author. 
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more than any change in mission.”55 At the same time, councils have become more 
intentional about bringing Republicans who care about the humanities onto their boards.56 
Some councils have also delegated the re-grant process to a separate board subcommittee, 
with the plenary boards focused more on questions of governance.57  
Finally, as noted above, a greater portion of the NEH’s budget goes to the 
councils. Prior to 1995, that portion of funding was kept near the 20 percent minimum 
mandated by Congress. Following the crisis, it was raised to 35 percent. As of 2017, the 
percentage of the NEH’s grant funds going to the SHCs stood at more than 40 percent. 
While some at the NEH may prefer that more resources go to areas such as research, the 
agency appears reconciled to the reality that the councils deserve a greater share—and 
will receive it. At a 2014 conference, Carole Watson, then acting chairman, spoke about 
the loss of funding that the NEH sustained in 1995. She explained that the NEH was 
“forced to see what our core values were by what we kept and what we had to let go…At 
this stage, we’re pretty sure that we made those choices and that they were the right 
ones.”58 
                                                        
55 Jamil Zainaldin, “Public Works: NEH, Congress, and the State Humanities Councils,” The Public 
Historian 35, no. 1 (2013): 46. 
56 Esther Mackintosh interviewed by author, September 11, 2015. 
57 Esther Mackintosh interviewed by author. 
58 Carole Watson, “The Federation, NEH, and the State Councils” (panel remarks at Humanities Texas’s 
Fortieth Anniversary Program, LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, TX, December 6, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rvszPM1jTY.   
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
 At the founding of the NEH, there was a large consensus as to what the 
humanities were and how they could edify the polity. Since the culture wars, this has 
definitively not been the case. Yet because of the state humanities councils, the agency 
has remained durable despite culture wars, with the councils having captured a greater 
share of the agency’s grant funds. The politics of the agency no longer deal with the 
actual content and substance of the humanities. The most that many politicians will say 
about the humanities is that they advance cultural heritage, a platitude vacuous enough so 
as not to offend anyone, and reach certain populations.  
But even as the NEH finessed the culture wars in its relations with Congress, the 
agency must still make funding decisions that bear on contested questions in the 
humanities. Though Congress is largely indifferent to the content of what the NEH supports 
in regard to scholarly research, public programs, and education, provided the work does 
not appear blatantly morally offensive or anti-American, cultural elites are not. The 
question of how the NEH has coped internally with polarization in the humanities is the 
subject of the following section. 
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PART TWO: BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE 
“NEH’s mission is expressed through grant making. We started out and continue to be a 
grant-making agency. That’s how I describe myself when I’m on the plane and someone 
asks me what we do. We make grants in various areas. Various chairmen will come along 
and will have an initiative or a theme, but 99 percent of what we do is make grants…We 
see our leadership through the various divisions through which we make grants…We 
make grants. That’s what we do.”1 – Carole Watson, NEH acting chairman (2014) 
 
To describe the NEH’s mission as “We make grants” is simple enough. But the 
NEH makes those grants in the context of a culture war, in which the humanities have 
become controversial and many humanists have become polarized into “progressive” and 
“orthodox” camps, to return to James Davison Hunter’s terminology. The broad question 
that this section of the dissertation tackles is, how has the NEH, in its grant-making, 
coped with the polarization that has beset the humanities?  
The previous section on organizational maintenance explained how the culture 
wars have resulted in a greater portion of the NEH’s budget being passed through to the 
state humanities councils. Politicians, moreover, no longer argue about how the NEH 
ought to carry out its mission or debate the grander vision of cultural uplift it ought to 
pursue. But even as this has occurred, the Endowment still makes grants in support of 
interpretative projects that will touch upon controversial issues and questions. In some of 
                                                        
1 Carole Watson, “The Federation, NEH, and the State Councils” (panel remarks at Humanities Texas’s 
Fortieth Anniversary Program, LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, TX, December 6, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rvszPM1jTY. 
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its grant-making, the NEH will invariably advance certain ideas, lines of research, or 
educational efforts that align more with one side in the culture war than the other.   
The chairman of the NEH is a political appointee, and at least some of the 
individuals who have held the position have not been shy about indicating where they 
stand on various controversies within the humanities. William Bennett and Lynne 
Cheney, for example, issued reports in which they criticized university humanities 
curricula for a declining focus on Western civilization and threats to free speech on 
campus. The special initiatives undertaken by Democratic appointees Sheldon Hackney 
and Jim Leach, the National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity and 
Bridging Cultures, respectively, dealt with multicultural themes. But does the chairman 
bring his or her ideology to bear on the NEH’s grant-making in its core, run-of-the-mill 
programs? And, if so, how does he or she accomplish that bureaucratically?  
Based on public discourse, one could get the impression that the chairman has 
both a significant influence and is fairly limited in his or her capacity to direct grant-
making. Scholars and commentators on the Left, for example, have decried Republican 
appointees such as Bennett and Cheney for “politicizing” the grant-making process; for 
outright rejecting applications that peer reviewers rated highly because they took a more 
progressive perspective, or finding ways to derail those applications at various points in 
the review process.2 On the Right, in contrast, some have claimed that the chairman’s 
capacity is fairly limited. Bennett and Cheney both said this in 1995 when they testified 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Stephen Burd, “Chairman of Humanities Fund Has Politicized Grants Process, Critics 
Charge,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 22, 1992, A1, A32-A33.  
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that the NEH ought to be terminated.3 Roger Kimball, editor of the conservative journal, 
The New Criterion, opined that both NEA and NEH are “captives of the cultural Left and 
no new Chairman, be he the reincarnation of Pericles, can do anything about that.”4  
Part of the difficulty in ascertaining the influence of the chairman is that the NEH 
is, in many respects, a black box. The NEH publishes all of the grants that it awards. But 
everything that takes place up until the chairman approves those grants is not accessible 
to the public. The agency does not make public the applications that were rejected, peer 
reviewers’ evaluations of applications, the actions of agency staff, the recommendations 
made by the National Council on the Humanities, or actions made by the chairman (other 
than the chairman’s decision to sign off on the applications that are funded). Nor is this 
information available under the Freedom of Information Act. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, in this section I have gone “under the hood,” as 
it were, to understand how the agency makes grant decisions and how its bureaucratic 
structure works. Through interviews with former agency officials and staff, reviews of 
journalistic accounts of agency actions and agency records, and an analysis of grants 
made under an NEH fellowship program, I have sought to ascertain the influence that a 
chairman can have. I conclude that the chairman is not inconsequential in regard to the 
ideological thrust of the NEH’s grant-making. Even as progressive intellectual trends 
have become ascendant within the academic humanities, pace Kimball, a chairman need 
not be the “reincarnation of Pericles” to influence what the NEH funds. Bennett and 
                                                        
3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Downsizing Government and 
Setting Priorities of Federal Programs: Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 1, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 940-1, 984.  
4 Roger Kimball, “The NEH Can’t Be Mended, So End It,” American Greatness, April 25, 2017, 
https://amgreatness.com/2017/04/25/neh-cant-mended-end/. 
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Cheney, hence, were far too modest in their assessment of what a chairman can 
accomplish.  
This section treats the NEH and its grant-making in the culture war as a case 
study of how institutions can evolve and how policy outcomes can change even as formal 
rules remain the same. The grant-making processes at the NEH are largely the same as 
they were when the agency was founded. Yet the surrounding context has changed 
dramatically. When the agency was established, it was assumed that the humanities 
largely dealt with the history of Western civilization and “the best that has been thought 
and said.” But over the past half century, other perspectives within the humanities have 
displaced this approach.   
To understand how the NEH’s bureaucratic structure has functioned amidst this 
changing context, I draw explicitly from the model of gradual institutional change put 
forward by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. They argue that institutions, in general, 
are not “self-enforcing” and that agents’ interpretation and implementation of rules are 
key in affecting how institutions end up distributing resources. They argue that actors 
seek to exploit the ambiguity that exists in certain rules, and that “where we expect 
incremental change to emerge is precisely in the ‘gaps’ or ‘soft spots’ between the rule 
and its interpretation or the rule and its enforcement.”5  
Two modes of change which Mahoney and Thelen (and others) describe as 
“conversion” and “drift” are particularly helpful in explaining the evolution of the NEH 
since the start of the culture wars and the operation of its bureaucratic structure. In cases 
                                                        
5 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, eds. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 10, 14. 
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of conversion, actors influence the outcomes of institutions by interpreting and enforcing 
the same rules in new ways. In cases of drift, actors influence outcomes by enforcing the 
rules in the same manner as before, but procuring a different result because of changes in 
the external environment.6 How one appraises whether conversion or drift is occurring 
can depend on how one views the substance of the issue at stake.7 This is very much the 
case with respect to the NEH. Conservatives who oppose the dominant trends in the 
humanities have, in effect, accused Democrat-appointed chairman Sheldon Hackney, for 
example, of subjecting the NEH to harmful drift. Conservatives say that when a chairman 
manages the agency in a passive fashion, simply allowing the peer review process to 
churn along, the NEH can end up funding projects that advance a left-wing political 
agenda. Progressives who welcome newer intellectual trends, in contrast, have accused 
Republican-appointed chairmen of subjecting the NEH to illegitimate conversion, 
abusing their power to prevent quality projects from being funded simply because they do 
not align with their ideological views.  
This analysis focuses a great deal on how actors have interpreted the roles of the 
following offices: the chairman, the National Council on the Humanities, and 
professional staff. Though the statute has remained largely unchanged, it has allowed for 
“gaps” and “soft spots” between the wording and how the offices and duties are carried 
out. In a changing cultural context, the bureaucratic structure has allowed the politically 
appointed leadership to push the NEH in progressive and orthodox directions.  
                                                        
6 Mahoney and Thelen, 15-16. 
7 Philip A. Wallach, “Competing Institutional Perspectives in the Life of Glass-Steagall,” Studies in 
American Political Development 28 (April 2014): 26-48. 
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The chapters in this section proceed as follows. Chapter 7 discusses the founding 
of the NEH, explaining why its founders chose the bureaucratic structure that they did 
and their goals. Chapter 8 explains how that structure evolved and functioned for roughly 
15 years before the start of the culture war. Chapter 9 describes how that structure has 
functioned since the culture wars.
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7.0  DESIGNING THE NEH 
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 gave few 
specifics as to how the NEA and NEH would function in practice. Of the legislation’s 11 
pages, less than two are dedicated wholly to the establishment of the NEH. Congress set 
up each Endowment with a chairman and national council, both appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. The chairman of each Endowment was allowed to 
form a professional staff, as well as “utilize from time to time, as appropriate, experts and 
consultants, including panels of experts.”1 Beyond this, all the details, including the 
organization of the NEA and NEH into divisions and the systems that they would use to 
review, evaluate, and approve grant applications were left to the discretion of their 
respective chairmen.  
 In its terseness, the legislation embodied many assumptions about how the NEA 
and NEH would operate and to what ends. The main assumption was that the 
Endowments would operate in a manner similar to the National Science Foundation 
(NSF). This was the main goal of the scholars who lobbied for a federal humanities 
foundation. By 1965, the NSF had evolved in such a way as to reconcile the values of 
nonpolitical scientific expertise and accountability to government, as well as enjoy the 
                                                        
1 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Public Law 89-209, U. S. Statutes at Large 
79 (1965): 852. 
 218  
confidence of the American people. When Congress designed the NEA and NEH, it 
sought to achieve a similar goal: the reconciliation of expertise and accountability, the 
avoidance of government control over grant-making, and the public’s confidence in the 
new federal cultural foundation.  
7.1 HUMANISTS LOOK TO THE NSF  
As Terry Moe has argued, “Structural politics is interest group politics.” To 
understand why bureaucracies are organized the way they are, it is important to begin not 
with politicians, but with the relevant interest groups. Those groups “know that their 
policy goals are crucially dependent on precisely those fine details of administrative 
structure that cause voters’ eyes to glaze over.”2  
At the founding of the NEH, scholars in the humanities were the group most 
concerned with the proposed foundation’s administrative structure. As described in 
chapter one, in the early 1960s, the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and 
other groups came together in calling for a federal foundation that would support research 
and education in fields such as history, literature, philosophy, and anthropology. They 
wanted this new foundation to make grants according to the standards and criteria of their 
respective academic disciplines. 
Thus, scholars proposed that the new federal humanities foundation resemble the 
National Science Foundation. In their view, just as the NSF was governed by scientists and 
                                                        
2 Terry M. Moe, “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in Can the Government Govern?, eds. John E. 
Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1989): 269. 
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responsive to the needs of scientists, so too should the federal humanities foundation be 
governed by humanists and responsive to the needs of humanists. Frederick Burkhardt, 
president of the ACLS, spoke to these objectives in explaining why Congress should 
establish a new federal agency dedicated to the arts and humanities rather than work 
through an existing entity such as the Smithsonian or Office of Education. Burkhardt 
explained that a foundation governed like NSF would be critical for achieving the 
confidence of scholars and artists. He said, “This would be their foundation, directed by 
their peers, related to their interests and aims in a way that no bureau or agency within the 
Government is at present, or is ever likely to be.”3  As the 1964 Commission on the 
Humanities stated, “It is encouraging to note that the federal government in its massive 
program of subsidy for the sciences and technology has not imposed control and, indeed, 
has not even shown an inclination to control the thoughts and activities of scientists.”4 
7.2 THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION: RECONCILING 
EXPERTISE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY  
During the early history of the NSF, many of the issues that Congress and the 
agency had to sort out involved how to reconcile expertise, accountability, and efficiency. 
The goal was for the agency to support serious scientific research. But unlike a private 
                                                        
3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, National Arts and 
Humanities Foundations: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on 
Education and Labor on H.R. 334, H.R. 2043, H.R. 3617, and Similar Bills, Part 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1965, 282. 
4 “Report of the Commission on the Humanities” (1964), 8, 
https://www.acls.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/NEH/1964_Commission_on_the_Humanities.pdf. 
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foundation, the NSF was a public agency spending public money. Congress and the NSF 
had to work out how the agency would make decisions according to scientific expertise, 
but still remain accountable to the American people vis-à-vis their elected officials. 
Moreover, Congress and the NSF had to cope with the fact that as the agency grew, it 
was deciding on thousands of applications annually. In addition to meeting the demands 
of accountability and expertise, the NSF had to operate with greater efficiency.   
When Congress proposed the establishment of a federal science foundation in the 
late 1940s, in its design for the agency, authority was to be vested entirely in the 
foundation’s board. In this regard, Congress followed the plan put forward by Vannevar 
Bush in his 1945 report, “Science—The Endless Frontier.” Bush, who headed the 
government’s wartime Office of Scientific Research, called for a federal foundation to 
support basic research in medicine and the natural sciences. In his report, Bush proposed 
an administrative structure in which the foundation was headed by an unpaid board of 
private citizens, appointed by the President. According to Bush’s plan, the board was to 
hire a chief executive officer (the director) to oversee administrative functions. The board 
was also to appoint sub-boards to oversee each of the Foundation’s program divisions: 
Medical Research, Natural Sciences, National Defense, Scientific Personnel and 
Education, and Publications and Scientific Collaboration. In selecting members of the 
sub-boards, the main board was to consider recommendations from the National 
Academy of Sciences.5 Because Bush sought to enable federal support for scientific 
                                                        
5 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar 
Scientific Research (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1960): 34-36, 
https://ia800207.us.archive.org/12/items/scienceendlessfr00unit/scienceendlessfr00unit.pdf.  
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progress while avoiding governmental control over research, he proposed a structure that 
gave control primarily to scientists, not politicians.  
Congress passed legislation based on Bush’s plan in 1947, but President Harry 
Truman pocket-vetoed it. Though a supporter of a federal foundation for scientific 
research, Truman argued that the bill’s structure prevented the President from discharging 
his constitutional duty of ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed. In his explanation 
for the veto, Truman highlighted the fact that the director was not responsible to the 
President, “for he would be the appointee of the Foundation and would be insulated from 
the President by two layers of part time boards,” among other objections. The President 
encouraged Congress to develop new legislation that made the foundation more 
accountable to government.6  
In response to Truman’s objections, Congress passed a new version of the 
foundation, which the President signed into law in 1950. Under the revised administrative 
structure, both the board and the director were to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. Because the Foundation consisted of both the National Science 
Board and the director, the result was a “two-headed structure” that was “unusual” for a 
federal agency.7 Yet the National Science Board (NSB) still held the lion’s share of 
formal authority. The NSB was responsible for developing and establishing NSF policies 
and programs, was required to approve all funding awards, and was charged with 
appointing members of the divisional committees (the equivalent of the sub-boards in 
                                                        
6 Harry S. Truman, “Memorandum of Disapproval of the National Science Foundation Bill,” August 6, 
1947, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1918.  See also, “The National Science 
Foundation: A Brief History,” July 15, 1994, https://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf50/nsf8816.jsp.   
7 J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation’s Formative Years, 
1945-57 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1983): 348. 
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Bush’s plan). The President could not appoint the director until the Board had an 
opportunity to make recommendations. Furthermore, the director had only those powers 
granted explicitly by the statute and those delegated to him by the NSB, which retained 
all residual authority. 
Yet over time, the authority of the NSB and its involvement in various tasks 
receded in favor of the director. By 1965, the NSB was focused primarily on bigger-
picture policy issues. It had become largely removed from the process of approving 
grants, as well as division-specific policy matters—an evolution that both the Board and 
director welcomed. This was mainly because the NSF grew too large for the NSB to be 
involved in what had become relatively minor matters. 
As the NSF’s budget grew from $8 million in 1954 to $16 million in 1956 to $40 
million in 1957,8 it became impractical for the part-time board members to approve each 
and every award. In FY 1959, the NSF “awarded approximately 1,900 grants and 
contracts in support of basic science research, and 3,700 fellowships for scientific study 
or work, each of which had to be specifically approved by the Board.”9 Not only was the 
volume of grants too much to handle—by that point in time the NSB was mainly 
rubberstamping staff recommendations anyway10—it was also questionable whether the 
Board members had the scientific knowledge to evaluate proposals. While members had 
scientific backgrounds, many of them were by then in university administrative positions 
and “for the most part their own work in the laboratory had ended.”11 
                                                        
8 England, 217. 
9 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Amending the National Science 
Foundation Act: Report (to Accompany S. 2468), 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, S. Rep. 732, 2. 
10 Marc Rothenberg (former NSF historian), email message to author, June 2, 2016. 
11 England, 120. 
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In 1959, in response to this growing workload, Congress amended the NSF’s 
authorizing statute to permit the Board to delegate authority to the director to approve 
grants without its prior review. Soon after the amendment became law, the Board 
authorized the director to approve all fellowships and decide on grants and contracts less 
than $250,000, provided they did not “involve policy considerations.” The Board went on 
to make subsequent delegations of authority to the director, including awards of up to 
$500,000 per year and $2 million total and up to $1 million for the construction of 
research facilities. Thus, by the mid-1960s, the NSB was involved in approving only 
about 50 awards per year.12 
The NSB believed that its involvement in approving grant awards was 
unnecessary, even inappropriate, provided the peer-review system was operating 
properly. In 1966, the Board opposed a proposed amendment to the authorizing 
legislation that would have restricted the NSB’s ability to delegate grant-making 
authority to the director beyond the amounts it had already approved. The Board argued 
that the size of the award mattered little; if a grant program had a problem, then it was 
just as likely to arise with small grants as big ones. For this reason, the Board believed 
that it should focus on making sure that general policies were sound. Though Congress 
still ended up amending the statute in 1968 to require NSB approval of larger grants, it 
did so over the objections of the Board and the director.13 
                                                        
12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, The National Science 
Board: Science Policy and Management for the National Science Foundation, 1968-1980: Report Prepared 
by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress for the 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology, Transmitted to the Committee on Science and 
Technology, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 57-8. 
13 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, The National Science Board, 63-6. 
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Neither did the NSB remain deeply involved in the work of specific divisions. 
Early on, shortly after the NSF was founded, the Board believed that at least two of its 
members should sit on each divisional committee. However, Alan Waterman, the NSF’s 
first director, was able to persuade the Board against this idea, preferring that it concern 
itself with broader policy areas.14 As a result of executive orders, the NSB lost oversight 
of the divisional committees and the authority to appoint committee members, many of 
whom have been among the most prominent scientists in the nation.15 Reorganization 
Plan No. 2 in 1962 changed the jurisdiction of the divisional committees, so that rather 
than reporting to the NSB, they reported to the director. Reorganization Plan No. 5 in 
1965 replaced the divisional committees with a system of advisory committees, whose 
members were appointed by the director. Also in 1965, at the request of the director, the 
Board changed its own committee structure from working committees that paralleled the 
divisions to three major committees dealing with broader issues. The first committee 
focused on how the NSF related to the various scientific fields; the second, administrative 
issues involving proposal review; and the third, long-range planning over the next five to 
ten years.16  
One of the key functions that the NSB retained was to maintain the confidence of 
the broader scientific community, as well as reinforce the idea that the agency was 
serving the nation in its entirety. According to the statute, the persons nominated for 
appointment as members: 
                                                        
14 England, 171-2. 
15 Marc Rothenberg interviewed by author, April 19, 2016. 
16 Dr. Eric Walker (NSB chairman), congressional testimony, quoted in U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, The National Science Foundation: A General 
Review of Its First 15 Years: Report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics Prepared by the Science 
Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress for the Subcommittee on 
Science, Research, and Development, 89th Cong., 2d. sess., 1966, H. Rep. 1219, 17-18.  
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(1) shall be eminent in the fields of the basic sciences, medical science, 
engineering, agriculture, education, or public affairs;  
(2) shall be selected solely on the basis of established records of distinguished 
service; and 
(3) shall be so selected as to provide representation of the views of scientific 
leaders in all areas of the Nation. 
The statute also required that the President “give due consideration” to recommendations 
for NSB nominees from scientific and educational organizations including the National 
Academy of Sciences, the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, the 
National Association of State Universities, and the Association of American Colleges.17  
When President Truman nominated the first cohort of board members, his 
administration sought to ensure that the NSB reflected the diversity of the nation. 
William Carey of the Bureau of the Budget made the following recommendation in 
regard to choosing the first slate of nominees:  
It should not be an all-male case; recognition should be given to women 
where possible. We should make an effort to have one or more Catholics 
included. One or more Negroes should also be included. In the area of public 
affairs, we should recognize labor’s interests as well as industry’s. One or more 
federal research men should be included. Geographic dispersion is, of course, 
necessary.18 
 
In the first class of board members, the White House managed to achieve a balance of 
prestige and national diversity, covering most of Carey’s categories, save labor and the 
federal government. The NSB included two blacks, two women, and a Catholic priest. In 
terms of geographic distribution, seven hailed from the Northeast, six from the 
                                                        
17 National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Public Law 81-507, U. S. Statutes at Large 64 (1950): 150. 
18 Carey to S. R. Broadbent, April 3, 1950, BOB, Series 39.33, file unit 95—NSF Personnel, quoted in 
England, 116. 
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Northcentral, seven from the South, and four from the West. All but four members held 
appointments at colleges and universities. Seven were college or university presidents 
and represented a mix of institutions: Johns Hopkins, Harvard, West Virginia State 
College, California Institute of Technology, University of Wyoming, University of 
Missouri, and University of Wisconsin. There was also a balance among the scientific 
disciplines represented. Nine members were from math, physics, and engineering; and 
another nine were from biology and medicine.19  
The NSB continued to prize this kind of diversity. For at least 30 years it was a 
self-perpetuating body and, in selecting successive members, maintained an 
understanding that certain seats belonged to various constituencies and kinds of 
institutions.20 According to a 1983 congressional report on the NSB, “…the President 
generally adopts NSB’s recommendations for replacements of its own members. Only 
about six of 110 NSB members have not been among Board nominees.”21  
By virtue of its composition, the NSB lent public credibility to the agency, 
enhancing the NSF’s freedom to make judgments that its staff deemed best. That same 
congressional report described the NSB as “a consensus generating body—a body which 
reconciles the independence of science with public demand for accountability in 
determining priorities for Federal research expenditures.” The NSB “lends prestige to and 
depoliticizes the agency” and provides cover for the director in the event that he needs to 
make a controversial decision.22  
                                                        
19 England, 119-20. 
20 Marc Rothenberg interviewed by author, April 19, 2016. 
21 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, The National Science Board, 11. 
22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, The National Science Board, 12.  
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With the NSB having removed itself from the approval of grants, decisions on 
grants came to be made primarily at the level of the professional staff. The main actors 
who recommended which proposals to fund were program directors, themselves 
scientists, who served as either permanent staffers or “rotators” on leave from their 
universities. To arrive at recommendations, program officers drew upon their own 
expertise, the evaluation of outside experts (obtained through “ad hoc mail reviews” or 
convening in-person panels of experts), and site visits.23 Though program directors relied 
heavily on peer review, they understood that outside evaluations were not ultimately 
authoritative. While program directors were expected to take external reviews into 
account, they were still expected to exercise their own judgment in making final funding 
recommendations, which were then subject to review by supervisory staff.24  
Program directors evinced an understanding that the NSF should fund scientific 
research of the highest quality and that “science policy should respond to scientists’ 
needs.” According to Merton England, author of a history of the Foundation’s formative 
years, “Unashamed of being called elitists, the program officers cultivated their agency’s 
growing reputation as a foundation dedicated to excellence, not unlike such counterparts 
in the private realm as Ford and Rockefeller.”25 The idea that the NSF should be 
administered, in certain respects, more like a private foundation than a government 
bureaucracy, was prevalent when the agency was developing its policies. One of the 
critical policy decisions that followed from this perspective was to award funds primarily 
through grants instead of contracts. Whereas a contract can imply a predetermined result, 
                                                        
23 George T. Mazuzan, “‘Good Science Gets Funded…:’ The Historical Evolution of Grant Making at the 
National Science Foundation,” Science Communication 14, no. 1 (1992): 67-8. 
24 Mazuzan, 69. 
25 England, 349. 
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grants imply greater freedom for the scholar and suggest that the outcome of the research 
is geared toward the advancement of science and the public interest.26 
7.3 HUMANITIES FOUNDATION GOALS  
The scholarly organizations which lobbied for the establishment of the NEH 
aimed to achieve something similar to the situation that prevailed at the NSF: a federal 
humanities foundation that made decisions on the basis of expertise in the humanities, 
while enjoying the nation’s confidence. To that end, the Commission on the Humanities 
proposed a bureaucratic structure very similar to that of the NSF. The Commission 
recommended that the new foundation be composed of a board, director, and staff. Both 
the board and director were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. Like the NSB, the board was to be vested with formal authority. Though the 
Commission was not too specific in divvying up authority between the director and the 
board, it seemed to favor the board. In describing the nature and purpose of the proposed 
foundation, the Commission attributed agency to the board in the following respects: 
Under the provisions of a National Humanities Foundation Act, the Board 
should be empowered to determine and carry out its program with an 
appropriation made by the Congress of the United States…The Board should have 
the authority to experiment with ways in which the Foundation’s general purposes 
can best be carried out, but under no conditions whatsoever should it attempt to 
direct or control the scholarship, teaching, or artistic endeavor which it supports. 
   
The members of the board, like the members of the NSB, were to be chosen based on 
their expertise and experience in the humanities, arts, and education and “should 
                                                        
26 Mazuzan, 65 and Rothenberg interviewed by author.  
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represent a wide spectrum of American life.” Further, the President should not appoint a 
director of the humanities foundation until the board made its recommendations.27  
The Commission said that the foundation should have divisions, but did not 
specify how they should be organized or what areas of the humanities they should 
represent. However, the Commission did say, “At the discretion of the Board, each 
division might well have an advisory committee composed of eminent persons in the 
field involved,” possibly implying that the divisions be organized by academic field, as 
they were at the NSF. The Commission anticipated some form expert review, proposing 
that fellowships, for example, be decided on by “committees or juries composed of 
scholars, writers, and artists whose work has achieved distinction, with the majority of 
the members still productive.” It also suggested that the foundation might work 
“indirectly through organizations devoted to these same ends in whose selection 
processes the Foundation has confidence.” Though the Commission did not mention 
ACLS explicitly, this may have been one of the “organizations” it had in mind.28 
Congress shared the same ultimate objectives as scholars: to establish a federal 
foundation that would make grants according to nonpolitical humanistic expertise. Yet 
Congress and the Johnson administration also insisted that the new foundation be 
accountable to the government. To that end, unlike at NSF, Congress chose to vest all 
formal authority in the chairman of the NEH. The National Council on the Humanities, 
the counterpart to the NSB, was made purely advisory in nature. Recall that under the 
original NSF legislation, the NSB had formal authority in many key areas, including the 
actual approval of funding awards. The National Council on the Humanities, in contrast, 
                                                        
27 “Report of the Commission on the Humanities,” 9, 14-15. 
28 “Report of the Commission on the Humanities,” 12-15. 
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was given two main tasks. According to the National Foundation on the Arts and the 
Humanities Act of 1965, the National Council shall:  
(1) advise the Chairman with respect to policies, programs, and 
procedures for carrying out his functions, and 
 
(2) shall review applications for financial support and make 
recommendations thereupon to the Chairman. 
 
The chairman was prohibited from acting on an application, either positively or 
negatively, until he received the Council’s recommendation. Though unlike at the NSF 
(prior to the NSB’s delegations of authority), the Council did not have to sign off on a 
grant for it to go through. All it was required to do was provide a recommendation, which 
the chairman, in theory, could either accept or reject.29  
When the legislation to establish the NEA and NEH was being debated, the House 
rejected a proposed amendment to make all grant awards subject to the approval of the 
National Councils on the Arts and Humanities, just as NSF was structured originally. 
Proponents of the amendment argued that placing formal authority in a council of private 
citizens would help guarantee the “autonomy of the arts” and more reliably advance the 
public interest. Congressman Frank Thompson (D-NJ), one of the bill’s supporters and a 
dogged proponent of federal arts legislation, opposed the amendment, explaining that the 
White House favored giving ultimate authority to the chairman because it was easier to 
trace responsibility to a single person than a group. Thompson said, “[The Johnson 
administration] feel[s] it should belong in the Chairman, who is responsible to the 
President who, incidentally, is not only anxious but perfectly willing to accept ultimate 
responsibility for his action.”30 
                                                        
29 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 851. 
30 111 Cong. Rec. 23976 (1965). 
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Congress believed, though, that despite the national arts and humanities councils’ 
lack of formal authority, they would still ensure that the NEA and NEH would remain 
governed by and in the interests of professional artists and humanists. It was assumed that 
the backing of a prestigious board would provide the chairman with cover to make grants 
and start programs that were validated by experts, but might be deemed controversial.31 
Congressman William Moorhead (D-PA) said that the prestige of the council members 
would enable the Endowments to “withstand any improper pressure from government.” 
He explained, “I suggest in this Foundation we are creating not an institution of 
Government but an institution designed to be able to talk back to Government.”32 It was 
also assumed that the requirement that the councils review applications and make 
recommendations would keep the chairman from acting unilaterally and abusing his 
formal power. As Congressman Moorhead said during debate on the House floor, the 
chairman of the NEA (and by extension, the chairman of the NEH) would “be in trouble” 
if he departed too often from the Council’s recommendations.33 
The Commission on the Humanities likely assumed (and may have hoped) that 
just as the professional staff at the NSF had come to dominate decision-making, the same 
would be true at a federal humanities foundation. When the NEH’s legislation was being 
developed in 1965, the ACLS favored allowing the National Council on the Humanities 
to dispense with its role of advising on grants. During hearings on the proposed arts and 
                                                        
31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Arts and Humanities Amendments of 
1967: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare on S. 2061, Part 2, 90th Cong., 1st. sess., 1967, 331 (remarks by Senator Pell).  
32 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, National Arts and 
Humanities Foundations: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on 
Education and Labor on H.R. 334, H.R. 2043, H.R. 3617, and similar bills, Part 2, 89th Cong., 1st. sess., 
1965, 255. 
33 111 Cong. Rec. 23976 (1965).  
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humanities foundation, Burkhardt recommended that the section of the legislation 
requiring the National Council on the Humanities to advise the chairman on grants be 
amended to resemble the statute governing the NSF as it was amended in 1959. 
Burkhardt said: 
Specifically, I think it would make both the Chairman’s and the Council’s 
lives easier to add the following, which is adapted from section 5(b) of the 
National Science Foundation Act, and I quote:  
 
Or unless such action is taken pursuant to the terms of a delegation 
of authority from the Council to the Chairman.34  
 
This would have permitted the Council to dispense with its review of applications, 
leaving decisions completely in the hands of the chairman and, in turn, the staff. 
Congress, however, did not include this recommendation in the original legislation. Yet 
this question of whether the National Council should dispense with review of grants 
would remain an issue in debates over the structure and operations of the NEH for 
decades to come.  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 The NEH’s bureaucratic structure implemented in 1965 reflected the assumption 
that the agency would and should reflect the interests and ideas of scholars in the 
humanities; that the agency would defer largely to their judgment about what ought to be 
funded. In this unique moment of American history, it was widely assumed that the 
research and teaching that went on in universities had the potential to edify the nation. As 
                                                        
34 National Arts and Humanities Foundations, Part 2, 285.  
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described in chapter one, this notion had some degree of purchase among elites and the 
general public. The agency was set up to resist the “political” pressures envisioned by the 
founders, namely, pressures to turn the NEH into a pork barrel and shy away from projects 
that were worthwhile but might seem controversial to the public. With an all-powerful 
chairman that was both checked and backed by an eminent National Council on the 
Humanities, the NEH was thought to have a structure that would foster deference to 
nonpolitical humanistic expertise, but at the same time allow for accountability to the 
government.
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8.0  BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE EVOLVES  
From the founding of the NEH through President Reagan’s appointment of 
William Bennett as chairman—the years of the agency’s history prior to the escalation of 
the culture wars—the Endowment developed a bureaucratic structure that has remained 
largely the same to this day. The assumptions that were prevalent at the time of the 
agency’s founding continued to shape how the structure developed during these years. 
The NEH was to advance humanistic excellence, making decisions on the basis of 
professional standards. This understanding became the ethos of the professional staff and 
was behind the agency’s fervent embrace of peer review. It was also assumed that the 
NEH would have to fend off challenges of a political nature, such as the pressure to 
award funds to constituencies favored by politicians at the expense of a commitment to 
merit. This concern, which Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) raised early on, contributed to 
keeping the National Council on the Humanities involved as a final layer of application 
review, a departure from the model set by the National Science Board, which dispensed 
with acting on most proposals.  
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8.1 ENSHRINING PEER REVIEW  
 The authorizing statute left much to the discretion of the chairman of the NEH, 
including how the agency would make use of professional staff and external reviewers, as 
well as how to organize the agency into divisions. When the NEH was getting started in 
the late 1960s, its early leadership and staff looked to the NSF as a model for how it 
should operate.1 Like the NSF, the NEH viewed itself much like a private foundation. 
The NEH’s professional staff came to oversee a system in which all eligible applications 
were subject to review by outside experts, and their evaluations became the staff’s main 
criteria for recommending whether to fund or decline proposed projects. The staff 
developed a culture of seeing the NEH as a unique agency within government, one that 
was dedicated to the humanities and prized intellectual seriousness.  
An area in which the NEH departed from the NSF was in its divisional structure, 
organizing itself by project type instead of academic discipline. Whereas the NSF’s 
authorizing statute established several divisions based on various disciplines—Medical 
Research, Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences. Biological Sciences, and 
Scientific Personnel and Education—the legislation establishing the NEH did not name 
specific divisions or programs. With the freedom to organize itself as it saw fit, the NEH 
established divisions based on project type. The first NEH divisions were Fellowships 
and Stipends, Research and Publication, and Education and Public Programs, in addition 
to an Office of Planning and Analysis. By 1969, the NEH had established separate 
divisions for Education and Public Programs. The early divisions corresponded roughly 
                                                        
1 John Barcroft interviewed by author, September 5, 2014. 
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to the part of the statute which lists what the chairman is authorized to do, including 
supporting research, awarding fellowships and grants for workshops, and fostering public 
understanding and appreciation for the humanities.2 The NEH may have also gone this 
route because the humanities encompass so many disciplines; it would likely have been 
impractical, if not impossible, to have a division for each one, especially in the beginning 
when the budget was limited.  
Neither did the authorizing legislation say how the NEH was to make use of peer 
review. The statute provided only that the chairman had the authority “to utilize from 
time to time, as appropriate, experts and consultants, including panels of experts.”3 Free 
to develop its own processes, the NEH implemented a system in which standard practice 
was to subject all applications to external evaluation. That system, which has remained 
largely the same for the past 50 years,4 operates as follows.  
When applications are received, staff in the appropriate division perform an initial 
analysis to ensure that they are eligible and have no technical problems. Program officers 
form panels of outside experts who are charged with evaluating eligible proposals on 
their merits. The panelists assign initial grades along the following scale: E for excellent; 
VG for very good; G for good; SM for some merit; and NC for not competitive. 
Depending on the grant program, program officers will sometimes send proposals to 
additional outside reviewers with highly specialized knowledge; for example, a proposal 
for a research project dealing with an ancient language for which there are few relevant 
                                                        
2 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Public Law 89-209, U. S. Statutes at Large 
79 (1965): 850. 
3 National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, 852. 
4 Bruce Cole, “What’s Wrong with the Humanities,” Public Discourse, February 1, 2016, 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16248/.  
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experts. Panelists will take these supplemental external evaluations into account when 
determining initial grades. Panelists then travel to Washington, D.C. and meet as a group 
to discuss their assessments. At the conclusion of the meeting, typically chaired by the 
program officer, panelists can change their initial grades if they so choose.5   
Program officers then work with division heads to prepare a list of proposals to 
recommend for funding, basing their recommendations primarily on the panelists’ 
assessments and the program budget. The divisions then send their recommendations to 
the members of the National Council on the Humanities. Since 1967, the Council has 
divided itself into committees that correspond to the divisions. Program officers provide 
Council members on their respective committees with one-to-two page write ups about 
the projects they recommend for funding, describing them and the panelists’ reviews. 
This practice of providing write ups on projects resembles the practice that staff at the 
NSF employed early on, before the NSB delegated to the director the authority to make 
grants without its approval.6  
The National Council on the Humanities then convenes in Washington, D.C., 
typically for two days: a Thursday and a Friday. Over time, the Council has met either 
quarterly or thrice annually. On Thursday, the Council committees meet with the division 
staff and discuss the projects that have been recommended for and against funding. On 
Friday, the Council committees present their recommendations to the full Council, which 
then agrees on a final slate of recommendations for the chairman. It then falls to the 
chairman to decide on the Council’s recommendations: either to approve or decline 
                                                        
5 National Endowment for the Humanities, “NEH’s Application Review Process,” accessed June 17, 2016, 
http://www.neh.gov/grants/application-process. 
6 J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation’s Formative Years, 
1945-57 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1983): 166.  
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recommended projects. Because the Council’s work is purely advisory, the chairman is 
not formally bound by what it recommends.   
 A 1968 memo from Chairman Barnaby Keeney to NEH senior staff indicates that 
the use of panelists had, by that point in time, become prevalent inside the agency. The 
occasion of the memo was that Keeney had directed several proposals to the Office of 
Planning and Analysis for review instead of the main program divisions. In response to 
questions from senior staff, Keeney explained:  
Planning and Analysis handled these particular proposals because I told 
them to. I told them to because I wish speedy action on these. I intend to continue 
to refer proposals to Planning and Analysis when I feel that they can better 
accomplish them than can the Divisional machinery, which shows some signs of 
becoming rigidified. I do not intend the program of the Endowment to become a 
prisoner of the Divisional structure in programs, nor do I intend for it to become a 
prisoner of the panels.7  
 
Yet contrary to Keeney’s hopes, it appears that the NEH largely did become a “prisoner 
of the panels,” in the sense that nearly all proposals are evaluated in the manner described 
above.  
The NEH staff developed a reputation for professionalism and an unwavering 
commitment to the use of peer review. In 1990, The Chronicle of Higher Education 
published a retrospective of the NEH on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, which spoke 
very highly of the staff and the agency’s processes:  
The endowment’s professional staff is one of exceptional quality and 
integrity, among the very best in the federal service. And, despite criticism, its 
peer-review procedures—the most thorough and unbiased in the humanities—
have become the standard against which others are measured.8  
                                                        
7 Memorandum, Barnaby Keeney to Messrs. Redding, Bradford, Barcroft, Hedrich, Roschwalb, “Planning 
and Analysis Recommendations,” April 25, 1968, Records of the National Endowment for the Humanities, 
Office of the Chairman Internal Memorandums, 1966-1977, A – D, Box 1, Record Group 288, National 
Archives at College Park.   
8 James M. Banner Jr., “At 25, the Humanities Endowment Faces New Perils,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, May 16, 1990. 
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Former staffers have spoken of the strong espirit de corps at the NEH, as well as the 
professionalism and dedication of the career staff. Jason Hall, who was the NEH’s 
congressional liaison during the 1980s, compared the agency to the Sierra Club, in the 
sense that the staff shared a strong sense of purpose.9 Armen Tashdinian, who served at 
the NEH from 1969 through the mid-1980s, said that the staff provided “a lot of free 
overtime,” very dedicated as they were to the agency’s mission.10 As noted above, during 
the NEH’s formative years, staffers conceived of the agency as more akin to a private 
foundation than a federal bureau—just as did staffers at the NSF.11  
The academic pedigree of early staffers, the division directors in particular, may 
have contributed to the high-mindedness of the culture and insistence on professionalism. 
Early directors had been trained as academics, often at elite schools. James Blessing, for 
example, was the first director of the Division of Fellowships and Stipends, a position he 
held through 1983. He then led the Challenge Grants division until he left the NEH 
around 1986. Blessing had earned a B.A. in English from Princeton, an M.A. from 
Harvard, and a Ph.D. from Stanford.12 Guinevere Griest joined as a program officer in 
Fellowships in 1969, became deputy director in 1973, and retired in 1995 as director of 
the Division of Research Programs. She had earned her B.A. from Cornell and M.A. and 
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, in addition to having been a Fulbright scholar at 
                                                        
9 Jason Hall (former director, NEH Congressional Liaison Office) interviewed by author, March 24, 2015. 
10 Armen Tashdinian (former NEH staffer) interviewed by author, August 16, 2013. 
11 Roger Rosenblatt, who served as director of the Division of Education in the early 1970s, said that there 
was an inclination at NEH to “suspend belief that it is a government agency.” Government and the 
Humanities: Toward a National Cultural Policy, ed. Kenneth W. Tolo (Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs, 1979): 80. Ken Kolson said that, early on, Endowment staff created a quasi-myth 
that NEH was a private foundation. Kenneth Kolson (former staffer) interviewed by author, August 20, 
2013.   
12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 4, 94th Cong. 1st sess., 1975, 883.  
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Cambridge.13 The Research Division was first headed by J. Saunders Redding, a 
prominent black historian who, according to the New York Times, “is believed to have 
been the first black to teach at an Ivy League institution.”14 A two-time Guggenheim 
Fellow, Redding had earned an M.A. from Brown University and did further graduate 
studies at Columbia.15 His successor, William Emerson, who served at the NEH from 
1969 through 1973, had a B.A. from Yale and Ph.D. from Oxford, where he was a 
Rhodes Scholar.16 
Politically-appointed staff and members of the National Council, including 
Republican appointees, have praised the professionalism of the career staff and the 
seriousness with which they take the process of evaluating proposals. Leon Kass, who 
served on the Council in the 1980s, spoke of the “heroic work” that staff undertook in 
managing the flow of proposals and getting them reviewed. Kass also spoke of a 
principle at NEH, confirmed by others, that the NEH provides money for “excellent 
proposals” and not “excellent people.” This means that even if the applicant is a 
prestigious scholar, shoddy proposals will not get funded. There is a recognition on the 
part of the staff that the NEH’s budget represents taxpayer money and should only go 
toward truly meritorious work.17 Celeste Colgan, who served as deputy chairman under 
                                                        
13 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 11, 99th Cong. 1st sess., 1985, 8. 
14 C. Gerald Fraser, “J. Saunders Redding, 81, Is Dead; Pioneer Black Ivy League Teacher,” New York 
Times, March 5, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/05/obituaries/j-saunders-redding-81-is-dead-
pioneer-black-ivy-league-teacher.html.  
15 “Redding, J. Saunders (1906-1988),” http://www.blackpast.org/aah/redding-j-saunders-1906-1988.  
16 Wolfgang Saxon, “William Emerson, 74, Historian and Director of Roosevelt Library,” New York Times, 
June 8, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/08/nyregion/william-emerson-74-historian-and-director-of-
roosevelt-library.html. 
17 Leon Kass (former member, National Council on the Humanities) interviewed by author, July 9, 2013. In 
its response to a 1994 report by the GAO on the use of peer review by various federal agencies, including 
the NEH, the NEH said, “We fund applications in the humanities, we do not fund academic reputations: 
Applicants that are well-known in the humanities must, like all other applicants, develop a significant 
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Lynne Cheney, spoke of the “unbounded respect” she had for the program officers.18 
John Agresto, who served as Bill Bennett’s deputy, singled out Harold Cannon, a long-
time bureaucrat who served as director of the Research and Challenge Grant Divisions, 
for praise. Agresto said that Cannon was careful, “almost too careful,” and that “no junk” 
would get by him, which is partly why Bennett and Agresto had him head up the Office 
of Preservation when it first started.19 Andrew Hazlett, a politically-appointed staffer who 
worked in the chairman’s office under Bruce Cole, who self-identified as a libertarian and 
questions whether the NEH even ought to exist, said that his expectations about 
government workers were upended when he went to the Endowment. He was impressed 
by the quality of the staff, many of whom had Ph.D.’s and continued to publish in their 
respective fields. He concluded that NEH grants, even tiny stipends for summer research, 
must represent some of the most carefully vetted federal dollars to leave Washington, 
D.C.20  
The core task of the NEH’s professional staff is to convene panels of peer 
reviewers to evaluate proposals and then develop recommendations for funding based 
primarily on those external evaluations. In forming peer-review panels, the staff look for 
people who have the background necessary to evaluate the merits of a particular proposal, 
while aiming to make them as broadly representative of the nation and types of 
institutions as they can. Because the staffers often have advanced degrees in the 
humanities, they sometimes tap into their own personal networks. Though the choice of 
                                                        
project and submit a quality application if they expect to receive serious consideration for funding.” U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Peer Review: Reforms Needed to Ensure Fairness in Federal Agency Grant 
Selection, GAO/PEMD-94-1 (Washington, D.C., 1994), 120. 
18 Celeste Colgan (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, April 29, 2016.  
19 John Agresto (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, June 23, 2015. 
20 Andrew Hazlett (former staffer) interviewed by author, August 2, 2013.  
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panelists can influence what ends up getting funded, and staffers can become personally 
vested in some applications and desire to see them funded, the impression I received from 
interviews is that this is not the staff’s foremost concern in forming panels.  
The most urgent task that the staff faces is simply to form the panel in a timely 
fashion so as to keep up with the NEH’s grant cycles, which is not always easy. Program 
officers cannot rely on financial incentives to get people to serve as panelists. The work is 
hardly lucrative, especially given the time demands involved. As of 2015, panelists 
received an honorarium of $250 to review a batch of proposals, the number of which 
varies by grant program, and to spend at least a day in Washington, D.C (travel, lodging, 
and per diem expenses are also provided). Malcolm Richardson, a long-serving former 
staffer, said that some people liken being an NEH panelist to jury duty. Some agree to 
serve out of a felt obligation as a scholar or practitioner, and some like doing it to see 
what is happening in the field.21 NEH program officers regularly ask past grantees to 
serve as reviewers, not only because they tend to be competent people, as their grants 
attest, but also because they can often be counted on to feel an obligation to give back to 
the agency. One staffer said that sometimes the most important criteria for a panelist is 
whether he or she is available to be in Washington, D.C. on the date when the in-person 
panel session is to take place.22  
The staff, in their management of the peer-review process, adopted early on a 
posture of “standing back” and responding to what the various academic fields put 
forward.23 When panels convene in Washington, D.C., NEH program officers chair the 
                                                        
21 Malcolm Richardson (former staffer) interviewed by author, June 20, 2013. 
22 Thomas Adams (former program officer) interviewed by author, January 15, 2016. 
23 Jason Hall interview by author. 
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meetings, but refrain from opining on what should or should not get funded.24 According 
to a former long-serving staffer, division staff are, for the most part, “slavishly” 
committed to the panelists’ evaluations when they prepare lists of recommended projects 
for the National Council.25 A study by the General Accounting Office found that, at the 
NEH, like the NSF and NIH, the reviewers’ scores were “the most important factor 
affecting whether a proposal was funded.”26 There are occasional instances in which the 
staff will disagree with the panelists’ recommendations on the merits.27 Moreover, some 
staffers will occasionally decline to recommend a project, even when it has been ranked 
highly, knowing that the chairman will deem it unacceptable for ideological reasons. The 
extent to which that happens, though, is impossible to say. One staffer I interviewed 
spoke to this reality. But another staffer denied ever doing this, noting a commitment to 
advocating for any project that seemed deserving.28 In these cases, it may boil down to 
differences in personality. But for the most part, staff base their recommendations 
primarily on the grades given by panelists (the work of program officers in more 
ideologically fraught times is discussed at greater length in the following chapter). 
This posture of deferring to the external reviewers and responding to what 
scholars and humanistic institutions considered to be their needs was instilled early on. 
Congress and the original humanities advocates were clear that they did not want federal 
funding to lead to federal control, and the NEH did not disagree. Ronald Berman, the 
NEH’s second chairman, spoke of how the NEH followed this principle. In a 1974 speech 
                                                        
24 George Farr (former staffer and former director, Office of Preservation) interviewed by author, July 17, 
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27 Kenneth Kolson interviewed by author. 
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to the Association of American Universities, he said, “Just as the divisional structure 
reflects the Endowment’s purpose, the mechanism by which it operates reflects the 
agency’s commitment to respond to the humanistic community, rather than to prescribe 
for it” (underlining in original).29 He made a similar point in a speech to Phi Beta Kappa 
the previous year: “The mechanics of Endowment operations are simple enough. We 
initiate very little…The projects supported, therefore, reflect the interests and needs of 
the humanistic community; they are not prescribed by some government plan.”30  
Craig Eisendrath, a program officer in the Division of Education, expressed 
something of this sentiment in a letter he wrote to Irving Kristol, who was then a member 
of the National Council for the Humanities in the mid-1970s. Toward the end of the 
letter, Eisendrath explained that the NEH should not attempt to control the content of 
grantees’ work. It is worth quoting from at length: 
Finally, I think we must let schools make up their own programs and not 
attempt to regulate too minutely their particular content. Part of the reason might 
be a modesty on our part about what is and what is not useful as teaching material 
for a particular student body, although, of course, we must have standards about 
what is massively shoddy or unsuitable. But beyond this it is simply not the 
business of the federal government to prescribe what is and what is not acceptable 
education on anything other than quite broad educational grounds. We must let 
schools come to us with what they want to do, qualitatively judge that effort as a 
whole, and decided to assist or deny assistance. There will be some schools, for 
example, which may choose to use material quite critical of the United States. I do 
not think we should attempt to prevent them from doing so, providing their 
programs as a whole are educationally [sound?] and not coercively political. To 
condition our support on the removal [of?] particular readings would represent not 
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only an enfringement [sic] of academic freedom, but the assumption on the part of 
the Endowment of the role of commissar which is clearly not our role.31 
 
A congressional investigation in the late 1970s also noted the NEH’s insistence on 
being responsive and reactive, as opposed to prescriptive, though the investigators 
viewed this as a deficiency. The investigative staff believed that the NEH was abrogating 
the leadership role in the humanities that, in its view, the statute had intended. The 
investigative staff said that the NEH “allowed the various project applications submitted 
from the field to become a surrogate national policy, shaping the program direction and 
emphasis of the Endowment.”32 The NEH, in its response to the investigators, said that 
Congress had never intended for the agency to behave in a dictatorial fashion. The NEH 
accused the investigators of not paying close enough attention to the actual wording of 
the statute. The specific wording was that NEH would develop a “national policy of 
support” and “a national policy for the promotion of progress and scholarship.” The 
Endowment insisted that this was hardly the same thing as a “national humanities 
policy,” the term used by the investigative staff.33 In this regard, the NEH was adhering 
to Congress’s intent, which was simply to provide federal support for what scholars in the 
humanities were doing, not seeking to impose a government agenda on fields such as 
history or philosophy. 
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8.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE 
HUMANITIES  
One of the main differences between the bureaucratic structures of the NSF and 
NEH pertained to the status of their respective boards: the National Science Board and 
National Council on the Humanities. Whereas the NSB was originally vested with formal 
authority, the NCH had none. By law, the latter was in a purely advisory capacity. 
Despite this difference, however, humanists who advocated for the NEH likely 
assumed—and hoped—that the NCH would play a similar role as the NSB. Recall that by 
1965, the NSB had delegated away much of its formal authority to the NSF’s director and 
had largely removed itself from the process of awarding grants. The NSB concerned itself 
mainly with advising the NSF on broader matters and helped shore up the agency’s 
credibility with both scientists and the American public. Though the early NCH seemed 
to conceive of itself in similar terms as the NSB, by the late 1970s, the Council 
understood its main role was to be a final reviewer of grant applications. Congress 
insisted upon keeping the NCH involved in this function, believing, as did the founders of 
the Endowment, that the Council could help provide cover for the chairman and give him 
or her the wherewithal to resist inappropriate pressure from politicians.  
During the 1960s and early 1970s, membership on the National Council on the 
Humanities largely followed the pattern established by the NSB. Members were chosen 
to enhance the prestige of the NEH and bolster the confidence that both practitioners in 
the humanities and the general public had in the agency. In 1969, Gerald Else, who was 
vice chairman of the Council, explained:  
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The Council was set up deliberately by the enabling Act as a broadly 
based group representing the public at large. Its function is to bring the point or 
points of view of the community as a whole—including education, science, 
business, and the arts, as well as the humanities—to bear on the problems of the 
Humanities as a national concern…34 
 
Such a membership could also provide cover to the chairman in the event of controversial 
grants.  
President Johnson’s first appointees to the NCH constituted a Blue Ribbon group, 
whose members represented a mix of humanistic disciplines, regions, types of 
institutional affiliations, races, and religions. Scholars on the Council included, among 
others:  
 Gustave Arlt, head of the Council of Graduate Schools, one of the sponsoring 
organizations of the 1964 Commission on the Humanities  
 Kenneth B. Clark, the professor of psychology whose work was central in the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision 
 Robert Goheen, a classicist who was president of Princeton  
 Adelaide Cromwell Hill, an African American female professor of sociology who 
headed the Boston University African Studies Center  
 Robert Lumianski, a professor of medieval English and chairman of ACLS 
  
 Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., a leading Catholic theologian  
 
The diversity of scholars on the board was enhanced by an archaeologist/anthropologist 
from the University of Arizona, a professor of French literature from the University of 
Wisconsin, a government professor from University of Texas, Austin, and a law 
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professor from Montana. Corporate America was covered by the president of Textron, an 
industrial conglomerate based in Providence, Rhode Island, and by the chairman of the 
board of Ball Brothers Company, a diversified manufacturer based in Muncie, Indiana. 
Labor had its representative in a leader of the United Steelworkers of America. The 
Council had a representative from the natural sciences: Robert Bower, a physicist, who 
was director of the Bureau of Social Science Research. (The NSB, in like fashion, at one 
time included Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, president of the University of Notre Dame, so as 
to have a perspective from the humanities.) Filling out the Council were a composer from 
Los Angeles, a Chinese architect from New York, the art critic for Newsday, an author of 
Appalachian fiction from the South, and Reverend Robert Warren Spike, a Protestant 
divinity professor and civil rights activist.35 
When it came time to appoint the first round of replacements in 1968, President 
Johnson continued in the spirit of the NSB, at least to some degree, in which seats 
represented certain constituencies. Though terms on the Council are for six years, a third 
of the original class was appointed for a two-year term and another third for a four-year 
term, so as to begin the regular rotation of members. Many of the new appointees had 
analogues among the departing cohort:  
 Fr. Murray left and was replaced by another Jesuit priest, Fr. Walter Ong, S.J., an 
English professor (and later president of the MLA).  
 Adelaide Cromwell Hill left and was replaced by another African American, 
Stephen Wright, president of the United Negro College Fund. 
  
                                                        
35 National Endowment for the Humanities, First Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1966, 1967, 21.  
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 Rev. Robert Spike, who died before his term was supposed to end in 1970, was 
replaced by another Protestant minister, J. William Morgan, pastor of University 
Methodist Church in Austin, Texas.  
 Meredith Wilson, a composer and conductor from Los Angeles was replaced by 
Jacob Avshalomov, a composer and conductor from New York.  
 John Letson, a school superintendent left and was replaced by Allan Glatthorn, 
the principal of Abington High School of Abington, Pennsylvania.36  
It is even possible that, just as the NSB was self-perpetuating, the first Council members 
may have had some hand in designating their successors. At the November 1967 Council 
meeting, the NCH reviewed the names of 167 people that various organizations had 
recommended, as well as offered some of its own recommendations.37 
The next group of members, appointed in 1970 for terms ending in 1976, did not 
replace departing members one-for-one. However, the appointments still seemed to be 
made in the interest of diversity and prestige:  
 Robert O. Anderson, a businessman and philanthropist, was chairman of the board 
of Atlantic Richfield, Co., an oil company (and the only member of this cohort 
not to have a Ph.D.).  
 Lewis White Beck was a professor of philosophy at the University of Rochester.  
 Leslie Fishel, Jr. was a scholar of African American history and president of 
Heidelberg College in Ohio.  
                                                        
36 National Endowment for the Humanities, Third Annual Report, 1969, 73. 
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 Leslie Koltai was chancellor of Metropolitan Junior College District in Kansas 
City, Missouri.  
 Sherman Emery Lee was director of the Cleveland Museum of Art.  
 Herman Hodge Long, an African American, was president of Talladega College 
in Talladega, Alabama, a historically black college.  
 Rosemary Park was vice chancellor, Student and Curricular Affairs, at UCLA.  
 Arthur Peterson was chairman of the Department of Politics and Government at 
Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio.38  
Though President Nixon made these appointments, he did so before Ronald Berman 
came on as chairman. As described below, the next round of appointments, in 1972, 
appear to reflect Berman’s influence. 
During the first several years of the NEH’s existence, especially as the number of 
applications began to increase and the agency implemented its peer-review system, the 
Council grappled internally with how it should carry out the requirement in the law that it 
make recommendations on grants.39 Minutes of early Council meetings suggest that the 
NCH seemed intent on following the practice in place at the NSF, which was to 
rubberstamp applications for smaller grants recommended by the staff and concern itself 
primarily with larger awards.40 At the February 1968 meeting, the Committee on 
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Research and Publication “reported it felt its purpose, in general, was not to second guess 
panelists on individual applications but to concern itself with the establishment of policy 
and procedures under which there could be confidence about the choice of projects being 
recommended for approval and disapproval.”41 In addition, like the members of the NSB, 
many early NCH members “were not practicing scholars,” so it was questionable what 
kind of evaluation they could provide.42 
In 1967, around the time of the NEH’s first reauthorization, when the NCH had 
developed a policy of rubberstamping most applications that the peer reviewers had 
recommended, Congress considered amending the statute to allow the Council to 
dispense with advising on some grants.43 During hearings, Chairman Keeney explained 
that it was common for private foundations to provide their officers with the authority to 
award grants without board review, at least for grants of smaller amounts.44 Not only was 
this common practice for foundations, it was also arguably becoming an administrative 
necessity at the NEH due to the volume of applications. The Endowment received 
approximately 1,600 applications the previous year. Keeney said that it troubled the 
Council members to have to vote on projects that they had not studied in depth. He also 
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stressed that the ability to bypass Council review would enable the NEH to make small 
“preliminary grants” if a ripe opportunity presented itself and timing was of the essence.45 
Senator Pell, however, was wary of removing the Council from the grant-review 
process. He explained that Congress had required Council review in order to provide the 
chairman with political insulation for decisions he would have to make, especially given 
“the explosive nature of some of the ideas” that can come up in the humanities. Pell was 
also concerned that the amendment “could bring up the question of the Chairman 
exercising a czar-like role in his field.”46 Congress had made the same arguments about 
the importance of the Council at the founding the agency, when it vested all formal 
authority in the chairman.  
Probably because of Pell’s skittishness about doing away with the Council’s 
recommendation on grants, the Senate version of the reauthorization allowed the Council 
to wave its responsibility to advise on grants only up to $5,000. The House version 
capped such grant awards at $10,000. At the May 1968 NCH meeting, before a final 
conference version of the reauthorization legislation had been prepared, the Council 
adopted a resolution delegating to the Chairman the authority to approve or disapprove of 
requests up to $10,000 without its recommendation.47 Congress soon thereafter sided 
with the House version on the amount.  
 But after Barnaby Keeney received the authority to award small grants without 
first getting the NCH’s recommendations, he made little use of it. The same was true of 
                                                        
45 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Arts and Humanities Amendments of 
1967: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare on S. 2061, Part 2, 90th Cong., 1st. sess., 1967, 329-30.  
46 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, Arts and Humanities Amendments of 1967, 329-31. 
47 “Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” May 6-7, 1968, 26, NEH 
Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities. 
 253  
Wallace Edgerton, who succeeded Keeney as acting chairman. Both made sparing use of 
what came to be known as “chairman’s grants.” Between quarterly National Council 
meetings, never once did either Keeney or Edgerton make more than nine of them. Many 
of the chairman’s grants seemed to have been made because timing was of the essence, 
the justification that Keeney gave to Pell in arguing for this prerogative. Between when 
the reauthorization was passed in June of 1968 and the next Council meeting in 
November, Keeney made nine chairman’s grants. Seven of them were for summer 
workshops on Negro history for college and university faculty members. If Keeney had 
needed the Council to give its recommendation on them, the workshops might not have 
been able to take place.48 11 of Edgerton’s 33 chairman’s grants were planning grants to 
launch state humanities committees, an initiative that Congress was insistent that the 
NEH pursue.49  
 The question of whether to expand both the NEA and NEH’s authority to approve 
grants without first having the recommendation of their respective National Councils 
came up again during debate over the 1973 reauthorization. The Nixon administration’s 
proposed version of the reauthorization raised the ceiling on chairman’s grants for both 
Endowments from $10,000 to $25,000 and allowed up to 10 percent of grants to be 
awarded in this fashion. The administration explained that allowing the NCH to delegate 
this authority to the chairman would enable the NEH to respond more effectively to 
emergency situations. But that was not the only justification. The administration argued 
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that if the Council was confident in the judgment of the external peer reviewers and the 
process in place in certain grant programs, then the NEH could reasonably relieve the 
Council of having to provide its own recommendations. The Council could then dedicate 
more of its time to larger questions of policy.50 In effect, the Nixon administration 
favored making the NEA and NEH more like the NSF, where the NSB deferred to the 
judgment of staff and outside reviewers on the merits of particular applications and 
dedicated more of its time to agency-wide issues. 
The National Council on the Humanities seemed to agree with the 
administration’s view of the matter. In 1972, the Council recommended raising the 
ceiling of awards that could be given without Council review from $10,000 to $50,000.51 
According to the minutes of the February 1972 Council meeting, “There was a feeling 
that the volume of material presented to the Council members has become so large as to 
be difficult to deal with.”52 However, while the Council recognized the need to make 
processes more efficient, there were still some reservations about delegating this 
authority to the Chairman. Fr. Ong, for example, supported the Administration’s 
proposed $25,000 ceiling, but did not want as much as 10 percent of NEH funds to be 
distributed via this mechanism, the cap set by the administration’s bill.53 
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 On the NEA side, Nancy Hanks and the National Council on the Arts also favored 
the administration’s proposal. In her prepared testimony on the reauthorization, though 
Hanks did not bring up the National Science Foundation explicitly, her argument about 
increasing the ceiling for chairman’s grants reflected a view that the NEA be allowed to 
run more like the NSF. Hanks explained that the National Council on the Arts did not 
think that it needed to add its judgment to that of the external reviewers and that it should 
be paying attention to policy matters, such as program guidelines.54  
 In the reauthorization legislation that passed, Congress raised the ceiling on 
chairman’s grants to $17,500. This new ceiling represented a compromise between the 
Senate, which proposed increasing it to $15,000, and the House, which proposed 
increasing it to $20,000. Senator Pell, once again, maintained that review of grants by the 
National Councils was important to protect the chairmen from political pressure. When 
Chairman Hanks was testifying, Pell told her that if the White House were to apply 
pressure for the NEA to fund certain local bicentennial projects, “it would be very had 
[sic] for her to resist.”55 Backing from the National Council on the Arts, however, could 
give her the wherewithal to fund what the agency thought was best. Both the House and 
Senate acknowledged the Councils’ heavy workload, but insisted that they remain 
involved in recommending grants, saying that this level of review was important in order 
to encourage projects of high quality. Despite raising the ceiling on award size, Congress 
did not want the chairmen to make extensive use of chairman’s grants. The House 
Committee on Education and Labor stated, “The Committee wishes to make clear that it 
                                                        
54 U.S. Congress, Senate and House, Committees, National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 
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does not anticipate that the Chairmen will utilize the full 10 percent authority 
provided…This authority should be used on a very limited scale and only to the extent 
necessary.”56 
 Chairman Berman was content to abide by Congress’s preference for a limited use 
of chairman’s grants. At the February 1973 Council meeting, NCH member Sidney Hook 
asked Berman why he made so few of them. According to the minutes, Berman was 
“convinced that it is important that as many NEH grants as possible receive a Council 
recommendation because that lends added prestige to the grant.”57 Even when the GAO 
recommended that the NEH increase its use of chairman’s grants following the 1973 
reauthorization, Berman remained reluctant to do so. At the August 1974 Council 
meeting, according to the minutes, Berman said that he wanted the NCH to review “the 
great majority of applications because if such review is not given, he would be deprived 
of the benefit of their knowledge and experience which he considers to be a protection to 
him.”58 This “protection” could refer to the possibility that the NCH discover a project 
that does not deserve funding, or the notion that the NCH’s backing would provide 
Berman with cover to make a grant that some politicians might find disagreeable.   
 Yet just as the Council remained involved in making recommendations on grants, 
the nature of its membership departed from the original composition. As described above, 
the NCH was initially composed in a manner following the NSB, in which members were 
chosen with the goal of representing the humanities and various constituencies. But after 
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Berman became chairman, Presidents Nixon and Ford ceased to follow the earlier 
practice. Of the full slate of Council members appointed between 1972 and 1976, roughly 
a third were practicing scholars, another third were Republican leaning business people, 
philanthropists, and their spouses, and the remaining third was composed of university 
presidents and other individuals. Of the scholars and intellectuals, some were known 
conservatives, such as Irving Kristol, Jeffrey Hart, Sidney Hook, and Robert Nisbet. 
While the NCH continued to rubberstamp many of the staff’s recommendations, it is 
possible that Berman appreciated having scholars like them as a final check on what was 
coming through the grant pipeline.  
The makeup of the Council was not lost on Richard Kostelanetz, a professor of 
literature, whose application to the NEH for a project called, “The New Literature,” was 
turned down. In a 1978 essay critical of the Endowment, he made the following 
observations about the NCH. Of the members appointed in 1972 and 1974, he wrote:  
Four of these sixteen appear to be businessmen whom I could not find 
listed in Who’s Who in America (Ashley, Solow, St. Johns, Hewitt); one wonders 
how their names came to the attention of the NEH (and yet evaded the ever-
solicitous Marquis Co.). A fifth (Luis Ferré) is less a civil servant than the former 
proprietor of Puerto Rico’s largest cement company. Two Council members are 
culturally active wives of very rich philanthropists. Four are politically 
conservative polemicists (Hart, Hook, Kristol, and Nesbit [sic]). None whom I 
can publicly trace was born after 1931 except Kilson, who also appears to be the 
sole black. 
 
Of the class of 1976, Kostelanetz said:  
In sum, to the supreme Council were added three academic chiefs, two 
newspaper publishers, two old-style political hens, a military-industrial lobbyist, 
and one token bona fide scholar, all of whom were also born before 1930.  
 
Kostelanetz continued:  
Anyone aware of the plurality of American culture can see that this 
appointed panel is a scandalously unrepresentative crew, stacked to the political 
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right and to age against youth. Were we not otherwise informed, we would think 
these “distinguished citizens” were trustees of a right-wing think tank, or a retreat 
for retired academics, or a high-faluting school desk company. (Perhaps the NEH 
is a front for something else.) The thought of getting stuck with them on a sinking 
ship would give most of us scholarly applicants nightmares…. 
 
I for one would honestly have more confidence in an NEH Council 
composed, say, of a random sample of readers of this magazine, or, say again, of 
Howard Cosell, Alex Karras, Muhammad Ali, and Billie Jean King. At least, their 
decisions would be less deleterious.  
 
One job for the Carter administration will be flushing out the hidden 
legacies of the Nixon-Ford years.59 
   
By the late 1970s, the National Council had come to view making 
recommendations on grants as its primary responsibility, despite the statute requiring that 
it also advise on policy.60 Staff at the NEH may have discouraged Council members from 
getting too involved in policy matters. At the August 1974 meeting, Hanna Gray, a 
member of the Council who would soon become president of the University of Chicago, 
asked about the NCH’s role in developing the NEH’s budget, given that many boards 
were involved in this task. According to the minutes, deputy chairman Robert Kingston 
told her that while the Council was welcome to participate in developing the budget, its 
role was necessarily limited. Kingston explained that the Council “is an advisory body, 
not a board of trustees, and ultimate budget decisions are made by the Office of 
Management and Budget in preparing the President’s budget requests.” If Council 
members wanted to have a hand in influencing the budget, they should share ideas with 
agency staff.61 However, this was something that many members probably lacked the 
                                                        
59 Richard Kostelanetz, “The National Endowment for the Inhumanities,” College English 39, no. 5 (1978): 
598-9. 
60 Mary Beth Norton, who was appointed to the Council in 1978, said that by then, the NCH viewed 
recommending grants as its primary role, not advising on policy. Mary Beth Norton interviewed by author, 
May 6, 2016. 
61 “Minutes of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” 9-10. 
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time or inclination to do. Furthermore, given the way the composition of the Council 
changed under Presidents Nixon and Ford, many of the members, especially the 
Republican-donor types, may not necessarily have been the most qualified to think about 
broad issues in the humanities. 
Any chance that the allowance of chairman’s grants, however limited, could lead 
to a reduction in the Council’s role of application review died as a result of how 
Chairman Duffey used (or abused) them. Duffey made more extensive use of chairman’s 
grants than his predecessors, prompting concerns among the NCH and drawing public 
scrutiny. Recall that the Nixon administration had proposed increasing the ceiling on 
chairman’s grants partly to allow the NEH to function more efficiently and more like the 
NSF. The administration believed that the NCH should be able to dispense with having to 
make recommendations on grants if it was confident in the peer-review procedures being 
used. Reducing the number of applications that they had to recommend on would have 
allowed the Council to devote more of its time to advising on policy. Duffey, however, 
seemed to use chairman’s grants in an effort to bypass peer review.  
On at least two occasions during Duffey’s chairmanship, Council members balked 
at applications to add funding to chairman’s grants that had already been made. At the 
November 1978 meeting, the Council was presented with an application to add $5,600 to 
a project that had already received a chairman’s grant. Chairman Duffey had made a 
chairman’s grant of $17,500 (the maximum allowed) to the Organization of American 
Historians for a project, “Women in the Humanities, a Planning Grant.” Robert 
Hollander, a member of the Council, opposed the project, claiming that it represented 
advocacy and not research, and emphasized that neither the original application nor the 
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supplemental request had gone through panel review. The Council ended up voting to 
approve the supplemental grant, though not without internal division: 8 were in favor, 4 
were opposed, and 2 abstained.62 At the August 1979 meeting, a similar situation arose, 
in which the Council was asked to recommend additional funds for a project supported by 
a chairman’s grant. Hollander noted his concerns and, according to the minutes, 
Blanchette Ferry Rockefeller (wife of John D. Rockefeller III) “also was disturbed by this 
grant.” She felt that chairman’s grants were reserved for special situations and that they 
should not obligate the NEH’s divisions to continue supporting certain projects.63 
Furthermore, Hollander expressed alarm over the amount of money Duffey was 
distributing through these grants, nearly $1 million in 1979.64 
Duffey was publicly accused of political bias in his use of chairman’s grants. 
Terry Krieger, a former NEH staffer, wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “it seems that the 
purpose of many of his Chairman’s Grants has been not so much to enhance the 
humanities as to advance social causes or please politically important groups.” Recipients 
of Chairman’s Grants had included “the American Federation of Teachers, the National 
Council of La Raza, the National Italian-American Foundation, the National Coalition of 
Cuban-Americans, the National Consumers League, and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic 
Workers International Union.”65 
                                                        
62 “Minutes of the Fiftieth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” November 16-17, 1978, 17, 
NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities. 
63 “Minutes of the Fifty-Third Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” August 15-17, 1979, 
24, NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities.  
64 “Minutes of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” November 14-16, 
1979, 17, NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities. 
65 Terry Krieger, “Thoughts on Mr. Duffey’s Humanities Endowment,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 
1979, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
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When Bill Bennett became chairman, he reformed the NEH’s policy in regard to 
chairman’s grants in response to the perception that they had been abused under the 
previous chairmanship. (Applicants had come to believe that the chairman had a 
discretionary fund and that it could be easier to obtain a chairman’s grant than go through 
the regular process.66) Under Bennett’s new policy, organizations that sought grants outside 
of the standard review process had to justify why their situation was a real emergency and 
funds were needed immediately. Bennett even renamed chairman’s grants as “emergency 
grants,” reinforcing their true purpose.67 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
 During the 1970s, before the buildup of the culture wars, the NEH’s bureaucratic 
structure operated largely as intended. While still in its formative years, the NEH 
developed processes to make expert judgment the dominant criteria in determining grant 
awards, an approach that Republicans, in particular, strongly encouraged. Chairman 
Ronald Berman was adamant about the use of peer review and about being responsive to 
the needs expressed by professional humanists as opposed to prescribing what scholars 
should be doing. This was the same goal expressed by the scholarly organizations that 
advocated for the establishment of the NEH, as well as the founders in Congress. The 
Nixon administration even sought to allow the National Councils on the Arts and 
                                                        
66 “Minutes of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” November 4-5, 1982, 
10, NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities; “Minutes of the 
Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” 17.  
67 “Minutes of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” 10.  
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Humanities to dispense with review of a portion of applications if they thought that the 
underlying peer review processes were sound, just as the National Science Board had 
done (though Berman still preferred to maintain the Council’s involvement as a final 
screen).  
As the founders predicted, the NEH came under pressure to distribute funds to 
favored constituencies, possibly at the expense of excellence, with Chairman Duffey 
clearly out to achieve this goal. Yet Duffey did so partly by working around the NEH’s 
standard processes; for example, through making chairman’s grants to ethnic 
organizations. In this situation, the National Council ended up playing the role that the 
founders had hoped, to a degree: certain members objected and challenged his actions as 
inappropriate. But even Duffey himself was still generally supportive of the principle of 
peer review—”not because it’s the wisest way to make judgments, but because it’s the 
safest. It’s safer than having the chairman or even members of the National Humanities 
Council sitting around the table as a group of wise men.”68  
Yet the NEH’s structure, with its emphasis on peer review, was originally 
premised on the notion that there was consensus as to what constituted nonpolitical 
expertise in the humanities. But with the rise of the culture war, many scholars and 
intellectuals became polarized into multiculturalist and canonical camps. How the NEH’s 
structure has functioned in that context, one that was wholly unanticipated by the 
agency’s founders, is the subject of the following chapter. 
                                                        
68 Malcolm G. Scully, “‘Fuss’ and Controversy at Humanities Endowment: Some Cultural Questions May 
Never Be Free of Politics,” Chronicle of Higher Education, January 27, 1982, 13.   
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9.0  MAKING GRANTS AMIDST A CULTURE WAR  
At least since the early 1980s, the NEH’s bureaucratic structure has operated in a 
context for which it was not designed. When the agency was founded, Congress 
anticipated that the major conflicts would be between the interests and ideals of 
professional humanists and the desires of elected politicians. Hence, the agency was 
designed so as to empower the chairman (and constrain the chairman, if need be) to 
follow the recommendations of experts in the humanities. But as the culture wars 
escalated, scholars, educators, and intellectuals—those who could claim the mantle of 
expertise—became sharply divided over the content and purpose of the humanities. In 
this new context, the NEH’s bureaucratic structure has enabled chairmen to influence the 
ideological direction of grants. Though the NEH’s formal rules and processes have stayed 
the same, Democratic- and Republican-appointed chairmen have executed those rules and 
processes in different ways to different outcomes.  
In public discourse, Republican appointed chairmen such as Lynne Cheney have 
been accused of “politicizing” the NEH. By this, scholarly critics have meant that such 
chairmen have refused to defer to the staff-run peer-review process; that they have 
abused their power to prevent the NEH from funding projects that panelists rated highly, 
but to which they were ideologically opposed. In their defense, Republican appointees 
and their supporters have claimed that, in fact, they have sought to depoliticize the NEH; 
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to prevent the agency from funding politically tendentious projects and keep it focused on 
work that advances humanistic excellence and presents balanced perspectives. 
Conservatives, in turn, criticized Cheney’s successor, Sheldon Hackney, for taking a 
passive stance toward the grant-making process. They argued that his decision to let the 
staff run the process and not intervene has effectively enabled “politicized” projects to 
get funded.  
To return to the theory of institutional change described in the introduction to Part 
II, the operation of the NEH’s bureaucratic structure since the 1980s represents a case of 
“conversion” under Republicans and a case of “drift” under Democrats. The Republican 
appointees have repurposed aspects of the bureaucratic structure to push the NEH to fund 
work that is less reflective of progressive academic trends. Democratic appointees, in 
contrast, have allowed the agency to function largely as originally designed, but with the 
result that it will fund some kinds of projects and approaches to the humanities that the 
founders would not have expected. When the NEH was founded, it was assumed that the 
humanities were focused largely on Western civilization—and viewed Western 
civilization in generally positive terms. But now that trends such as multiculturalism have 
become ascendant, the Endowment’s processes, if left to run on their own, are more 
likely to result in the funding of such projects.  
This chapter begins with a presentation of an analysis of grants awarded under the 
NEH’s “Fellowships for University Teachers” program. This analysis of what the agency 
has funded at different times suggests that the chairman influences the ideological 
direction of grant-making (multiculturalist versus canonical). There is a likely 
explanation for the fact that grant-making moves in a more progressive and less canonical 
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direction under Democratic administrations: chairmen take a passive approach, allow the 
staff to administer the process, and let the agency reflect mainstream judgment in 
academia. This is what the founders had wanted, even if they had different expectations 
for what would constitute the humanistic mainstream. What calls for more explanation is 
how Republican-appointed chairmen have been able to work within the same rules to 
push grant-making in the opposite direction.  
Following the presentation of the analysis of fellowship grants, this chapter 
identifies various points in the grant-making process in which the chairman of the NEH 
can exercise leverage. These leverage points come into sharp relief when the structure of 
the NEH and the power of its chairman are compared with how the NEA has operated, at 
least in the past. When the NEA was engulfed in controversy in the late 1980s, Congress 
formed an Independent Commission to audit the Endowment for the Arts and assess its 
processes for awarding grants. The Commission found that the NEA’s political 
leadership, and even the career staff to a degree, had been marginalized from the process 
in favor of the expert panels. 
While the NEH was organized under essentially the same statutory language as 
the NEA, the bureaucracy of the former evolved such that the chairman had more 
opportunity to take an active, assertive role in the grant-making process. Since the start of 
the cultural wars, Republican-appointed chairmen have, at times, aggressively taken 
advantage of the prerogatives at their disposal. Though critics find these strategies 
illegitimate, these chairmen have not done anything per se illegal; rather, they took 
advantage of the lack of specifics in the organizing statute in ways that the founders of 
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the agency never anticipated. But then again, neither did the founders of the NEH 
anticipate the sea change that has occurred within the humanities.  
9.1 GRANT-MAKING: FELLOWSHIPS FOR UNIVERSITY TEACHERS   
 As chairmen come and go, the NEH’s underlying grant-making process remains 
largely the same. Professional staff, in interviews, said that irrespective of whoever was 
the chairman, their main task remained the same: to convene panels to evaluate 
applications. Bruce Cole, who served as chairman from 2001 to 2009, has also noted how 
the NEH’s processes have changed little from the time the agency was founded.1 Yet 
while the process stays largely the same and staff turnover can be low, chairmen come in 
with different perspectives on the humanities. Does the NEH’s grant-making reflect these 
perspectives? 
To get at this question, let us consider grants awarded under the NEH’s 
Fellowships for University Teachers program over a 20-year period. If the divisive issues 
in the humanities are going to crop up anywhere, interpretive academic research is as 
likely a place as any. Fellowships, moreover, have been a particular cause for concern for 
Republican-appointed chairmen. Celeste Colgan, who served as deputy chairman under 
Lynne Cheney, said that while she had great admiration for what the NEH was doing in 
many areas, from research to library projects, fellowships “called out for watching.” 
Applications that were questionable, if not “outlandish,” were more likely to come out of 
                                                        
1 Bruce Cole, “What’s Wrong with the Humanities,” Public Discourse, February 1, 2016, 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16248/. 
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the fellowships programs.2 Bruce Cole, in an article he authored years after serving as 
chairman, said that he was disappointed with most of the fellowship applications the 
NEH received: “applicants often viewed their research exclusively through the same 
predictable lens of race, class, gender, theory, or some trivial aspects of popular culture.”3  
 This analysis encompasses 764 grants made in the years 1991-1992 (232), 1994 
(107), 1999-2000 (178), 2002 (84), 2007-2008 (96), and 2010 (67). Those years were 
chosen because they represent different stages in the political lifecycle of the NEH. 1991-
1992, 1999-2000, and 2007-2008 are years after which a Republican or Democratic 
presidency had the opportunity to put its full stamp on the NEH, appointing not only the 
chairman, but all members of the National Council (it takes six years for the full Council 
to be replaced). 1994, 2002, and 2010 all mark the first full year of a new chairman 
appointed by an administration of a different party than the previous one. While the 
chairman has had an opportunity to begin advancing an agenda, two thirds of the NCH 
represent holdovers from the previous administration. As the political leadership has 
changed, there has been consistency in the professional staff. From 1991 through 1994, 
the division that oversaw this particular grant program was headed by Marjorie 
Berlincourt; from 1999 through 2002 it was headed by James Herbert.  
 First, it is worth noting how certain grantee characteristics stayed the same even 
as chairmen have changed. The geographic distribution of grants and the most highly 
represented disciplines change little. California, New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois—
states with many universities, including prestigious ones—are almost always in the top 
five in any given year. In terms of which disciplines receive the most funding, history 
                                                        
2 Celeste Colgan (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, April 29, 2016. 
3 Cole, “What’s Wrong with the Humanities?” 
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projects of one kind or another, such as U.S. history, European history, art history, and so 
on, tend to fare well irrespective of the political party in power.  
Table 8. Distribution of Fellowships for University Teachers Grants by State: States that 
Came in the Top Five4 
  1991-1992 1994 1999-2000 2002 2007-2008 2010 
California X X X X X X 
New York X X X X X X 
Massachusetts X X X X   X 
Illinois X X X     X 
 
Table 9. Distribution of Fellowships for University Teachers Grants by Discipline: 
Disciplines that Came in the Top Five5 
 
  1991-1992 1994 1999-2000 2002 2007-2008 2010 
British Literature X X X X X X 
Art History and Criticism X X   X   X 
European History X X X X X   
Music History and Criticism X X   X X X 
U.S. History X X X   X X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Fellowships for University Teachers Grants can be downloaded at www.neh.gov; calculations by author.  
5 Fellowships for University Teachers Grants can be downloaded at www.neh.gov; calculations by author. 
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Figure 6. Percentage of Fellowships for University Teachers Grants in Support of History 
Projects6 
 
 The ideological direction of grant-making, however, changes with new 
presidential administrations. To ascertain whether there was a shift in this regard, I noted 
if grants were of a canonical or progressive nature. Because most fellowship grants result 
in either a book or journal article, it was possible to glean the substance of most 
sponsored projects. A project was coded as canonical if it dealt with any author or text 
listed in the appendix of Harold Bloom’s The Western Canon: The Books and School of 
the Ages.7 A project was coded as identity-themed if the scholar approached the topic 
through the lens of race, class, or gender or focused on a marginalized population, such as 
indigenous peoples, women, slaves, racial minorities, and so on. This information was 
obtained typically through summaries on Amazon.com and Google Books, book reviews, 
and article abstracts.  
                                                        
6 Fellowships for University Teachers Grants can be downloaded at www.neh.gov; calculations by author. 
 
7 Harold Bloom, “Appendix A-D,” in The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1994), https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/literature/bloom/complete.html#C.  
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It is likely that this analysis undercounts both categories. Bloom’s list omits 
figures that many scholars would consider part of the Western Canon, including Moses 
Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, and 
Immanuel Kant. Some might also view projects about Medieval or Renaissance art or 
history in general as representing a more classical approach to the humanities. Book 
summaries, moreover, may not capture the totality of a scholar’s approach, so some 
projects that had identity or multicultural themes may have been missed. Nevertheless, 
the analysis resulting from this approach still suggests that the ideological direction of 
grant-making changes under Democratic- versus Republican-appointed chairmen.  
Figure 7. Percentage of Fellowships for University Teachers Grants in Support of 
Canonical Versus Identity-Themed Projects8 
 
 According to this analysis, progressive versus canonical projects trend in inverse 
directions. The percentage of identity-themed projects rises under Democratic 
administrations and falls under Republican; the inverse happens in regard to canonical 
projects. The percentage of multiculturalist projects starts at 13 percent in the final years 
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of Lynne Cheney’s chairmanship and rises to 29 percent in the final years of William 
Ferris’s chairmanship. During this same time period, the percentage of projects with a 
canonical focus declines from 19 percent to 10 percent. The identity-themed versus 
canonical trends then proceed in an inverse fashion during the Cole chairmanship, with 
progressive grants falling to 15 percent and canonical projects rising to 15 percent. 
During the first full year of the Leach chairmanship, the percentage of multiculturalist 
projects begins to climb upwards to 21 percent, though, interestingly, so do canonical 
projects, up to 16 percent. As indicated by the changing percentages from 1991-1992 to 
1994 and the change from 1999-2000 to 2002, a significant change in emphasis can occur 
shortly after the installation of a new chairman. Furthermore, recall that these changes 
happened when the Fellowships for University Teachers program was overseen by the 
same career staffers.      
9.2 LEVERAGE POINTS: A COMPARISON WITH THE NEA  
As discussed earlier, the chairman of the NEH has full formal authority when it 
comes to the approval of grants. While the chairman can use panels of experts to evaluate 
applications and must receive the advice of the National Council, he or she is not bound 
by law to accept their recommendations. In practice, though, chairmen rarely go against 
the final set of recommendations that the Council provides. While chairmen do, on 
occasion, approve a grant that the NCH has recommended against or decline a grant that 
the NCH recommended positively, these are rare instances. Lynne Cheney, for example, 
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testified that she accepted the Council’s recommendations on 99.7 percent of all grants.9 
To influence the direction of grants, Republican-appointed chairmen, like Cheney, have 
successfully utilized leverage points within the long advisory phase—before projects 
reach them for final approval or decline. These main leverage points within the NEH’s 
bureaucratic structure, prior to the chairman having to make a final decision, are the 
formation of peer-review panels, the preparation of grant guidelines for prospective 
applicants, and the review of applications by the National Council on the Humanities. 
 These leverage points come into sharp relief when a comparison is made with 
how the NEA has operated, at least in the past. When it was discovered that funds from 
the Arts Endowment had supported exhibitions featuring a photograph of a crucifix in a 
jar of urine and sexually explicit photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe, Congress 
established an Independent Commission to audit the NEA and its process for awarding 
grants. The Commission’s analysis focused much on accountability and expertise, the 
same principles that were at issue in the founding of the Endowments and the NSF. In the 
view of the Commission, while the NEA favored expertise, the agency did not do enough 
to remain accountable to the American people. The NEA’s expert panels had come to 
dominate the grant-making process, with the politically appointed leadership and even the 
career staff insufficiently involved, a situation that the Commission deemed 
unacceptable. According to the Commission, “the original system [of awarding grants] no 
longer works as it once did, for reasons that the NEA’s founders could not have 
foreseen.” The main reason was that the country had become “polarized” on cultural 
                                                        
9 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 6, 102nd Cong., 1st. sess., 1991, 464.  
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issues in a way that America was not in 1965. The Commission said that while the NEA 
had to insist on artistic excellence, the agency also had to “be accountable to all of the 
American people”— including more religiously orthodox people who would find the 
aforementioned works of art offensive.10  
At the time of the audit, the NEA made use of two kinds of expert panels: policy 
panels and grant advisory panels. Both sets of panels were appointed for year-long terms, 
with members’ eligible to serve for up to three years. Policy panels were similar to the 
advisory committees of the divisions within the NSF. Policy panels advised the NEA on 
how it related to specific fields and made recommendations on “priorities, practices, 
guidelines and the allocation of resources for individual programs.” Grant advisory 
panels reviewed and rated applications, not only judging applications on their merits, but 
also recommending the size of grant awards and reconciling grants with the program 
budget.11 
In its audit, the Commission suggested that NEA staff, which had become 
marginalized from decision-making at the expense of the outside panels, may have felt 
that their primary loyalty was to the artistic fields that their programs supported, as 
opposed to the chairman.12 The NEA’s internal structure, with grant program areas 
corresponding to artistic fields, may have encouraged this development. Like the NSF, 
whose divisions correspond to disciplines within the sciences (e.g., Molecular & Cellular 
Biosciences; Environmental Biology; Civil, Mechanical & Manufacturing Innovation; 
Ocean Sciences; Chemistry; Mathematical Sciences; Physics; etc.), the NEA’s programs 
                                                        
10 Independent Commission, A Report to Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts, Submitted by 
the Independent Commission, September 1990, 2-3.  
11 Independent Commission, 26, 30. 
12 Independent Commission, 64, 72. 
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correspond to artistic fields (e.g., Dance, Opera, Literature, Music, Folk & Traditional 
Arts, etc.).  
The National Council on the Arts, which the Commission wanted to see become 
more active, had long been a marginal player in the grant process, mainly providing a 
perfunctory approval of the panels’ recommendations. A decade before the Independent 
Commission’s audit, an investigation by the House Appropriations Committee came to a 
similar finding about the role of the National Council on the Arts. The Appropriations 
Committee’s investigative staff found that the NEA did not provide the Council “with 
sufficient information in a usable form to accomplish its responsibilities” of advising the 
chairman both on policy and on grants. The investigative staff noted that of the three-day 
Council meetings, only two to three hours were dedicated to grant review, with each 
program considered for an average of four and a half minutes. Prior to the meetings, 
Council members received one- or two-sentence summaries of projects recommended by 
the panels. If members had questions about proposed projects, staff answered their 
questions directly; rarely were their questions brought to the full Council’s attention. 
According to the investigative staff, “The Advisory Council relies completely on the 
individual program review panels for grant review, a posture the Investigative Staff 
believes mitigates the Council’s legislated responsibility of project review.”13 
In its response to the investigative staff, the NEA argued that the Council’s lack 
of involvement in grant evaluation was a feature of the grant-making system, not a bug. 
                                                        
13 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 11, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, 869-70 (“A Report to the Committee on 
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on the National Foundation on the Arts and the 
Humanities, Volume I, The National Endowment for the Arts,” Surveys and Investigations Staff, March 
1979). 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, in the early 1970s, both National Councils on the 
Arts and Humanities had favored removing themselves from the grant process, just as the 
National Science Board had done. The NEA, which went in that direction, responded to 
the investigative staff that in the authorizing statute, Congress had listed the Council’s 
responsibilities as advising the Chairman with respect to policy and with respect to 
grants, in that order. The Council decided to dedicate more of its time to policy issues, 
relying on panels to review the merits of individual applications. The Council had 
instituted “application review groups” in 1975, but retired them in 1977 in an effort to 
“streamline the process.” The Council believed that making its role in the grant-review 
process more efficient was important so as to have more time to advise on broader 
Endowment policies. The NEA said of the Appropriations Committee’s findings:  
The report seems to assume that the National Council, meeting for two 
and a half days, four or five times a year, should be intimately familiar with 
18,000 – 20,000 applications which result in 4,500 grants. This is absurd.14  
 
The Independent Commission made several recommendations on how to 
strengthen the authority of the chairman and involve the National Council. To strengthen 
the chairman meant, in part, limiting the role of the panels. The Commission 
recommended that the panels focus primarily on judging the artistic merits of proposals; 
they should no longer determine the size of particular grants or reconcile awards with 
Endowment program budgets. Ideally, panels would recommend more worthy projects 
than the NEA had resources to fund, requiring the chairman to exercise judgment. 
                                                        
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 1980, 961-2 (“Response of the National Endowment for the Arts to the March 22, 1979 
Report of the Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations Committee, April 4, 1979”).  
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Neither should the panels be the primary authors of program guidelines. According to the 
Commission:  
Because guidelines articulate the policies and priorities of the agency, 
their formulation falls within the purview of the Chair. She/he should take the 
responsibility for proposing guidelines for all programs.  
 
The chairman must also take responsibility for the composition of the panels, “[ensuring] 
that the membership of panels represents a variety of aesthetic and philosophical views.” 
The chairman’s term should be coterminous with that of the President, thereby 
strengthening the sense that the person in charge of the Endowment is accountable to the 
President in office who had appointed him. The staff, moreover, should adopt an attitude 
of accountability to the chairman, rather than to their artistic fields.15 
 The Commission’s main recommendation to make the National Council on the 
Arts “more active” in the process was for it to reinstate committees to provide an 
additional tier of review of applications. The Commission believed that because the 
Council represents the arts generally instead of specific fields, it could bring a broader 
perspective to bear than the panels. These Council committees, designed to be 
interdisciplinary in nature, would make their own evaluation of the proposals in select 
Endowment programs. They would then forward to the full Council two sets of 
recommendations, their own and those from the panels.16  
 Though the Commission did not say so explicitly, in making these 
recommendations, it was calling for the NEA to operate less like the NSF, where grant 
decisions were made primarily by the staff in consultation with outside experts, and more 
like the NEH. Particularly under Lynne Cheney, who was chairman when the 
                                                        
15 Independent Commission, 63-8. 
16 Independent Commission, 69-70. 
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Independent Commission did its audit, the principle of “checks and balances”17 was alive 
and well at NEH. 
9.3 CHECKS AND BALANCES AT NEH  
Across the board, the Independent Commission’s recommendations for how the 
NEA should operate—in a manner more accountable to the American people—were 
already in place at the NEH. In fact, in the early 1990s, some scholars argued the NEH’s 
politically-appointed leadership was too powerful and needed to be reined in. The 
National Humanities Alliance, an advocacy group representing scholarly organizations, 
colleges, and universities, proposed making only a third of the members of the National 
Council on the Humanities appointed by the President, so as to limit the influence of the 
chairman over who was named to it (under the Alliance’s plan, the other two thirds would 
have been appointed by Congress). Critics of Cheney also wanted the NEH to 
reemphasize the importance of peer review in grant-making decisions.18 Stanley Katz, 
then president of the American Council of Learned Societies, said, “Regardless of the 
specific actions of this chairman, or any chairman, there is a basic flaw in the legislation: 
It accords the chairman too much unchecked discretionary authority for effective public 
accountability.”19  
                                                        
17 Independent Commission, 63. 
18 Stephen Burd, “With Cheney Gone, Humanities Groups Hope Congress Will Focus on How the NEH 
Can Better Serve Scholars,” Chronicle of Higher Education, January 20, 1993.  
19 Karen J. Winkler, “Humanities Agency Caught in Controversy Over Columbus Grants,” Chronicle of 
Higher Education, March 13, 1991.  
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The main difference between Republican- and Democratic-appointed chairmen, at 
least since the early 1980s, has been that the former have taken advantage of the leverage 
points at their disposal, particularly with respect to the formation of panels and use of the 
National Council on the Humanities as a second layer of review. In so doing, Republicans 
have been accused of “politicizing” the NEH; of disrespecting the agency’s peer review 
process. Yet these chairmen and their defenders have argued that because of trends in the 
humanities, such actions are necessary to keep the NEH from funding projects that are 
politically tendentious. Moreover, Republicans have acted within the letter of the law, 
albeit taking advantage of the statute’s lack of specificity and using various bureaucratic 
features of the agency in ways that the NEH’s founders never anticipated. Democratic 
appointees, in contrast, have managed the agency in a more passive fashion, intervening 
little, if at all, in the grant-making process. Under those chairmanships, the agency has 
been run in a manner closer to the NSF. These differences in management of the 
bureaucratic structure has likely helped account for the changing focus of the NEH’s 
grant-making, at least in some programs. 
9.3.1 The NEH Chairman and the Panels  
 The NEH’s panel system, while at the core of the grant-making process, is less 
autonomous than the system that prevailed at the NEA at the time of the Independent 
Commission’s audit. NEH grant panels traditionally have evaluated proposals only on 
their merits. Whereas NEA panels concerned themselves with reconciling grant awards 
with program budgets, NEH panels have focused solely on the quality of the applications. 
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It has been up to the division staff to make funding recommendations that go to the 
National Council on the Humanities.  
During the panel-review and post-panel-review phase, divisions have long been 
expected to bring potentially controversial applications to the attention of the chairman. 
A draft memorandum from Deputy Chairman Wallace Edgerton to Chairman Ronald 
Berman suggests that the NEH, by the early 1970s, was developing protocols to ensure 
that the chairman had an opportunity to take a closer look at applications that could be 
controversial in advance of Council meetings.20 According to Malcolm Richardson, 
whose career at the NEH stretched from the early 1980s through 2016, the staff look out 
for the chairman and want to make sure that he or she is not “blindsided by 
controversy.”21  
Bruce Cole, when chairman, encouraged the division staff to apply their own 
judgment and expertise when developing recommendations, given that they themselves 
had advanced training and experience in the humanities. While the staff were supposed to 
take the panelists’ recommendations seriously, Cole did not want them to conceive of 
themselves as “clerks,” merely recording the external evaluations and passing them 
along.22 Recall that the Independent Commission had criticized the NEA’s staff 
specifically in this regard.  
The involvement of the chairman’s office in the formation of NEH peer review 
panels has been a controversial issue, particularly during the chairmanship of Lynne 
                                                        
20 Draft memorandum, Wallace B. Edgerton to Ronald Berman, “Grant Review Process,” 1-2, (undated), 
Records of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Office of the Deputy Chairman, Memorandums, 
1966-1973, Box 1, Record Group 288, National Archives at College Park. 
21 Malcolm Richardson (former staffer) interviewed by author, June 20, 2013. 
22 Bruce Cole interviewed by author, April 15, 2016. 
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Cheney. There were allegations that she acted inappropriately by insisting upon including 
more conservative panelists. In 1992, the Chronicle of Higher Education ran a story 
reporting that, according to former agency personnel, Cheney made sure panels included 
at least one person who was a “hostile” critic of non-traditional scholarship. Former staff 
members said that the chairman’s office had started to provide program officers with lists 
of scholars from which they should draw when assembling panels. According to one peer 
reviewer interviewed for the article:  
The last several times I’ve been on a panel, they included this avowed 
right winger, and he walked into the room like he was a member of the NEH staff. 
He reliably represents the radical right in judging projects. And if he puts down 
“very poor,” that’s the end of it.23  
 
Don Gibson, in his memoir, said that staff were upset that Cheney circulated lists of 
preferred panelists, who presumably would recommend against proposed projects so that 
she would not have to deny them on her own.24  
Cheney and her senior staff denied any malfeasance on their part. They countered 
that the volume of proposals, panels, and panelists would have made this kind of 
engineering nearly impossible.25 When Cheney was questioned about the Chronicle story 
by Congressman Sid Yates (D-IL), she said that the extent of her involvement in 
suggesting panelists is that when she is “out on the road” and happens to meet people 
who might be good, she shares their names with staff. The NEH, after all, is always in 
                                                        
23 Stephen Burd, “Chairman of Humanities Fund Has Politicized Grants Process, Critics Charge,” 
Chronicle of Higher Education, April 22, 1992, A32. 
24 Donald G. Gibson, Iowa Sky: A Memoir (Shoulder Friends Press, 2013): 165. 
25 Burd, “Chairman of Humanities Fund Has Politicized Grants Process, Critics Charge,” A32. 
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search of new people to serve on panels. Jerry Martin, who served as deputy chairman, 
said that when the staff form panels, the chairman’s office never overrules their choices.26  
Because information about the formation of specific peer review panels is 
unavailable, it is impossible to say with certainty which side’s claims are closer to the 
truth. Cheney’s critics have even said that proving wrongdoing is hard.27 Another 
possibility, though, is that staffers took it upon themselves to ensure greater ideological 
diversity among panelists, once it was understood that this was what the chairman 
expected. Celeste Colgan, who served as deputy chairman under Lynne Cheney, said 
something to this effect. She said that while the politically-appointed staff had no hard 
agenda, they wanted to support work that would be for the good of civilization and of 
enduring value and significance. When the program officers understood this focus, they 
asked the senior staff for recommendations on panelists.28 Furthermore, it is important to 
remember that the staff’s most urgent task often is simply to form the panels, which, as 
discussed in chapter eight, can be difficult. If the chairman’s office has panelists who are 
willing to serve, the staff may be inclined to use them, even if they may disagree with 
some of their perspectives on the humanities.   
This possibility becomes easier to imagine in light of the sense of accountability 
that the staff have felt toward the chairman’s office. Harold Cannon, a long-time 
                                                        
26 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1993: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Part 9, 102nd Cong. 2d. sess., 1992, 927. 
27 Stanley Katz accused Cheney of “the radical politicization” of the NEH; that she had turned the Council 
into “a narrow organization representing a tiny spectrum of the ideological reality the American intellectual 
community” and “loaded the endowment’s peer review committees with people who rejected individuals’ 
grants on partisan grounds.” However, he acknowledged that such charges “are almost impossible to 
document.” Charles Truehart, “Lynne Cheney to Resign as Humanities Chief,” Washington Post, 
December 2, 1992, Nexis Uni. 
28 Celeste Colgan (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, April 29, 2016. 
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bureaucrat who served as director of Research and Challenge Grant Divisions, as well as 
the Office of Preservation when it first began, would tell his subordinates, “We all work 
for the chairman.”29 Bill Bennett, though an outspoken critic of trends in academia, did 
not encounter stiff resistance from the professional staff during his time as chairman. 
William Kristol, who profiled his leadership strategy, noted that Bennett “has found it 
possible to marshal cooperation and even support from the civil service.” According to 
Kristol, “on the whole Mr. Bennett has found the civil service so ‘governable’ that he has 
brought in only five or six political appointees to join a professional staff of about 250.”30 
Neither does John Agresto, who served as Bennett’s deputy, recall the staff being 
confrontational.31  
The NEH’s divisional structure may have contributed to the professional staff’s 
sense of accountability to the chairman. While the NEA’s grant programs are organized 
by artistic field, the NEH’s divisions are based on project type and welcome applications 
from all humanistic disciplines. Probably because of this, the NEH’s divisions have never 
had field-specific advisory bodies, akin to the advisory panels that have been used by the 
NSF and NEA. Such bodies otherwise constitute an additional layer of bureaucracy 
between the chairman’s office and the professional staff.   
The development of grant program guidelines presents another way in which the 
chairman of the NEH can influence what the Endowment funds, or at the very least, the 
applications that come in. At the NEA, the Independent Commission found that program 
advisory panels developed the guidelines; not so at NEH. Because the chairman of the 
                                                        
29 Harold Cannon interviewed by author, June 27, 2014. 
30 William Kristol, “Can-Do Government,” Policy Review 31 (Winter 1985): 64. 
31 John Agresto (former deputy chairman) interviewed by author, June 23, 2015. 
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NEH develops the guidelines, he or she can encourage applications that pertain to 
particular themes. Even though all applications are evaluated the same way, the 
chairman’s guidelines can affect the pool of proposals from which it will make selections. 
Bill Bennett, for example, had an initiative focused on the 200th anniversary of the U.S. 
Constitution and encouraged applications for “studies covering the range of philosophical 
and historical questions raised by the Constitution and the founding period,” while under 
Sheldon Hackney, divisions encouraged proposals that related to his initiative, “A 
National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity.”32  
Though Congress did not appropriate any special funding for Bennett’s 
bicentennial initiative, NEH still funded projects that fell under this theme, with several 
large grants going to conservative organizations and scholars. Bennett set up an office 
inside NEH to encourage proposals to the various divisions on his theme. Some notable 
grants that were made included: 
 The Claremont Institute, “A New Order of the Ages: The American Constitutional 
Heritage,” $343,689: To support a three year project of annual conferences, a 
lecture series, a speaker’s bureau, local library exhibits and publications designed 
to examine and elucidate the continuing relevance of the political thoughts of the 
American Founding. 
 
 American Enterprise Institute, “A Decade of Study of the Constitution,” 
$249,544: To support a series of three conferences and three books of essays on 
constitutional issues (Robert Goldwin, project leader). 
 
 University of Dallas, “Constitutionalism in America,” $483,113: To support a 
program of scholarly research and public education, including three conferences, 
annual lectures, several public forums and teachers’ institutes, and the publication 
of books and pamphlets. (Thomas West, project director) 
 
                                                        
32 National Endowment for the Humanities, “Guidelines and Application Forms: 1985-86 Fellowships,” 5, 
NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, Grant Programs & Opportunities; National Endowment for 
the Humanities, “1996-1997 NEH Fellowships,” 3, NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, Grant 
Programs & Opportunities. 
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 Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, $150,000: To support a 
two-year series of public conferences and lectures on the constitutional principles 
of separation of powers and economic liberties. The first conference will be held 
in Atlanta, the second in Chicago; the lectures will be held around the country; 
and printed material will be produced.33  
 
Had it not been for the special initiative, it is possible that these organizations may not 
have applied and would not have received funding. It is important to note, however, that 
many other groups that submitted proposals in response to the initiative, which may also 
have been conservative or right-of-center, were turned down. In fact, NCH member Ellis 
Sandoz expressed concern that so many bicentennial related projects were being declined. 
Agresto, who was then assistant chairman, said that the panels had high standards and 
that the NEH sought to honor the bicentennial “by the quality, not the quantity of 
applications funded.”34 Just because a proposal had to do with the U.S. Constitution in no 
way guaranteed funding; it still had to pass the rigors of the NEH’s review system. 
Signals from the chairman’s office can also discourage certain applicants. A 
program officer who served in the Public Programs Division in the 1980s said that some 
people assumed that they would never get funded by Lynne Cheney and did not bother to 
apply.35 Bruce Cole said that more right-of-center scholars felt the same way during 
Sheldon Hackney and Bill Ferris’s terms.36 
                                                        
33 Records of these grants can be found at www.neh.gov.  
34 “Minutes of the Seventy-Fourth Meeting of the National Council on the Humanities,” November 7-9, 
1984, 27, NEH Digital Repository, Public Reading Room, National Council on the Humanities.  
35 Glenn Marcus (former program officer) interviewed by author, August 7, 2014. 
36 Bruce Cole interviewed by author, April 15, 2016. 
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9.3.2 National Council on the Humanities: Flagging Proposals and Stacking 
Committees  
When Congress designed the NEH, it intended for the National Council on the 
Humanities to empower the chairman to follow the recommendations of the peer 
reviewers and constrain him in the event that he pursued a questionable direction in 
grant-making. The NCH began as a blue-ribbon group, broadly representative of 
humanistic disciplines and covering various constituencies, similar to the National 
Science Board. The makeup of the NCH was to instill both professional humanists and 
the general public with confidence in the agency. Yet in the context of the culture war, 
under Republican administrations, the NCH has taken on a different function. Rather than 
empower the chairman to follow the advice of peer reviewers and resist more run-of-the-
mill “political” pressures, the NCH has empowered Republican chairmen to decline 
proposals that they think are politically tendentious or frivolous, even when the peer 
reviewers have graded them highly. A negative recommendation by the NCH can provide 
cover for the chairman, saving him or her from having to be the one to decline a project 
that panelists had rated highly and the staff recommended. 
To repurpose the NCH, Republican-appointed chairmen have done three things: 
ensure that its membership includes eminent conservative humanists; stack certain 
Council committees with Republican appointees; and flag proposals for the NCH to give 
special scrutiny. Democrats and progressive scholars have criticized these tactics as 
politicizing the Endowment; for inappropriately interfering with the staff-run peer-review 
process. Yet none of these tactics are, per se, illegal. The statute says nothing about 
Council committees or about flagging. To recall Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
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institutional change, this is an instance in which agents are taking advantage of the gaps 
or ambiguity between the wording of the statute and how it is to be enforced.  
When it was President Reagan’s turn to nominate his first batch of Council 
members, his appointments were not geared toward bringing the NCH back to the kind of 
composition it had in the late 1960s. But unlike Presidents Nixon and Ford, neither he did 
load the Council with Republican businessmen. Beginning in 1982, many Republican 
nominees have been among the most prestigious humanities scholars in the nation who 
lean conservative in some way.37 Of the first 21 members appointed by President Reagan, 
six of them were professors of political philosophy, several of with connections to the 
“Straussian” school: William Allen, Walter Berns, George Carey, David Lowenthal, Ellis 
Sandoz, and Fr. James V. Schall, S.J. Other scholars of that early group included 
historian Gertrude Himmelfarb (also the wife of Irving Kristol) and bioethicist Leon 
Kass.38  
During the chairmanship of Lynne Cheney, who was of a more populist bent than 
Bill Bennett, a larger number of non-academics received appointments to the Council, 
drawing criticism from scholarly groups.39 But even then, the Council always had a core 
group of prestigious conservative academics. Scholars appointed during the Cheney years 
included Paul Cantor, Bruce Cole, Hillel Fradkin, Donald Kagan, Alan Kors, Harvey 
Mansfield, Gary McDowell, and Condoleezza Rice.40 Not only were such members more 
                                                        
37 A former Council member who was appointed by President George W. Bush said that it is much easier 
for conservative scholars to be appointed to the NCH, namely because there are so few of them in the 
humanities. Former council member interviewed by author. 
38 Members of the National Council on the Humanities can be found in NEH annual reports.  
39 Christopher Myers, “2 Scholarly Organizations Say Humanities Endowment Council Hasn’t Enough 
Academics; Chairman Calls Complaints ‘Elitist,’” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 10, 1991, A19, 
A22.  
40 When Mansfield was appointed, he said, “I’m going to adopt a West Point approach and sound the guns 
against those in the humanities who want to destroy the greatness of our intellectual past.” Karen J. 
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inclined toward an appreciation of canonical works, but they were also accomplished 
scholars. According to a former Council member, they were the kinds of people who 
could really “pick apart a proposal” and sometimes had to “set the staff right.”41 Some 
scholars, though, criticized President George H. W. Bush’s appointments, arguing that 
they were not in accordance with the Endowment’s authorizing legislation, which said 
that members should “provide a comprehensive representation of the views of scholars 
and professional practitioners in the humanities.” These critics, who were supportive of 
feminism, multiculturalism, and deconstruction, objected to the “one-sided nature of 
recent appointments and nominations.”42 
The main leverage point where members of the NCH can influence the grant-
making process are the Council committee meetings. These take place on Thursday, on 
the first day of the Council’s two-day sessions. The full Council, which convenes on 
Friday, generally ratifies what the committees have recommended. Most Council 
members have only given serious thought to the grants reviewed by their respective 
committees. In addition, while the full Council will occasionally discuss specific 
applications that might be controversial for one reason or another, the timing of the 
plenary meeting—Friday morning—does not encourage extensive deliberation. One 
former member noted that members are often checking their watches during the session, 
concerned about catching their afternoon flights out of Washington. Another former 
member said that as the Council works through its agenda, if a member brings up too 
                                                        
Winkler, “A Conservative Plans to ‘Sound the Guns’ at NEH,” Chronicle of Higher Education, October 16, 
1991, A5.    
41 Former National Council on the Humanities member interviewed by author. 
42 “Washington Update,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 15, 1992, A30; see also, Scott Heller, “2 
New Groups Hope to Organize the Academic Left Against Conservative Scholars and the NEH,” Chronicle 
of Higher Education, April 22, 1992, A15-A16.  
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many items for discussion, it feels like the student who asks one too many questions in 
class. Further, the NEH has stopped serving lunch following the meeting, which may 
provide even another disincentive for the members to have drawn-out discussions.43 
Thus, the NCH subcommittee meeting are the main opportunity for Council members 
either to advance a proposal that the staff and panelists recommend against or 
recommend against a proposal that the staff had favored.  
Republican-appointed chairmen have pressed their advantage at this stage of the 
process by stacking certain committees with conservative members, particularly when the 
partisan composition of the Council has been in transition. Because the members’ terms 
are staggered, roughly a third of the Council is replaced every two years, meaning it takes 
six years to renew the entire body. According to Mary Beth Norton, a Carter appointee to 
the NCH who served until 1984, therefore overlapping with part of Bennett’s tenure, 
“Bennett accordingly concentrated the first Reagan Council appointees on the two 
committees he especially wanted to control: Fellowships and General Programs.”44 In 
2004, during Bruce Cole’s first term as chairman, the Chronicle of Higher Education 
reported that Clinton appointees were being concentrated on the committee overseeing 
the federal-state partnership, which awards grants for the state humanities councils. 
Though this Council committee provides recommendations to the state councils, the 
grants go through as a matter of course. One Clinton appointee, Evelyn Edson, described 
the federal-state committee as “essentially a committee to be powerless.”45 Lynne 
Cheney, in contrast, was not accused of stacking committees. Because she became 
                                                        
43 Former National Council on the Humanities members interviewed by author. 
44 Mary Beth Norton, “Bill Bennett’s NEH,” Scholar and Educator 10, no. 6 (1986): 7-8. 
45 Anne Marie Borrego, “Humanities Endowment Returns to ‘Flagging’ Nontraditional Projects,” 
Chronicle of Higher Education, January 16, 2004.   
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chairman in 1986, she enjoyed a Council that had nothing but Republican appointees. 
Malcolm Richardson said that under Lynne Cheney, the NCH, “with a few exceptions, 
resembled nothing more than an Eastern European parliament in pre-glasnost days. They 
voted the party line.”46   
NEH records bear out the claims that Republican-appointed chairmen have, in 
fact, concentrated Republican-appointed Council members on certain committees. When 
Bill Bennett became chairman, he did not do this immediately. From the July 1982 
through November 1983 meetings (six in total), Bennett distributed the first nine 
Republican-appointed Council members across the committees. The committees for 
Education and State Programs, Fellowships, and Research and Policy generally had a 
composition of two Republicans and four Democrats.47 General programs, which 
oversaw public-facing humanities programs such as media, museum, and library grants, 
tended to have at least three Republicans. For the first four meetings, the ratio on the 
General Programs committee was three Republicans to three Democrats; the next two 
meetings the ratio was four to three; and the next two meetings the ratio was three to 
three. Bennett began stacking certain committees with holdover Democratic appointees 
and others with Republican appointees beginning in the February 1984 meeting. For that 
meeting and the next seven, the composition of the Education committee was four 
Democrats to one Republican. Not coincidentally, Bennett had undertaken a significant 
reform of the Education Division, redesigning its grant categories to encourage deeper 
                                                        
46 Stephen Burd, “Conservatives on NEH Advisory Board Charge Hackney Had Political Motives in 
Personnel Move,” Chronicle of Higher Education, December 1, 1993, A29. 
47 “Republican” or “Democrat” refers to the president who appointed them, not the Council members’ 
actual voter registration. Bill Bennett, after all, was himself a registered Democrat when appointed 
chairman of the NEH.    
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study of core texts in the humanities. Challenge grants was the other committee that had a 
Democratic majority, three to two. Beginning in August of 1984, the other committees—
Fellowships, General Programs, Research, and State Councils—had four to one 
Republican majorities.48  
Bruce Cole began stacking Council committees early on. For the July 2002 
meeting, after President Bush had nominated a new class of Council members, Cole 
concentrated Democratic members on the Federal-State committee (four Democrats, zero 
Republicans) and Preservation committee (three Democrats, one Republican). The 
Education, Public Programs, and Research committees, by contrast, all were majority 
Republican; respectively, three to two, three to one, and three to one. For the next two 
years, while the Council was still fairly mixed, Cole continued to place several 
Democrats on the Federal-State committee. Out of eight meetings between July 2002 and 
May 2004, only once did Republicans constitute a majority on that committee; four times 
there was an equal number. The Research committee, by contrast, always had a solid 
Republican majority; twice it was wholly Republican.49 
Democratic chairmen, in contrast, have not handled committee assignments in this 
fashion. Under Sheldon Hackney, the partisan divide of all of the committees reflected 
the overall composition of the Council. After President Clinton had the opportunity to 
appoint a slate of Council members, for the next six meetings, the holdover Republicans 
constituted majorities on each and every committee, typically three to two. It was not 
until the November 1996 meeting that a Council committee had a majority of Democrat-
appointed members: Preservation and Challenge grants had a four to three Democratic 
                                                        
48 “National Council on the Humanities Committee Assignments” (provided to author by NEH).  
49 “National Council on the Humanities Committee Assignments” (provided to author by NEH). 
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majority. The other two committees that meeting had a Republican majority and a tie. Jim 
Leach also maintained balanced committees during his chairmanship.50   
Republican-appointed chairmen have taken further advantage of the NCH through 
a practice known as “flagging.” During the Thursday committee meetings, Council 
members spend most of their time discussing projects that have been flagged prior to the 
meeting. Only when a project has been flagged prior to the in-person meeting do the 
Council members receive the actual full proposals to review. If there are no or few 
flagged proposals, the Thursday committee meetings can be short. Flags may come from 
Council members themselves, the division staff, or the chairman’s office. The extent to 
which Council members flag proposals depends on the individual. One former member 
said that it seemed as though members who were retired, and with more time on their 
hands, were more likely to flag than those who were not.51 A division director explained 
that one member of his Council committee always flagged a few projects, believing that 
it was his responsibility to look at the details of at least some proposals.52 Another former 
Council member said that because he took his role seriously, he often flagged proposals 
(and followed by saying that his service on the Council was typical of academics putting 
no value on their time).53 Division staff flag proposals for Council committee review 
usually in cases in which they disagree with the panelists’ recommendations, if the 
division staff would appreciate more input, or to bring something potentially 
controversial to chairman’s attention.54  
                                                        
50 “National Council on the Humanities Committee Assignments” (provided to author by NEH). 
51 Former National Council on the Humanities member interviewed by author. 
52 Former NEH division director interviewed by author.  
53 Former National Council on the Humanities member interviewed by author. 
54 Former staffers interviewed by author. 
 292  
Flagging that originates in the chairman’s office has been far more controversial 
and has been done primarily by Republican chairmen. According to a former Council 
member who served during the Cole years, it was easy to tell the difference between 
proposals that had been flagged by the division staff versus the chairman’s office.55 In 
2004, the Chronicle of Higher Education reported on the rise of flagging under Chairman 
Cole and suggested that much of it was politically or ideologically driven. Pedro Castillo, 
a professor of history at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a Council member 
who had been appointed by President Clinton, was interviewed for the piece. According 
to Castillo, “My sense is that if it’s something that’s not traditional—having to do with 
gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, or the Middle East—it gets red-flagged.” The Chronicle 
also reported that some flagged proposals that peer reviewers had rated highly were 
rejected, while others with lower marks were funded. Chairman Cole and deputy 
chairman Lynne Munson told the Chronicle that they flagged proposals for review out of 
a concern for quality, not ideology.56 Munson, when interviewed for this dissertation, 
defended flagging, explaining that unless a proposal was flagged, the Council would not 
review it. Recall that prior to the Council meetings, NCH members receive one-to-two 
page write-ups of the projects that the staff recommend and list of all those that they 
recommended be declined. Unless proposals are flagged, the Council members have little 
to do.57 
Democratic-appointed chairmen, in contrast, have been reluctant, even resistant, 
to flagging. This is because they are generally more comfortable with the work of the 
                                                        
55 Former National Council on the Humanities member interviewed by author. 
56 Anne Marie Borrego, “Humanities Endowment Returns to ‘Flagging’ Nontraditional Projects.” 
57 Lynne Munson interviewed by author, March 25, 2015.  
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staff and confident in the recommendations of the peer reviewers. Bill Ferris, who seldom 
flagged proposals, said that because the peer-review process is so rigorous, flagging by 
the chairman should not be necessary. He bases this perspective partly on his own 
experience as a former NEH grantee. Getting a grant from the NEH is not easy. The staff, 
in his experience, insist on quality and make applicants work hard. Ferris spoke of his 
personal experience as an applicant to the NE; of having his own applications turned 
down, but eventually receiving funding after he had worked with the staff to improve his 
proposals. Furthermore, as chairman, he saw it as part of his duty to avoid even the 
perception of impropriety. He stressed that “it would have been wrong” to have 
intervened in the process and said that he bent over backwards to draw a clear line 
between his role as chairman and the work of the staff. He said he related to the divisions 
by blessing the peer-review process.58 Jim Leach said that with respect to flagging, he 
was “vastly closer” to Bill Ferris than Bruce Cole.59 Leach spoke of his great respect for 
America’s academic community and said that, as chairman, one of his priorities was to 
protect the peer-review process as it existed. Sheldon Hackney, who made headlines in 
the Chronicle for his decision to diminish the use of flagging, said that his approach 
stemmed from his desire to work collaboratively with the staff. He explained that if he 
were to question the staff’s judgment through flagging, “it would undermine our ability to 
work together closely.” Moreover, “I want them to think of themselves as part of a single 
enterprise that includes the chairman.”60 
                                                        
58 William R. Ferris interviewed by author, April 29, 2016.  
59 James Leach interviewed by author, May 25, 2016. 
60 Stephen Burd, “New Chairman of Humanities Endowment Curtails Practice of ‘Flagging’ Potentially 
Controversial Grant Applications,” Chronicle of Higher Education, March 2, 1994, A24.  
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Hackney’s decision to limit the use of flagging by the chairman’s office was 
praised by scholars, NEH officials, and humanities lobbyists as depoliticizing the agency, 
while criticized by conservatives for making it easier for politicized and lesser-quality 
work to receive funding. Among Hackney’s critics was none other than Bruce Cole, who 
in 1994 was a member of the National Council on the Humanities. Cole said, “By 
refusing to flag applications for review by the national council, Sheldon Hackney has, I 
believe, abrogated one of his most important oversight responsibilities as chairman.”61 A 
decade later, when flagging returned under Cole’s chairmanship, Stanley Katz, a former 
president of ACLS, spoke of his reservations with the practice in general, saying, “I think 
that on the whole, flagging is a bad idea, and it is always subject to abuse.” He also said, 
“Certainly in the past, I am convinced that it was used for very bad reasons.”62  
Flagging by the chairman’s office has the potential to influence which projects the 
Council members review closely, if only because it saves them the trouble of having to 
flag for themselves. Edward Delattre and John Searle, both Republican appointees to the 
NCH, protested Hackney’s policy of not flagging, saying that the Council should be 
consulted on grants.63 Mary Beth Norton, quoted above, responded to Searle and Delattre 
in a letter to the editor of the Chronicle of Higher Education. In her letter, she spoke of 
her time on the Council, when she would arrive in D.C. ahead of Council meetings and 
ask staff to pull proposals. (In an interview for this dissertation, Norton said that, in 
advance of Council meetings, NEH staff would place bets amongst themselves on the 
                                                        
61 Stephen Burd, “New Chairman of Humanities Endowment Curtails Practice of ‘Flagging’ Potentially 
Controversial Grant Applications.” 
62 Anne Marie Borrego, “Humanities Endowment Returns to ‘Flagging’ Nontraditional Projects.” 
63 Stephen Burd, “Conservatives on NEH Advisory Board Charge Hackney Had Political Motives in 
Personnel Move.”  
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proposals with which she would disagree with their assessments.) She concluded her 
letter with the following advice to Delattre and other Council members: “Do thy 
homework.”64 In other words, if they were serious about their responsibilities, they would 
not have to rely on the chairman’s office to flag. 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
 During her confirmation hearing in 1986, Senator Pell asked Cheney about 
allegations that the NEH’s internal processes had been politicized under Bill Bennett. 
Cheney, in response, said:  
I am aware that that kind of charge has surfaced in the past. As I have 
looked at the Endowment as an outsider and looked at the peer review system, 
though, it seems to me it would be an incredibly difficult system to politicize, 
even if one should be so motivated.65  
 
But despite the complexity of the NEH’s grant-making system—or perhaps 
because of its complexity—Republicans have found opportunities to favor the funding of 
more classical, traditional, or canonical humanities projects and discourage more identity-
themed ones. In so doing, they have not done anything illegal or in violation of the formal 
rules, which have stayed the same. Rather, Republican appointees have found ways to 
repurpose them in order to keep the NEH from funding projects that, in their view, 
advance leftist political agendas, as opposed to humanistic excellence. Again, how one 
                                                        
64 Mary Beth Norton, Letter to the editor, “A Historical Perspective on the Humanities Endowment,” 
Chronicle of Higher Education, January 19, 1994. 
65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Nomination: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources on Lynne Vincent Cheney, of Wyoming, to be Chairperson of 
the National Endowment for the Humanities, 99th Cong., 2d. sess., 1986, 28. 
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evaluates their actions will likely depend on how one appraises intellectual trends in the 
humanities. If one is supportive of trends such as multiculturalism, then the assertiveness 
vis-à-vis the peer-review process will appear illegitimate. But to those who oppose such 
trends, Democratic appointees’ passivity is deserving of censure, as it will likely allow 
tendentious projects to receive funding.
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CONCLUSION 
“The politics of culture refers to the contestation of power over cultural issues. This 
would include the mobilization of parties and rank-and-file support, the organization of 
leadership, the formation of special-interest coalitions, and the manipulation of public 
rhetoric on matters reflecting the symbols or ideals at the heart of a group’s collective 
identity…Though culture is implicated at every level, the politics of culture is primarily 
about politics.”1 
 
The NEH was founded with the loftiest of goals: to foster and nurture wisdom, 
vision, and high culture in America. This policy history has examined how the mundane 
aspects of American politics—from party positioning to the demands of constituency 
building to the details of bureaucratic structure—have affected the pursuit of that 
mission. Founded at a time of consensus about the substance of the humanities and their 
importance to American life, the NEH as had to cope with the breakdown of that 
consensus over the past 50 years.  
In this conclusion, I note a few potential directions for future research. This 
dissertation made use of several theoretical models to explain how the politics of the 
agency have developed over time. I will suggest how findings from this dissertation 
might help reinforce and refine these theories.  
Beyond this, I will offer a few reflections on what we might expect from the NEH 
in its current political context. In terms of organizational maintenance, thanks to the state 
                                                        
1 James Davison Hunter, “Liberal Democracy and the Unraveling of the Enlightenment Project,” The 
Hedgehog Review 19, no. 3 (Fall 2017), http://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_2017_Fall_Hunter.php.  
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humanities councils and the NEH’s strategic direction of funds to favored constituencies, 
the agency has become quite durable, even as leading Republican politicians continue to 
call for its termination. Because the politics of the NEH have become “primarily about 
politics,” the agency has, in effect, elided the controversies that have become so intense 
within the humanities. In regard to making grants that bear on contested approaches in 
the humanities, the agency’s bureaucratic structure and processes have allowed for 
something of a compromise between orthodox and progressive camps. Because the 
chairman has the ability to push the substance of grants in either direction, when a new 
political party wins the presidency, the other side then gets a turn. Even as both sides 
have reasons to dislike the current bureaucratic structure, especially when controlled by 
their opponents, it is difficult to conceive of reforms that both sides would find 
acceptable.  
POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The main purpose of this dissertation was to understand the NEH. The theoretical 
models discussed in this dissertation were in service to that end. Yet for scholars seeking 
to develop those theories further, this research on NEH could help reinforce and possibly 
even refine those models—party position change and gradual institutional change, in 
particular.  
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Party Position Change and the Nature of Party Ideology  
David Karol argues, “reliance on ideology among politicians as an explanation for 
party position change is problematic. It can explain too much.” He contends that the 
makeup of a party’s coalition drives what becomes the “conservative” or “liberal” 
position on an issue.2 The NEH presents a clear case of how this can happen, especially 
on the Republican side. The GOP did not come to embrace the idea of terminating the 
NEH because that was the “conservative” position. Rather, termination became the 
“conservative” position because that was what an important Republican constituency—
the Religious Right—demanded.   
Consider that over the span of 20 years, from 1976 to 1996, the GOP Platform 
went from calling for an increase in federal funding for the NEA and NEH to advocating 
for the termination of both Endowments. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
“conservative” position, found among intellectuals and some Republican politicians, was 
to insist on “excellence” and “merit.” This perspective aligned with the critique of mass 
culture and concerns about the fate of high culture that both liberal and conservative 
intellectuals put forward in the 1960s around the time of the founding of the NEH. It was 
understood that high culture was important to edify American life and that the federal 
government could encourage it. Michael Joyce’s critique of the NEH, published in the 
Heritage Foundation’s 1980 Mandate for Leadership, reflects a confidence that the 
agency could serve the noble ends for which it was established, provided it prioritized 
                                                        
2 David Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009): 15.  
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research and adhered to the use of peer review over favoring applicants from certain 
constituent groups. 
Yet in the end, there was simply no constituency for this vision for the agency. 
Even as there were occasional “conservative” defenses of the NEH and recommendations 
on how the agency could better advance high culture, they were nonstarters within the 
Republican Party. Even conservative intellectuals such as Irving Kristol and George Will, 
who appreciated and understood the importance of high culture—and who once wrote 
favorably about governmental efforts to advance it—came to favor shuttering the cultural 
agencies. Neither Will nor William Bennett and Lynne Cheney, who testified in favor of 
abolishment, sought to offer a vision for how NEH might still address what had 
previously been viewed as a serious problem: the maintenance of high culture in a 
commercial society. Instead, they embraced the populist opposition to the idea of federal 
funding for culture pushed for by the Religious Right, a Republican constituency of 
increasing importance.      
This turn of events reinforces Karol’s argument about how constituency shapes 
ideology, as well as his view about the limited role of intellectuals in driving position 
change.3 For scholars interested in developing further insights into the relation between 
elite ideas, intellectuals, ideology, and party position, the history of the NEH provides a 
rich case for inclusion in a broader study.  
                                                        
3 Karol, 188. 
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Gradual Institutional Change  
 Mahoney and Thelen, after developing their model of institutional change, invite 
other scholars to apply it to new cases and assess it empirically.4 Part II does just that, 
applying the concepts of conversion and drift to the NEH. But there is more empirical 
work that can be done regarding the NSF, NEA, and NEH to test and possibly refine their 
model. These three federal foundations began with a similar goal—to have the 
government fund projects on the basis of relevant expertise. They were all founded, 
moreover, at a time when the United States had achieved a high degree of national unity; 
the era in which the “vital center” reigned supreme. 
 Part II argued that the NEH had evolved in such a way that the chairman had the 
opportunity, much more so than at the NSF and NEA, to influence the direction of grant-
making, even as the formal rules remained constant between presidential administrations. 
Republican appointees have taken advantage of various leverage points in the process, 
repurposing features of the agency to push grant-making in a more conservative and less 
multiculturalist direction—a case of conversion. Democratic appointees, in contrast, have 
allowed the agency’s processes to operate as designed and, as a result, fund work that 
reflects mainstream academic trends. Though the founders had intended the agency to 
fund mainstream academic work, what has since become the mainstream in the 
humanities is different than what the founders assumed, arguably making for a case of 
drift.  
                                                        
4 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, eds. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 32. 
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The comparative qualitative analysis of the three federal foundations in Part II 
suggests that the chairman of the NEH has been more empowered relative to his 
counterparts at the NEA and NSF. Yet a more in-depth comparison of how these 
institutions evolved and have implemented the directives found in their authorizing 
statutes could provide greater insight into institutional change. Moreover, it is possible 
that an empirical analysis of grant-making at NEA and NSF, similar to the analysis of the 
Fellowships for University Teachers program (chapter 9), could suggest that political 
leadership may influence the substance of grants at those agencies, too.   
 The chairmanship of Dana Gioia, who led the NEA from 2003 to 2008, might 
provide a fascinating case study in this regard. In an interview with a former NEH 
bureaucrat, I was told that Gioia effectively transformed NEA into an operating foundation. 
Under his leadership, NEA launched major national initiatives such as Shakespeare in 
American Communities, Jazz Masters, and American Masterpieces, in which local 
organizations applied to participate. Gioia’s leadership resulted in the sponsorship of 
projects that were widely praised, including by conservative intellectuals.5 This approach 
differed markedly from the tactics pursued by Republican-appointed chairmen at the NEH. 
It is possible that the limits on the chairman of NEA over the agency’s grant programs may 
have favored this approach. Mahoney and Thelen’s model of “layering,” in which new 
rules are introduced “on top of or alongside existing ones,” may aptly characterize what 
happened at the NEA during the George W. Bush presidency.6 But it would take a sustained 
analysis to ascertain whether and to what extent this was the case.  
                                                        
5 Mark Bauerlein and Ellen Grantham, eds., National Endowment for the Arts: A History, 1965-2008 
(Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Arts, 2009), 149-162. 
6 Mahoney and Thelin, 15-17.  
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WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE NEH  
The refusal of the Republican House of Representatives in 2017 to vote to abolish 
the NEA and NEH, even when, for the first time, a Republican president proposed doing 
so, suggests that the cultural agencies have become durable institutions. Yet the agency’s 
organizational maintenance is no longer based on a consensus about advancing a vision 
of cultural and spiritual uplift—nor has it been about that for quite some time. Though the 
importance of nurturing high culture was an idea that gained elite and popular support in 
the mid-1960s, it has since lacked a meaningful constituency and never acquired one. The 
organizational maintenance of the NEH has come to depend primarily on the influence of 
the state humanities councils, the reputation of the chairman, and the perception that 
NEH is serving particular communities such as Native Americans. When it comes to 
articulating a broader significance of the humanities, politicians seem to have coalesced 
around the notion of “heritage,” a term that is sufficiently vacuous to be inoffensive, as 
well as aligns with efforts to celebrate local and ethnic culture.   
As NEH persists, its budget will likely remain far below what it was in the late 
1970s—just before the culture wars began to escalate. Given the group compositions of 
the Democratic and Republican Parties, neither has a strong incentive to fight for greater 
funding for the NEA and NEH. The agency’s budget grew the fastest in the early-to-mid 
1970s. At the time, federal funding for culture was a “groupless” issue, and President 
Nixon backed the idea to burnish the GOP’s image, or at the very least, his own. But 
today, given the importance of rural, southern, and Evangelical Americans to the GOP’s 
coalition, it is harder to imagine that a Republican president would be inclined to 
champion the NEA and NEH. It is not inconceivable that the budget could grow 
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significantly, but this is most likely to come about because a president happens to think 
that the humanities are very important or makes the NEH part of a broader initiative that 
is not simply about the humanities. Recall, for example, that President George W. Bush 
helped increase the NEH’s budget as part of a broader effort to promote civic education 
in response to 9-11. Democrats, beginning in the late 1970s, have often seemed more 
concerned with ensuring that a larger, more equitable portion of grants goes to their 
constituent groups such as women, labor unions, and racial and ethnic minorities, rather 
than expand the agency’s budget overall.  
 Of the NEH’s tiny budget, it is not inconceivable that a greater portion will be 
passed through to the state humanities councils. Because of the local programming that 
they sponsor and the placement of local influencers on their boards, they have become a 
dominant clientele. Now that the relationship is conceived as one of “partnership,” it is 
easy to imagine that the councils will gradually push for as much as half of the agency’s 
funding, especially if the overall budget remains flat or is reduced.  
 Within the interpretative work that NEH still funds, the ideological emphasis of 
grant-making will likely continue to seesaw between more conservative and mainstream 
academic trends, depending on whether the chairman is a Republican or a Democratic 
appointee. When Democratic appointees are in office, they will most likely manage the 
agency in a passive manner, rubberstamping what the staff-run grant-making process 
churns out. Republicans, in contrast, will likely be more vigilant in ferreting out 
applications that they deem tendentious, using the various leverage points at their 
disposal, including the proximity of the chairman to the division staff, grant guidelines to 
encourage certain kinds of applicants, and the National Council on the Humanities as a 
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second layer of review. It should be noted, however, that at least one conservative public 
intellectual has questioned President Trump’s choice of John Parrish Peede to lead the 
agency, given his invocation of the importance of “inclusion” and of “breaking down 
barriers of race, of gender, of class,” all progressive watchwords.7 Yet as of the writing of 
this dissertation, it is too early to assess the effects of his leadership on the NEH. 
 Partisans on both sides of the culture war may find this situation untenable, 
especially when the opposing political party is in power. Progressives will decry 
conservative chairmen for politicizing the NEH; conservatives will decry when 
progressive chairmen allow funding for projects that appear politically biased, frivolous, 
or anti-American. However, the status quo may be the best for which either side can 
hope.  
It is difficult to conceive of administrative reforms that both sides would find 
acceptable and that would be guaranteed to serve either side’s objectives over the long 
term. For example, recall that toward the end of Lynne Cheney’s tenure, the National 
Humanities Alliance called for limiting the power of the chairman by having only a third 
of the National Council’s members be appointed by the President and the rest chosen by 
Congress. In that moment, such a change may have limited Cheney, but the 
recommendation also reflected the politics of the time. In the early 1990s, Republicans 
had won the presidency in five of the previous six elections, while Democrats always 
controlled at least the House of Representatives. Since then, the political dynamics have 
been reversed, with Democrats winning the presidency more than Republicans, but 
                                                        
7 John Parrish Peede, “The Humanities in Relationship” (2017 National Humanities Conference, Boston, 
MA, November 4, 2017), https://www.neh.gov/about/chairman/speeches/the-humanities-in-relationship, 
quoted in Heather Mac Donald, “A Defender of the Humanities,” City Journal, January 12, 2018, 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/defender-humanities-15670.html.  
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Republicans more often controlling Congress. Had the Alliance’s plan gone into effect, 
for much of the Clinton and Obama administrations, the chairmen they appointed would 
have had to deal with Council members chosen partly by the Republican-controlled 
Congress. This reform would potentially have led to a confrontational situation between 
the chairman and the Council. The fact that the chairman can have Council members that 
are in line with his or her agenda may serve to help the NEH run more efficiently and less 
likely to have internal disputes.   
As per the quotation from James Davison Hunter above, the politics of culture are 
mostly about politics. The sometimes bitter controversies over the nature and content of 
the humanities—defenders of Great Books versus defenders of multiculturalism—have 
had, to be sure, a bearing on the politics of the agency—particularly on the reputations of 
the chairmen who have led it. But at the same time, the controversies over the humanities 
themselves have, more often than not, been of marginal importance to the functioning 
and maintenance of the agency. This is partly because the NEH was designed not as a 
ministry of culture dedicated to an explicitly defined notion of art, literature, and 
scholarship, but more as a bureaucratic mechanism for distributing federal funds based on 
the recommendations of people outside of government. Though the founders of the 
agency had assumptions about what the humanities were and what such a federal 
foundation would likely sponsor, the actual institution they established was oriented more 
around processes than substantive notions of the humanities.  
The agency and its professional staff embraced this understanding of the NEH 
from the get-go. With the understanding that “we make grants,” the staff has focused on 
keeping the internal processes moving—receiving applications (often far more than the 
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agency can fund), assembling panels of outside reviewers, convening them in 
Washington, preparing recommendations for the National Council on the Humanities, 
having the Council meet in Washington, and then, once the chairman makes decisions, 
continue with the process anew. Even when conservative, Republican-appointed 
chairmen have sought to steer the NEH away from funding progressive scholarship and 
programs, their actions have been subtle. This is not to say that their actions are 
inconsequential; as chapter nine argues, they are not. But chairmen such as William 
Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and Bruce Cole have still had to work within a set of formal 
rules that remain the same.  
In conclusion, the politics of the NEH have reached a new equilibrium. 
Conflicting visions of cultural uplift are no longer central to the debate, nor are concerns 
about “elitism” or “populism” in grant-making. Politicians are focused far more on who 
gets funding, regardless of what it is spent on, with an inclination to pass greater portions 
of the budget to their local constituents through the state councils. Meanwhile, the 
progressive or orthodox thrust of grant-making will likely shift when the administration 
changes parties, and then back again once a new administration comes in. Some lovers of 
the humanities may be disappointed by the declining importance of the substance of the 
humanities in the politics of the humanities. But in the absence of a cultural consensus, 
perhaps the NEH, in its present form, is the most that a culturally divided democracy can 
expect of a cultural agency.  
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